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ABSTRACT 
THE SEARCH FOR A COMMUNIST LEGITIMACY: TITO’S YUGOSLAVIA 
ROBERT EDWARD NIEBUHR 
Supervised by Larry Wolff 
Titoist Yugoslavia—the multiethnic state rising out of the chaos of World War 
II—is a particularly interesting setting to examine the integrity of the modern nation-state 
and, more specifically, the viability of a distinctly multi-ethnic nation-building project.  
Much scholarly literature has been devoted to the brutal civil wars that destroyed 
Yugoslavia during the 1990s with emphasizes on divisive nationalism and dysfunctional 
politics.  But what held Tito’s state together for the preceding forty-six years?  In an 
attempt to understand better what united the stable, multiethnic, and successful 
Yugoslavia that existed before 1991, this dissertation illuminates the pervasive problem 
of legitimacy within this larger history.  Cast aside and threatened with removal by 
Stalin’s henchmen after the war, Tito made his revolution a genuine alternative to Soviet 
control.  Because Tito and the ruling elite feared the loss of political power by either 
foreign aggression or from domestic groups challenging the Communist Party’s (LCY) 
claim to govern, they fought hard for the reform of Marxism.  Furthermore, Yugoslav 
elites manipulated popular conceptions of a Yugoslav identity as a means to solidify their 
regime with a unifying and progressive identity.  Citing elite perceptions of the Yugoslav 
system—including key aspects of central institutions such as the LCY and the military—
this dissertation attempts to reconcile how leaders of a country that scholars have 
dismissed as full of national hatreds had constructed a functioning and popular system for 
so long.
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NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS AND TERMS 
In his recent translation of Dante’s Inferno, John Ciardi has noted that language is like a 
musical instrument, and, as such, each language enjoys its own specific logic.  Ciardi 
stated that to unveil the rich language of Dante for English readers, he rejected the notion 
of word-for-word translation.  Instead, “transposition” has replaced the conception of 
directly correlating words exactly from the original language.1  I agree wholeheartedly 
with this concept of bringing alive the original text as part of a broader understanding in 
order to capture better the spirit of the speaker’s language.   
 I have been fortunate to learn Serbo–Croatian—or, today, Bosnian, Croatian, 
Serbian, and Montenegrin—from native speakers in the United States and in former 
Yugoslavia; but, in addition, I have been able to share my skills with other language 
learners.  In 2005, I signed onto a project to coauthor with Aida Vidan two beginner-level 
books on Croatian and Serbian for English speakers.  Thanks to insightful commentary 
by linguists including Wayles Browne at Cornell University and Danko Šipka at Arizona 
State University, these books represent thorough and user-friendly guides to developing 
reliable competency in either Croatian or Serbian.  Moreover, I am thankful to Patricia 
Chaput—language director of the Slavic Department at Harvard—for having invited me 
to teach Bosnian–Croatian–Serbian (BCS) for a semester at the introductory and 
intermediate levels.  My students gave great feedback on the language books (then in 
draft form) and helped me to develop further my own language and teaching skills.  To 
all of them, I am grateful.   
                                                 
1.  Dante Alighieri, The Inferno, trans. John Ciardi (New York: Signet Classics, 2003), ix. 
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 A language as complex as BCS defies easy translation into English if, for no other 
reason, than the absolute density of Slavic sentence structure.  What I have done 
throughout this dissertation was to focus on transposing as Ciardi has with Dante, rather 
than having created blocky and awkward English from otherwise sophisticated BCS.  The 
only archival materials not presented in the original language appeared in certain boxes at 
the Open Society Archives in Budapest; there, some materials were in original form, 
while professionals at Radio Free Europe or the U.S. State Department directly recorded 
or translated other resources into English.  In such cases, I have kept the spellings as 
presented, without an addition of diacritical marks to names of people or places.  
Otherwise, throughout the text, the English equivalency—from BCS, German, or 
Slovenian—is solely my responsibility.  Lastly, I have provided the original language in 
the footnote if I deemed that a fuller examination might prove useful for the reader; as an 
extension of that, because BCS appears in both Latin and Cyrillic scripts, there are a few 
points where I maintained Cyrillic script as in the original.     
 I have tried at every point in the dissertation to be as precise and deliberate as 
possible; to that end, I have attempted to follow stylistic conventions as much as possible, 
but, as sources sometimes paint only a partial picture, an occasional actor lacks a 
complete name or an appropriate political title.  I have chosen not to use quotation marks 
for cynicism nor have I used emphasis expect when appropriate formatting helps point 
the reader more directly to my argument.  For references, I have tried to follow what the 
respective archivists have suggested, but I have elected to describe fully the documents in 
the notes so that they can be readily found; as a result, despite a standardized system of 
 
  viii 
abbreviation and citation, some references are a tad lengthy.       
Finally, debate exits over whether to use the terms “Non-aligned Movement,” 
“Non-Aligned Movement,” or simply “N[n]onalignment.”  I will employ “Non-aligned 
Movement” when I am referring to the proper noun and its policies, and I will use 
“nonalignment” when I am discussing the broader concept of Cold War neutrality or 
when I use the term as a collective.  Despite the suggestion in the most recent Chicago 
Manual of Style, I also capitalize the Cold War.  This is deliberate, since I think that the 
capitalization differentiates this American–Soviet standoff from other cold wars.  For 
names, I have tried to remain true to the original language, when possible.  As a result, I 
have chosen Đilas instead of Djilas, Nasir over Nasser, and Josif Dzhugashvili Stalin 
rather than Joseph Stalin.  If these and other names appeared differently in quoted 
material, I left the spellings as they were.  It was my intention throughout this dissertation 
to deliver the most accurate material without leaving the reader confused as to 
conventions or style.            
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the first place, we fear Churchill; Churchill, the old wolf.  And we fear Eisenhower 
because he still understands.  Yes, we are afraid.1   
     —Nikita Khrushchev to Josip Broz Tito, 1955 
In 1990, when the Yugoslav Communist Party (LCY) dissolved its monopoly of political 
power in Yugoslavia, the New York Times journalist Marlise Simmons quoted an 
unnamed delegate from the constituent Slovenian LCY who prophetically proclaimed 
that, “birth and death are two crucial moments in a life and both are taking place here at 
this congress.”2  The subsequent dismemberment of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s 
shocked the world with brutality unseen in Europe since World War II.  The secession of 
Yugoslavia’s republics along ethnic lines reopened the prior questions about the integrity 
of the modern nation-state and, more specifically, the lasting consequences of multiethnic 
polities. 
Because this multi-ethnic creation failed the test of longevity and violently broke 
apart during the 1990s—merely a decade after longtime dictator Josip Broz Tito’s 
anticipated death—scholarship since has portrayed conflict, and specifically ethnic 
conflict, as the primarily negative explanation of why multi-ethnic Yugoslavia failed.  
From another angle, though, it becomes clear that while conflict served a key role in the 
creation, existence, and destruction of Tito’s state, the dismemberment of the state was in 
                                                 
1.  “Materijali o poseti delegacije Vlade CCCP Jugoslaviji, 27. maja do 2. juna 1955. godine,” 
Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore [ASCG] IX K.2 I–56, p. 43.  “U prvom redu Čerčil se boji, Čerčil, taj stari vuk.  I 
Ajzenhauer se boji zato što on ipak razume.  Da, boji se.”  
2.  Quoted in Marlise Simons, “Yugoslav Communists Vote to End Party’s Monopoly,” New York 
Times, 23 January 1990, p. A9. 
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no way inevitable.  Rather than seeing ethnic hatred at the core of troubles in Yugoslavia, 
I will clarify the relatively successful existence of Yugoslavia as a series of crises of 
expectation; conflict, or the threat of conflict, simply aided the communist leaders 
towards realizing their promise to the people of a better life.        
 One of the challenges in writing history lies in the ability to present material 
without assigning contemporary values or ideology to historical actors.  The Cold War 
ended and since then Marxism has largely eroded as a viable worldview across the globe, 
especially as Maoist China embarked on serious economic reforms that deemphasized 
central planning.  We cannot assume, though, that Marxists during the period under 
consideration were cynics or that their policies would not have persisted for many more 
years to come.  As a result, this dissertation focuses on the actors of the time and puts into 
perspective their strategies as seen at the time, primarily using their own words.  I have 
employed their voice liberally to illuminate their perspectives and have tried to make my 
own interpretation separate and clear.  Finally, because political elites in Yugoslav had no 
idea that their state would collapse in 1991, I think that we do them a disservice by 
examining everything through the lens of destruction and ethnic hatreds.   
 In an attempt then to understand better what forces combined to produce a 
relatively stable, multiethnic, and successful Yugoslavia before dismemberment in 1991, 
this dissertation aims to elucidate the pervasive and enduring problem of legitimacy in 
the history of Titoist Yugoslavia.  This acute dilemma preoccupied the leadership of the 
country and resulted in a wide array of measures to maintain stability and strength.  In 
addition to the government’s manipulation of fear as a basic part of the struggle for 
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political mastery, widespread uncertainty also preoccupied the ruling elites as part of a 
genuine attempt to come to terms with the fragile external political environment marked 
by the Cold War.  The implications of analyzing the problem of legitimacy as a tool in 
this context include understanding how members of Tito’s Communist Party relied 
primarily upon, and brokered the reform of Marxism, to endure serious challenges to 
their rule.  I hypothesize that the never-ending search for legitimacy—real or imagined—
served as the primary factor in shaping the nature of progress in Titoist Yugoslavia.     
While the history of modern Yugoslavia falls under the subset of state building in 
the modern era, the prospect of destruction has defined the Yugoslav state-building 
project.  After 1948, when Soviet Premier Josif Dzhugashvili Stalin set Tito as an outcast 
and placed him tenuously between the superpower blocs in the middle of Europe, the 
ultimate dread that plagued the Yugoslav leadership was its own ruin.  Just a few years 
before that, when Tito created a state based on the ideological principles of Marxism, he 
recognized not only the latent danger of ideologically-driven politics, but also the 
underlying power of nationalism as a deciding factor in the survival of a Yugoslav state.  
Yugoslav communists could easily point to the death of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 
1941 as one fraught by competing nationalisms and zero-sum struggles.  While Marxism 
claimed to have the solution for nationalism, many people still questioned its place as a 
legitimate force and as a viable, long-lasting system of governance.  Nonetheless, Tito 
and his loyal political elite predicated the stability and integrity of their new creation on 
the success of Karl Marx’s ideology, and they constantly sought the realization of a 
communist paradise; all the while, they recognized that in such a “complicated situation,” 
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it was no longer clear “who the enemy” was.3  Divisive agents operated both in and 
outside of Yugoslavia and the LCY fought hard to thwart its own destruction.   
In subsequent chapters, I will employ three basic assumptions about state-building 
specific to the Cold War to clarify my argument: the significant role that external 
pressures played in eliciting notions of unity and cohesion; the multifaceted employment 
of ideology and propaganda in the quest for popularity and stability; and, the dynamic 
nature of what it meant for elites to establish and secure a strong state.  In the end, despite 
constant adaptations to their policies after the employment of a reformed socio-economic 
model based on worker self-management, Yugoslav ruling elites failed to secure a lasting 
legitimacy for the state.  The destruction of the Titoist model that ensued continues to 
challenge some of the traditional notions of state building, civil-military relations, and 
legitimate governance.   
The notion of legitimacy—as a recognized conformity with law or standards—is 
quite compelling, especially combined with the highly ideological nature of politics in the 
twentieth century.  Each chapter attempts to focus the regime’s movements—either in the 
domestic or international spheres—as having this notion in mind.  An early Yugoslav 
scholar, Dennison Rusinow, wrote that for Tito’s experiment to work, elites needed to 
secure four sources of legitimacy: power; international recognition and legal continuity; 
Partisan wartime legacy of brotherhood and unity; and last, what Rusinow termed as 
“relevant only for Marxists”—namely, the legitimacy of their ideology reinforced by the 
reach for popularity in the “promise of rapid economic development,” and the high 
                                                 
 3.  See Branko Horvat, An Essay on Yugoslav Society, trans. Henry F. Mins, (Belgrade: 
Jugoslavenski Institut za Ekonomska Istraživanja, 1967), p. 210.  
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standard of living that accompanies it.4  These four markers will appear to some extent 
later as part of this work’s effort to attain why Tito and the LCY made the decisions that 
they did.   
Longtime Yugoslav specialist Sabrina P. Ramet recently has returned to this issue 
of legitimacy and recognized it as paramount in understanding any of the modern 
Yugoslav states—indeed, for Ramet, a “permanent crisis” plagued elites who failed “to 
resolve the dual challenges of state-building and legitimation.”5  Much of her insight has 
proven inspiring for this work, although in order to clarify just how pervasive the issue of 
legitimacy was, my argument will center on the critical events and utterances of key 
political actors from the time.  Prefaced in her look at legitimacy, Ramet has rooted 
herself in the values of the liberal Enlightenment and taken note of the mood of leaders 
who perpetuated hostility to this liberal project that “ultimately,” created an atmosphere 
“conducive to instability and decay.”6  In contrast to Ramet, I embrace a more relative 
outlook that takes into account differences between cultures and peoples that may 
correctly contrast this liberalism; but, in the case of Yugoslavia—placed squarely in 
Europe—the argument that the Enlightenment has defined the political environment 
remains dominant and helps to explain the apparent drift of Tito’s regime into a 
Rechtstaat by 1974.  Two final aspects from Ramet’s study have great importance for this 
study.  First, I want to emphasize her point on how system legitimacy works in politics to 
                                                 
4.  See Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment: 1948–1974, (London: C. Hurst & 
Company, 1977), p. 13.  
5.  Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-building and Legitimation, 1918–2005, 
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), p. 13.  
6.  Ramet, Three Yugoslavias, p. 10–11.  
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incorporate “political, economic, and moral factors,” that when infected with illegitimacy 
in any one of those spheres, ultimately erodes any authority in the others.7  We will see 
how Tito succeeded at times in one area only to face challenges in another.  At each of 
these junctions, the negative features outweighed the positive in the long term and 
weakened the power of the regime to govern under such varied circumstances.  
Regarding the ever-important concept of change in politics, Ramet has concluded, “crisis 
is associated with vulnerability to and openness to wholesale change.”  Elaborated 
further, Ramet recognized that this effectively meant that a change equaled a legitimacy 
crisis for Tito.8  This last point seems a bit presumptuous and discounts the 
preponderance of evidence that the idea of change, while admittedly wrapped up in 
securing legitimacy, was wedded to Tito’s Marxist system after the 1948 split with the 
Soviet Union.  Reform of any one-party state is dangerous and has its own unique 
problems, but elites peddled change in Tito’s Yugoslavia as part of a pledge to improve 
the lives of everyday people alongside the evolution of politics.  Tito’s politics centered 
on reform and he used it not necessarily to respond to crises of legitimacy so much as to 
prevent and build a positive one for the future.       
In order to understand how legitimacy fits within the broader notions of Yugoslav 
political history a brief look at competing viewpoints is in order.  Former Yugoslavia and 
its successor states have made news ever since Stalin ejected Tito from the international 
Communist organization, the Cominform, and severed relations with Yugoslavia.  
                                                 
7.  Ramet, Three Yugoslavias, p. 30.   
8.  Ramet, Three Yugoslavias, p. 32.  Ramet also quoted Lipset, “A crisis of legitimacy is a crisis 
of change.”   
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Throughout the ensuing Cold War, policymakers and scholars in the West regarded 
Tito’s survival as a relative success, praising his independence from Moscow’s guiding 
hand alongside innovative policies, such as socialist self-management and Tito’s 
successful stewardship of the promising Non-aligned Movement.  While certain elites in 
the West saw Tito as no different as his communist neighbors, others saw a glimpse of 
reform as moving increasingly towards democratic norms.  This complex, and often 
conflicted, view of Tito, alienated him from true inclusion into international 
organizations and thus hampered his quest for a lasting and secure system.   
 The problem that this dissertation addresses intersects with why Titoist 
Yugoslavia—a relatively successful and functional state—collapsed in 1991, unleashing 
the worst barbarism in Europe since World War II.  Arguments about why Yugoslavia 
collapsed often proceed on the assumption that a Yugoslav project had been either 
impossible to make into reality or that Titoist elites simply failed to establish a proper 
political condition.  The media coverage of the brutal civil wars propagated the idea that 
old national hatreds brought about the dismemberment of Yugoslavia due to the intense 
ethnic rivalries of groups that merely tolerated each other during Tito’s relatively benign 
yet repressive dictatorship.9  These primordialist theories of nationalism, by assigning to 
                                                 
9.  Certain language emerged—both before and after the wars of secession—that Yugoslavia was 
a country rooted in ethnic tensions and violence.  This discourse mainly arose among journalists; but, these 
conceptions did not only remain isolated to newspapers.  For examples of  these representations see 
Anatole Shub, “After Tito—Who Can Keep Together the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Bosnian 
Moslems, Albanians, Hungarians, and Montenegrins?” New York Times, 6 January 1972, p. SM38.  “The 
empire [Hapsburg, to which both Croatia and parts of Serbia fell under] was undermined by the conflicts 
among the various ‘nations’ … Even more bitter nationalist conflict – especially between the Croats and 
Serbs – swept away the interwar Yugoslav monarchy, too, in the fratricidal chaos of World War II”; also 
Richard Burt, “Tito is Taken Seriously, and His Succession Even More So,” New York Times, 16 October 
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age-old hatreds the causal force for Yugoslav dissolution, have, though, come under 
intense scrutiny.  Eric Hobsbawm, a contemporary historian of nationalism, has declared 
that “nationalism was the beneficiary of these developments [dissolution] but not, in any 
serious sense, an important factor in bringing them about.”10  To him, “nations do not 
make states and nationalisms but the other way round.”11  Barry Posen, a political 
scientist of the realist school, also has argued that nationalism remains largely 
misunderstood.  According to Posen, despite ample evidence to the contrary, people 
instead find it convenient to “invoke folk theories about ancient hatreds, or sorcerer 
leaders who have miraculously called them forth.”12  Hence, contentious figures such as 
Serbian president Slobodan Milošević have taken center stage in accounts that try to 
place blame for the brutality of the 1990s.  Instead, this dissertation focuses the 
                                                                                                                                                 
1977, p. 172. “Predictably, few of these groups [Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, et cetera] have a history of happy 
co-existence: The best known and most volatile situation exists in Croatia, where as recently as 1971 local 
citizens rioted in protest against ‘Serbian rule’”; also Raymond Duncan, and G. Paul Holman, Ethnic 
Nationalism and Regional Conflict, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), p. 28.  They argued that the wars of 
the 1990s resulted from a “combination of economic and political forces [that] intensified ancient ethnic 
antagonism.” 
10.  Eric. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 167. 
11.  Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p. 10.  This statement by Hobsbawm drew upon Ernest 
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), pp. 48–49.  “But nationalism is not the 
awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present itself.  It is in reality 
the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent 
high cultures, each protected by its own state….Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as 
an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-
existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing 
cultures: that is a reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one.”  See also the compelling 
constructionist thesis by Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (New York: Verso, 1991).  
12.  Barry Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” International Security, 18:2 
(Autumn 1993), p. 80. 
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evaluation of why Yugoslavia remained together for so long on Tito’s perpetual state-
building program, while offering support to those constructionalists who see national 
identity, much like the state itself, as responsive to constant refashioning.13  This study of 
the political history of Yugoslavia will therefore close with a reevaluation of nationalism 
during the final days of the state’s existence.   
 Recognizing that excessive nationalism opens up problematic issues about human 
nature and the status of contemporary identity, some scholars have blamed Yugoslavia’s 
dismemberment on dysfunctional politics.  Political scientist Samuel P. Huntington 
observed that Tito fulfilled the role of a strongman in his government and that his force 
alone kept divergent peoples together against their will.14  Furthermore, Huntington 
emphasized the legacy of the Yugoslav revolution during World War II, which had 
“institutionalized the centralization and the expansion of power in a one-party system.”15  
Historian James Gow concurred when he noted that Tito’s “diffuse system left nobody 
                                                 
13.  See also Robert Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the 
Yugoslav Conflicts, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 27.  Hayden wrote, “It is 
tempting to see the breakdown of federal Yugoslavia as the inevitable result of those national tensions, 
once the overarching structure of the one-party state, which had served to bind them together, was 
removed. Yet to stress only those nationalisms is to distort the reality of political, social, and economic life 
in Yugoslavia in the critical years of 1989–91.” 
14.  See Richard Betts and Samuel P. Huntington, “Dead Dictators and Rioting Mobs: Does the 
Demise of Authoritarian Rulers Lead to Political Instability?” International Security, 10:3 (Winter 1985–
86), p. 112.  “There is a widespread presumption that countries ruled for extended periods of time by 
authoritarian leaders degenerate into chaos when those rulers die and their special personal status no longer 
holds the lid on their countries’ tensions;” furthermore Huntington noted that “In Yugoslavia, for example, 
the results have been mixed.  The country did not “fall apart” when Tito died in 1980, but it did suffer 
severe unrest in the province of Kosovo.”    
15.  Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1968), p. 315.  
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with enough power or authority to act decisively” after his death, leaving the state 
vulnerable during times of “crisis” and “chaos.”16  Still other authors have focused on the 
role of the multi-ethnic military as the flawed arbiter of power in Yugoslavia.  Political 
scientist Robert W. Dean has said that, “in no other European Communist state” did the 
“military play as integral a part in political affairs” as in Yugoslavia, leading to such 
devastating consequences in 1991.17  What I intend to do is situate the literature on what 
was seemingly wrong with Titoist politics in the context of the earnest quest by the ruling 
elites to construct and maintain a real legitimacy that they felt they had earned following 
their successful liberation of Yugoslavia during World War II. 
 
YUGOSLAVIA AS HISTORY 
Because Tito wrestled power in Yugoslavia using armed force and created his state on the 
laurels of military victory, post-World War II elites largely consisted of his so-called 
Partisan fighters, and, as a result, Yugoslav institutions supported veterans alongside their 
claim of ownership of the revolution.  During the war, Tito had premised his victory on 
the defeat of the foreign invaders and their domestic collaborators and, coupled with an 
inclusive message of “brotherhood and unity,” directed towards the constituent ethnic 
groups of the country, he had brought relative stability to post-war Yugoslavia.18  
                                                 
 16.  James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis, (London: Pinter Publishers, 
1992), p. 7.  
17.  Robert W. Dean, “The Yugoslav Army,” in John Adelman, ed. Communist Armies in Politics, 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), p. 83.  
18.  While the primary ethnic groups included Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Albanians, 
and Hungarians, fourteen recognized ethnic groups existed in Tito’s Yugoslavia, and for success, Tito 
understood that cooperation among all of them was critical.    
Introduction  11 
 
 
Nevertheless, securing power has never been enough for a revolutionary, and Tito was no 
exception.  Threats of internal counterrevolution originally centered on popular resistance 
to communist policies such as collectivization, but the elites worried constantly about the 
nationalist-based tensions between the country’s various ethnic groups.19  Furthermore, 
the tenuous international situation facing Yugoslavia during the Cold War, as one of the 
few nonaligned states neighboring both nuclear-armed superpower camps, compelled the 
Yugoslavs to recognize and address their own fear of maintaining independence in light 
of Western pressure for democracy and Soviet-led interventionism in Eastern Europe.  
The Yugoslav government tried to gain moral advantage in international affairs through 
its nonaligned status and then sought refuge in the status quo, thereby reigning in an 
intrusive revisionism.   
 Because the threat of Soviet invasion plagued the regime in Belgrade—especially 
in the wake of the Tito–Stalin split in 1948 and the Soviet-led military interventions in 
Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968—politicians increasingly relied on a high 
level of popular political participation from all levels of society.  An analysis of the 
                                                 
19.  The Yugoslav Defense Ministry conducted a poll in 1971 asking officers and non-
commissioned officers what they felt posed the greatest threat to Yugoslavia.  Fifty-four percent of high-
ranking officers (rank of major and above), forty percent of low-ranking officers, and forty-seven percent 
of non-commissioned officers saw nationalism as the greatest danger, only 13.5 percent, ten percent, and 
11.7 percent, respectively, saw foreign aggression as the greatest danger facing Yugoslavia.  Cited in Adam 
Roberts, Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defense, (New York: Praeger Publisher, 
1976), p. 200.  Also see A. Ross Johnson, The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: An Historical 
Sketch, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1978), p. 11–12.  Johnson added, “Seventy-two percent of the “higher 
officers” thought the national question had been overemphasized in the public discussion of the 
Constitutional Amendments of 1971.”  This is indicative of the kind of downplaying that higher officers 
wished on the entire issue of nationalism in Yugoslavia.  Such public discussion could only but exasperate 
problems in their eyes.   
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nature of popular support for the Yugoslav government as manifested through party 
organs and state institutions illuminates the profound seriousness with which the ruling 
elites strove to strengthen the state against external challengers, not only through the 
adoption of a conservative and pragmatic foreign policy, but also under the guise of 
creating a truly popular and unified citizenry supportive of the LCY.     
Following Yugoslavia’s ejection from the Cominform in 1948, Yugoslav elites 
searched for an ideological justification for the independence of their Marxist system 
from Moscow’s guiding hand.  This change stemmed from the realization that the LCY 
could not continue to emulate the Soviet Party once criticisms from Josip Stalin reached 
epic proportions in the Soviet press, which labeled Tito a “fascist stooge” and the LCY a 
deviant, faithless, “Trotskyite organization.”20  The profoundly ideological nature of the 
Soviet accusations led Tito to embark on a course of national communism; soon after the 
split, he boldly declared, “no one has the right to love his country less than the Soviet 
Union.”21  The chief ideologues in the LCY later called for a socio-political system that 
combined decentralization of state power and socialist self-management, which in 
principle meant that workers—rather than the state—owned the means of production.  
The withering away of the state thus began immediately in the wake of the Tito–Stalin 
split, but reforms in the system, once began, never ceased.  An investigation as to why 
such reforms continued after the Soviet–Yugoslav split had been reconciled by the early 
1950s will reveal the motivations of the Yugoslav leadership to build Marxism from the 
                                                 
20.  For examples, see Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks: His Self Portrait and Struggle with Stalin, 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954), p. 343.  
21.  Tito cited in Dedijer, Tito, p. 353.  
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bottom up with popular and credible support at each step along the way, including 
adapting a credible and receptive foreign policy that reached out to leaders in the Third 
World unwilling or unsure about an alliance with either Moscow or Washington.   
 In his 1989 book, With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav 
Communism, Ivo Banac examined how Tito’s regime dealt with the fear of domestic 
challengers in the aftermath of Yugoslavia’s banishment from the Cominform.  Banac 
argued that while attempting to escape the trappings of Stalinism, Yugoslav elites 
actually enacted contradictory reforms that, on the one hand, modified Marxism to make 
it more palatable to peasants and more inclusive by incorporating worker management, 
while, on the other hand, they created a system of internal repression that “mirrored the 
Soviet system.”  Furthermore, Banac asserted that the early Yugoslav conflict with Stalin 
“played the same part in the shaping of Yugoslavia’s political system that collectivization 
and the purges of the 1930s played in the history of Soviet communism.”22  After almost 
twenty years, though, Banac’s assertion that the Yugoslav state adapted Stalinist 
trimmings must come under reevaluation in light of new evidence.  Instead, evidence 
points to Tito having operated outside of the Kremlin as the first communist leader to 
shed the totalitarian Stalinist model; as a result, he altered the course of global Marxism 
and forced a reevaluation of the Cold War by the superpowers. 
One of the most significant impetuses for later change came after the Soviets 
intervened in Czechoslovakia in 1968, thereby heightening Yugoslav fears of foreign 
invasion and causing LCY leaders to question their degree of success at home and 
                                                 
22.  Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 257. 
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abroad.  Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev’s employment and later articulation of his 
doctrine against the moderate communist leadership in Prague raised the possibility that 
Moscow’s defense of socialism might serve as adequate justification for regime change in 
Belgrade.  As Tito declared that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia “violated and 
trampled upon the sovereignty of a socialist country and inflicted a heavy blow on the 
socialist and progressive forces of the world,”23 thousands of Yugoslavs petitioned the 
LCY desperately seeking party membership in response to a sharpened level of 
uncertainty.24  As a result, Tito was another step close to achieving the sort of strength 
and support for his state that he always wanted.  
As the guardian of Tito’s state and his helpmeet in attaining power, the Yugoslav 
People’s Army (JNA) also underwent dramatic transformations in response to Soviet 
threats against Yugoslavia.  Military doctrine changed with the adoption of the socialist 
self-management system and decentralization to create a system premised on Territorial 
Defense.  Alongside the JNA—as the federal armed component—the Territorial Defense 
Forces (TDFs) came from the local populations and trained in the sort of guerrilla warfare 
that characterized Tito’s experience during World War II.  The legitimacy of the TDF 
rested on solidifying a place for all people in the defense of the country and enlisting the 
                                                 
23.  Tito cited in Roberts, Nations in Arms, p. 161. 
24.  For data on the membership of the Leauge of Communists see Dušan Pejanović, Josip 
Karavanić, Mihajlo Golubović, Ernest Mezga, Boška Stojanović, Božo Šašić, and Čedo Stanković, 
Organizacija SKJ u JNA, vol. 2, Razvoj oružanih snaga SFRJ, 1945–1985., (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački i 
novinski centar, 1986), p. 259.  “U toku te godine [1968] u Savez komunista primljeno je preko 20,000 
novih članova, od kojih 6,000 poslije 21. avgusta, dakle, nakon intervencije pet zemalja VU u ČSSR. ” (In 
this year [1968], in the league of communists they received an additional 20,000 new members, including 
6,000 after 21 August, which was after the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia.)      
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army as a so-called school for the nation.25  Only with this in mind can we understand the 
assertion that “the strength of our [military] doctrine,” according to Defense Secretary 
Viktor Bubanj in 1970, “is that it is public and belongs to the people.”26  An examination 
of the army, as the strongest state institution, will demonstrate the varied responses that 
Yugoslav elites took to anchor their state.  On 22 December 1971, Tito had explained that 
the army’s primary task was “to defend our country from external enemies, but also to 
defend the achievements of our revolution inside the country, should that become 
necessary.”  This competing scenario was unimaginable for Tito, but he said, “if it comes 
to shooting, the army too is here.”27 
The 1970s passed and, soon after, so did Tito, leaving behind a state plagued with 
troubles but full of promise—if for no other reason than thirty-five years of relative 
success.  At each juncture, Yugoslav elites met critical challenges to the legitimacy of 
their rule and, by the 1980s, Yugoslavia had embraced a partial market economy 
alongside greater civil liberties, self-rule, and varying degrees of democracy.  The notion 
of building legitimacy with popular support grew increasingly important; a party report 
from the 1960s declared that “greater democracy earlier and greater affirmation of the 
LCY as a political carrier and organizer of electoral activity” was the key to success, 
because “the thoughts of the citizens of Yugoslavia must be an important factor in our 
                                                 
25.  For a recent example of this argument see Ronald Krebs, “A School for the Nation: How 
Military Service Does Not Build Nations, and How it Might,” International Security 28:4 (Spring 2004), 
pp. 85–124.  I argue that the contact theory has particular importance for multi-ethnic societies because the 
army can serve as the primary venue for cooperation and inter-ethnic understanding.   
26.  Viktor Bubanj cited in Gow, Legitimacy, p. 47. 
 27.  Tito in Roberts, Nations in Arms, p. 202.   
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electoral process.”28  For the LCY, focused on reform and inclusion, it could be no other 
way, especially considering the fiercely competitive ideological battle that engulfed the 
world.  The party, therefore, needed to be “very close to the widest circle of citizens.”29  
An early chief ideologue, Milovan Đilas, summed up Yugoslavia’s policy of successful 
independence as seeking to “defend not only our own ideas and the independence of our 
internal social evolution, but also the frontiers of the State.”  Đilas continued by noting 
the fluidity of international relations: “And we have to defend these frontiers under the 
concrete condition of the world as it is today.  Hence it is our obligation to concentrate 
our forces in the direction from which the main danger is threatening at the given 
moment.”30  Pragmatism imbued with a Yugoslav ideology directed at both East and 
West: that is the essence of what Yugoslav elites strove to achieve at all levels and then 
maintain indefinitely.31   
One of the important points of consistency within Yugoslavia, during this time 
and until the bitter end of Yugoslavia, rested on the government’s appeal to persuade 
Yugoslavs to remain united because they were better off compared to their neighbors.  
The means to accomplish this took divergent forms, and while plenty of positive 
                                                 
28.  “Aktuelni problemi izbornog sistema i uloga društveno-političkih organizacija u izbornom 
sistemu,” ASCG CK SKJ XXIII K.2 7, 1967, p. 13, and p. 5.  
29.  “Stenografske beleške sa sastanka predsednice Komisije CK SKJ za pitanje društveno-
političkih odnosa,” ASCG CK SKJ XXIII K.2 7, 21 December 1967, p. 26. 
30.  Milovan Đilas cited in Ernst Halperin, The Triumphant Heretic: Tito’s Struggle Against 
Stalin, (London: Heinemann, 1958), pp. 118–19. 
31.  Alan Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1970), p. 198.  Rubinstein has said, “Pragmatism, not dogmatism, has been the trademark of 
Yugoslav nation-building.”  While I too emphasize the pragmatic, it seems clear that ideology—first 
aligned with Soviet interests and then independent—guided much in Yugoslav politics.    
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reinforcement existed, the government certainly took to manipulating divergent 
nationalisms and embracing dictatorial politics and nepotism, in addition to using the 
army and secret police to forcibly quiet opponents.  This examination takes a closer look 
at how Yugoslav elites sought legitimacy—both the intense focus on reform as a means 
to drum up popular support and, at the same time, a foreign policy that could benefit from 
the precariousness of the Cold War—as the driving force behind this critical notion in 
Titoist Yugoslavia. 
 
SOURCES 
Because this dissertation focuses on the Yugoslav ruling elite, it relies primarily on 
archival sources that illuminate what party members said—both to each other and to the 
public.  The Open Society Archive in Budapest has compiled a wealth of sources from 
the Cold War, which governments published, collected, and used in an effort to 
understand what lay on the other side of the Berlin Wall.  Radio Free Europe played a 
key role during this time in bringing together data from Eastern Europe and using it in 
research reports and government communications.  Included also in the Open Society 
Archive are transcripts from news reports on radio, television, and original newspaper 
and journal clippings.  Such sources have helped me understand how some regular 
Yugoslavs interacted with the policies of the regime (if only passively), alongside what 
types of things the government encouraged for general consumption.  Not all newspapers 
carried patriotic stories about how great the Yugoslav People’s Army was or how ready 
the Yugoslavs were to defend their country against outside aggression; some articles 
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instead spoke about the concerns the government had with respect to its ability to rule.  
What is included and excluded tells a great deal about how leaders saw public 
participation as a force of strength and change.   
Certain specific pieces of my argument rely on how foreign politicians—chiefly 
in the United States and the Soviet Union—reacted to Yugoslavs during the Cold War.  
For the American perspective, I have been fortunate to discover that the U.S. government 
has declassified many documents and made them available in a mostly uncensored 
format.  Regarding insights into the Soviet perspective, and indeed, directly from the 
Yugoslav perspective, I have relied on my major research endeavor for this project, 
which took place at the Archive of Serbia and Montenegro during summer 2007.  I was 
able to collect a prodigious amount of materials there and owe a great debt to the 
archivists who helped in the acquisition of key documents from the Yugoslav Communist 
Party, such as minutes from central committee meetings and other important committees, 
including propaganda, constitutional reform, and foreign policy.  With more than 70,000 
individual pages from this, the former Federal Archive of Yugoslavia, I have been able to 
get a sense of what Yugoslav leaders were really doing, saying, and, to an extent, what 
they were thinking.  Communist Party meeting minutes serve as an especially fruitful 
avenue into the machinations of political elites because of the closed-door nature of these 
gatherings.  We can assume that the recordings of these proceedings represent the best 
insight into the reality at the top and represent an uncensored view into high-level 
deliberations.  
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Few, if any, Western researchers (or any researchers at all, in many cases), have 
viewed these Communist Party documents, and some of the information breaks new 
ground with respect to broader Cold War historiography.  Since the governments of 
Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States have made difficult any research in 
virtually all of the former Soviet archives to scholars working today (especially foreign 
scholars), assumptions and arguments about the Cold War must work around a 
increasingly diminishing stock of hard evidence.  My research at the archive in Belgrade, 
though, has revealed a small treasure in not only Yugoslav–Soviet relations from both 
perspectives, but also uncovered some materials that the post-Soviet governments have 
locked away from peering eyes.  I believe that my archival work in Belgrade will open 
new doors for scholars working on former Yugoslavia as well as the Cold War more 
broadly.   
Finally, with the addition of newspaper accounts of the events—key Yugoslav 
papers such as Borba, Komunist, Vjesnik, NIN, and Mladost, as well as important 
Western periodicals such as the New York Times—I will try to bring to the forefront of 
this work the many voices of the time to better understand how Yugoslavs valued and 
strove for success.   
 
TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF CONFLICT AS THE HELPMEET FOR SUCCESS 
Violence and conflict has marked the history of the twentieth century.  States have come 
and gone alongside powerful ideologies; all the while, conflict remained.  Karl Marx 
created one of the most powerful ideologies to move the modern world—communism—
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that took hold of the idea of conflict and made it paramount to reaching a perfect society.  
The opening line to his famous Communist Manifesto (1848), has challenged readers with 
the ominous declaration that the “history of all hitherto existing society is the history of 
class struggles.”32  Furthermore, philosopher Georges Sorel, in Reflections on Violence, 
equated conflict with life, creation, and virtue—things that mankind cannot live out.33   
Because conflict is an inescapable aspect of life that requires constant adaptation 
and flexibility, it can help to broker positive change from opposed positions.  On a 
broader level, all societies must constantly adapt and an examination of Yugoslavia 
shows that Tito and his communist-party cadres succeeded for four decades in making 
the best use of conflict and building an unbeaten party-state as a result.  Constantly 
worried about legitimacy and popularity, Tito knew he needed to build a society immune 
to conflict-based degradation; but, at the same time, his ideology forced him to conform 
to an ideology that held conflict in high regard.  Because Tito fought to empower 
communism does not change how conflict intersected with his politics.  Scholar Ralf 
Dahrendorf argued that “political conflict is a structural fact of society under every 
imaginable condition,” including communism, and because constant danger exists from 
the point of the view of those in power, any type of permitted groups—including aspects 
of the ruling party—might morph into an agent of revolution.34  Thus, in the Soviet 
                                                 
 32.  Karl Marx, Communist Manifesto, trans. Samuel Moore, (New York: International Publishers, 
2004), p. 9.   
33.  See Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, ed. Jeremy Jennings, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999).    
34.  Ralph Dahrendorf, “Toward a Theory of Social Conflict,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
2:2 (June 1958), pp. 182–83.  This fear by the state seems to be quite a universal phenomenon.  Some 
scholars have argued that leaders in Renaissance Italy also struggled with lawlessness and state control.  
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Union, the party devoured its own children under Stalin’s greedy watch, because his 
purges guaranteed loyalty from those few who remained.  In the meantime, Tito, who 
was present in the Soviet Union during the climax of Stalin’s organized chaos, learned a 
somber lesson regarding state power and party loyalty, and, as a result, employed force 
selectively and only when absolutely necessary.  The Yugoslav social revolution 
attempted to unite divergent groups—class- and ethnic-based—under the umbrella of the 
party rather than eliminate large sections of society because of potential threats.  How 
Tito manipulated conflict or even competition between groups becomes more instructive 
following the break with the Soviet Union, which cast aside and isolated Yugoslavia from 
the rigidity of bloc politics.  
 The break between Stalin and Tito occurred primarily because power formed the 
most vital component of international relations in the post-World War II world.  Power is 
both stimulating and intoxicating and, therefore, is a primary concept for scrutiny by 
scholars, especially when looking at a country such as Yugoslavia.35  Regarding how 
Yugoslav leaders mitigated conflict within the state borders, it becomes useful to see how 
internal controls operated.  Sociologist Morris Janowitz wisely asserted that control over 
society rests on a “value commitment” of at least two elements: “the reduction of 
coercion,” although keeping in mind that some coercion is necessary in all systems, 
                                                                                                                                                 
See William Bowsky, “The Medieval Commune and Internal Violence: Police Power and Public Safety in 
Siena, 1287–1355,” The American Historical Review, 73:1 (October 1967), pp. 1–17. 
 35.  Raymond Mack, “The Components of Social Conflict,” Social Problems, 12:4 (Spring 1965), 
p. 388.  
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alongside the “elimination of human misery,” despite some level of inequality.36  Social 
control’s opposite is coercive control, or the “organization of a society which rests 
predominantly and essentially on force—the threat and the use of force.”37  Unlike Stalin, 
Tito attempted to rely less on coercive control, though, at times, as will become apparent, 
coercion represented the most expedient method for Tito’s continued hold on power. 
 Apart from external invasion, Tito most feared internal disruptions that could 
challenge his rule; as a result, he sought to unify the people behind his message and 
alleviate any causes for frustration.  With this concept in mind, sociologist Lewis Coser 
argued that a “well-integrated society” will not only tolerate, but also will even welcome 
group-based conflict, whereas, “only a weakly integrated one must fear it.”38  Tito used 
the tools at his disposal to build a strong society, but, at almost every point, he failed to 
construct a lasting legacy.  His break with Stalin necessitated that a particular Titoist 
version of communism develop, and, while more popular than Soviet communism, it too 
failed to survive the end of the Cold War.  The recognition of new ethnic groups—
Bosnian Muslims (Muslimani, with a capital “M,” in the Serbo-Croatian language 
                                                 
 36.  Morris Janowitz, “Sociological Theory and Social Control,” The American Journal of 
Sociology, 81:1 (July 1975), p. 84.  On a similar note, K. Saeed argued that not only is a strong government 
important for sustainable economic development, but that “democratic government” is vital because of the 
restrictions on limiting civil rights.  I would add to this that democratic government is vital not just because 
of a positive record on civil rights, but because competing groups posses an effective voice in resolving 
conflict through their respective political parties.  Parties win and lose power in a never-ending seesaw, 
serving as the primary vehicle of conflict resolution.  Armed conflict least likely occurs in a system where 
multiple, effective outlets exist.  See Matilde Kamiya and Annababette Wils, “The Puzzle of Conflict 
Dynamics,” International Political Science Review, 19:4 (October, 1998), p. 411.  
 37.  Janowitz, “Sociological Theory,” p. 84.  
38.  Lewis Coser, “Social Conflict and Social Change,” The British Journal of Sociology, 8:3 
(September 1957), p. 205.   
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opposed to muslimani, or Muslims more broadly), and Macedonians, otherwise classified 
as Southern Serbs, Bulgarians, or Slavic Greeks—meant that Tito understood well the 
politics of nationalism, although his policies only temporarily relieved tension without 
solving root causes of nationalist-based conflict.  His allowances for national rights 
within his federal state gave each national group, even religious identities and tiny 
minorities, a chance to believe in the larger system while still maintaining—at least 
rhetorically—some sort of sovereignty.  Moreover, Tito’s regime experimented with 
establishing a so-called Yugoslav nationality; an identity that sought to supersede all 
others while avowing supreme loyalty to its creator, Comrade Tito.     
 More than anything else during the Cold War, Stalin’s ejection of Yugoslavia 
from the Cominform—the Communist Information Bureau—facilitated a new paradigm 
based on dissention and conflict and challenged the legitimacy of Marxism in Tito’s state.  
Tito stood in opposition to Stalin and it was this overwhelming opposition that defined 
the path that Yugoslav leaders would take; after all, how could Tito embrace agricultural 
collectivization and alienate a majority of his people—with farmers cited at still fifty 
percent in the mid 1960s—when he no longer had the support of Moscow to guarantee 
his power?39  This conflict with Stalin resolved the divergent dualism inside Yugoslavia 
and achieved a sort of unity that, while based on a negative characterization of the other, 
turned out to fit within Tito’s goal of building a tangible Yugoslav patriotism.40  Unity 
then, for Tito, originated from this scenario a working consensus and concord between 
                                                 
39.  See “Stenografske beleške sa sastanka predsednice Komisije CK SKJ za pitanje društveno-
političkih odnosa,” ASCG CK SKJ XXIII K.2 7, 21 December 1967, p. 14.  
40.  See Georg Simmel, Conflict, trans. Kurt H. Wolf, (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1955), p. 13.  
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individuals, and, on a higher level, served to solidify the “ultimate wholeness” of the 
group”—the Yugoslav nation.41  Following the logic of German sociologist, Georg 
Simmel, it seems that Yugoslavia under Tito owed its unity completely to him and to the 
legacy of World War II, just as France owed the “consciousness of its national unity only 
to the fight against the English” since the Middle Ages.42   
Analyzing the role of conflict as having constantly transformed a modern 
Yugoslavia is a rather novel idea despite the overwhelming violent twentieth century that 
forged and destroyed three Yugoslav states in 1919, 1941–1945, and 1991.  While 
scholars have treated conflict as necessarily bad for Yugoslavia, it remains important to 
note how chief Yugoslav ideologue Edvard Kardelj recognized that violence set an 
example for the LCY because the “experience from the national war of liberation” served 
an important role as “a very reliable guide,” in establishing the fundamental basis of the 
new Yugoslavia.43  But when historians speak about the Yugoslav state in the twentieth 
century, the issue of conflict is a focal point, though, not in the same way as Kardelj 
thought about it.  Instead of seeing conflict as having built a Yugoslav nation through a 
common struggle and a system that attempted to serve common needs, scholars have 
instead noted the violence between the constituent ethnic groups: the seemingly endless 
                                                 
41.  Simmel, Conflict, p. 17.  
42.  Simmel, Conflict, p. 100.  
43.  See Edvard Kardelj, Borba za priznanje i nezavisnost nove Jugoslavije, 1944–1957, 
(Ljubljana: Državna zalažba Slovenije, 1980), p. 77.  The full quote is as follows: “Iskustva iz 
narodnooslobodilačke borbe bila su nam tu veoma pouzdan vodič, i to ne samo vodič u pogledu 
organizacije administracije nego i u pogledu osnovnih postavki Ustava.” (The experience from the national 
war of liberation was a very reliable guide for us, not only regarding the organization and administration of 
the country but also regarding the fundamental assumptions of the constitution.)    
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literature looks at issues of ethnic unrest and conflict as either primordial or 
representative of constructed identities that seek some sort of selfish benefits.44  For 
either view, there exists an ease with which to note the high level of inter-regional 
conflict during the twentieth century as somehow representative of a “Balkan normalcy” 
or “Balkan mentality” that even the LCY leadership acknowledged; after all, in 
comparison with the calm and peacefulness in Central and Western Europe, the “situation 
in the Balkans” seemed “forever fluid.”45  Much of this ignores, or treats as unique, the 
rather peaceful coexistence between peoples in Yugoslavia—at least as peaceful as others 
across the violent and conflict-riddled European continent over the last century.46
                                                 
44.  For example, see Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History, (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1994); Raymond Duncan and G. Paul Holman, Jr. eds., Ethnic Nationalism and Regional 
Conflcit: The Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994); and Dusan 
Kecmanovic, Ethnic Times: Exploring Ethnonationalism in the Former Yugoslavia, (London: Praeger, 
2002).  
45.  See Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
Her argument centers on the term “Balkan” and how the West has viewed the region and its people with 
suspect; see Stane Dolanc in “Magnetofonske beleške i materijal sastanka Izvršnog bira,” ASCG CK SKJ 
IV K.7 7, 1971, p. 24.  “Za razliku od popuštenja zategnutosti i smirivanja u centralnoj i severnoj Evropi, 
situacija na Balkanu još uvek je fluidna.”  
46.  Breaking down the levels of association between Simmel’s theory of conflict as a unifying 
force reveals gradations, which correspond to the level of cohesion in society.  The lowest step in this scale 
is constituted “by associations which are held together only by a common mood,” in contrast to a greater 
aversion to a third party.  Two types of unification then exist: the one most relevant to Yugoslavia is what 
Simmel characterized as “concrete but temporary,” meaning that persons who are not acquainted with each 
other but who share the same level of education or sensitivity find themselves together and remain 
“together by their common aversion.”  Lacking other concrete bases for a shared existence, this method of 
unification, as extremely delicate, but of a wholly unambiguous character, “marks the extreme on the scale 
of unifications of completely alien elements through a common antagonism.” (see Simmel, Conflict, pp. 
103–104).  Coser has embraced Simmel’s tendency to see positive features of conflict, which, under certain 
circumstances, he has argued as “strengthening the system’s basis of integration as well as its adaptability 
to the environment.”  Coser cited in Jonathon H. Turner, “A Strategy for Reformulating the Dialectical and 
Functional Theories of Conflict,” Social Forces, 35:3 (March, 1975), p. 434. 
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CHAPTER ONE: A STRUGGLE FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS: IDEOLOGY  
AND YUGOSLAVIA’S THIRD WAY TO PARADISE 
 
And, of course, it was a tremendous moral blow for us.1   
   —Josip Broz Tito to Nikita Khrushchev about the Tito–Stalin Split 
 
As much as the beginning, the end of the Cold War in 1991 unleashed profound changes 
throughout the world.  Some scholars witnessed the defeat of communism and 
proclaimed the triumph of democracy and market capitalism as an “end of history.”2  
Excitement at both the withering away of communism in Europe and the brutal civil wars 
that shook the political integrity of post-socialist states therefore marked this period of 
tense transition.  Yugoslavia’s tragic demise during this time of transition forced a 
reevaluation of many contentious questions surrounding the broader fundamentals of the 
modern nation-state as well as the more noteworthy multiethnic Yugoslav experiment.  In 
part because of the overwhelming speed of communism’s general collapse in the early 
1990s, and partly from the brutal nature of ethnic cleansing, the particular events in 
Yugoslavia have been largely misunderstood.3  As part of an effort to realize how the 
                                                 
1.  “I, razume se, da je to bio za nas ogromni moralni udarac.”  See “Fragmenti iz zapisnika o 
sastanku plenuma CK KPSS Jula 1955. godine na kome je vodjena diskusija o politici SSSR-a prema 
Jugoslaviji posle povratka Sovjetske Delegacije iz Beograda,” ASCG CK IX 119/I K.2 45–90, folder 56.     
 2.  For example, Francis Fukuyama authored a series of works with this idea of an “end of history” 
in mind.  See The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: Free Press, 1992); and Have We Reached 
the End of History?, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1989).  
3.  The debate over Yugoslavia’s demise still centers on either a nationalist-driven approach or an 
explanation based on Tito’s Yugoslavia as having suffered from dysfunctional politics (i.e., Tito as a 
strongman).  For some examples see Raymond Duncan and G. Paul Holman, Ethnic Nationalism and 
Regional Conflict, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994); Richard Betts and Samuel Huntington, “Dead 
Dictators and Rioting Mobs: Does the Demise of Authoritarian Rulers Lead to Political Instability?” 
A Struggle for the Hearts and Minds  27 
beginning of Tito’s state might have influenced its demise, this chapter will analyze the 
manner in which the unique identity of Yugoslavia was born as neither fully communist 
nor fully democratic; as a result, I argue that the foundation of Tito’s success rested on a 
thorough and dynamic reform program.  While communism’s death was an integral force 
securing Yugoslavia’s fate, Tito’s creation possessed a distinctive ideological worldview 
that also failed against the West.   
Following Yugoslavia’s ejection from the Cominform—the Communist 
Information Bureau—in 1948, Yugoslav elites searched for an ideological justification 
for the independence of their Marxist system apart from Moscow’s guiding hand.  This 
change stemmed from the Yugoslav Communist Party’s (LCY) realization that it could 
no longer continue to follow directives from Moscow.  The verbal criticisms reached too 
high a level for a real and lasting reconciliation—at least not while Stalin lived.  Having 
staked his wartime liberation movement on the politics of Marx, Tito found no possibility 
for wholesale retreat.  Unable to veer too far from its path, Tito’s party nevertheless 
turned to patriotism and emphasized to the war-weary Yugoslavs the otherness of Soviet 
communism; the need was clear for centralism and a merging of the party and the state, 
but the Yugoslav leadership knew that “revolutionary discipline, of course,” could shift 
easily into Soviet-style “bureaucratic discipline.”4  After having weathered the storm, 
Tito and the chief ideologues in the LCY reevaluated Marxist texts and found a genuine 
                                                                                                                                                 
International Security 10:3 (Winter 1985–86); and James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav 
Crisis, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992). 
 4.  See Branko Horvat, An Essay on Yugoslav Society, trans. Henry F. Mins, (Belgrade: 
Jugoslavenski Institut za Ekonomska Istraživanja, 1967), p. 196.    
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path that could free them from any ideological contradictions while also building a 
legitimate Yugoslav alternative to Stalinism.  The resulting self-management system 
called for a socio-political system that gradually devolved power away from the center.  
The party elites endlessly tinkered with this system, finding ways to strengthen it against 
all opposition, because, after all, the LCY did “not have a ready-made formula for 
socialism”; instead, the LCY elites needed to “constantly revise, correct, improve, and 
construct that socialist formula.”5  Part of this reform focused on including regular folks 
and designing a system that would serve as a mechanism to perpetuate self-management 
to include these people until true communism became a reality.6  As a result, by the 
1960s, Yugoslavia stood firmly wedged between the two competing systems—the 
democratic-capitalist West and the communist East—and could not fully identify with 
either.   
Scholars have enjoyed wide access to the sources of the Tito–Stalin split thanks to 
the opening of archives by the Yugoslavs, as well as the publication of biographies and 
testimonies from high-ranking officials such as Vladimir Dedijer, Milovan Đilas and 
Ambassador Veljko Mičunović.7  Most of the materials underwent publication in Western 
collections and seemed to portray Yugoslavia as representative of a neutral and benign 
socialist alternative to the Soviet system thanks to Tito’s departure on a reform campaign 
                                                 
 5.  Horvat, Yugoslav Essay, p. 210.  
6.  See “Aktuelni problemi izbornog sistema i uloga društveno-političkih organizacija u izbornom 
sistemu,” ASCG CK SKJ XXIII K.2 7, 1967, p. 2.   
7.  See various works such as Vladimir Dedijer, The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia, 
1948–1953, (New York: Viking Press, 1971); Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, trans. Michael B. 
Petrovich (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1962), and Veljko Mičunović, Moscow Diary, trans. David 
Floyd, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980).  
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that emphasized socialist self-management.  Popular reception later of a foreign policy 
followed after Tito’s domestic reforms sparked an international agenda centered on 
nonalignment, at which point, at least rhetorically, the Soviet Union became a target for 
criticism as a country ruled by so-called antidemocratic imperialists.8  Some of this 
benevolence worked its way into scholarship, as Western sources have concluded that the 
split resulted from a combination of power politics and a careful awareness of 
geostrategic realities.9   
The text of the Soviet charges against the Yugoslavs told a different story, still; 
one filled with ideological rifts and deviations that set Yugoslav leaders in opposition to 
the true path to communism.  A recent work on this subject, by Jeronim Perović, has 
benefitted from an opening of some Soviet archives, but he concluded that while the 
Yugoslavs emphasized the ideological charges from Moscow, the reality for the Soviets 
was the need for a firm control over Eastern Europe without competition or 
troublemakers.  Later, when Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev flew to Yugoslavia to 
mend relations between the states in 1955, Yugoslav records show that an independent 
Yugoslav foreign policy that pressured the West after World War II placed Tito squarely 
in Stalin’s sights.  Tito told Khrushchev, “we already saw” the reason for the split; “It 
                                                 
8.  Robert Pastor, “Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade,” National Security Council 
Memorandum, (7 August 1978).  This document has summarized nicely the conflicts within the Non-
aligned Movement, such as the struggle between moderates and radicals and how Yugoslav diplomats 
attempted to steer a middle ground for the sake of stability. 
9.  For examples, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1960); John C. Campbell, Tito’s Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in 
World Politics, (New York: Harper Row, 1967); and Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United 
States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War, (University Park, PN: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).   
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was a question of our interests towards Corinthia [Austria] and in relations over Trieste,” 
combined with the “question of [war] reparations.”10  The newest scholarship has 
recognized the power politics involved over Tito’s expulsion from the Cominform, but 
has continued to rely on primary documents that do not represent direct Soviet–Yugoslav 
interactions.  A political assessment, though, has identified that the Yugoslav territorial 
designs on Albania and Tito’s continued meddling in the Greek Civil War reinforced 
Stalin’s realist credentials to establish firm authority with little risk of retaliation.11   
One of the preeminent works on the topics of ideology in Yugoslavia, A. Ross 
Johnson’s The Transformation of Communist Ideology, has noted how dynamic Tito 
really was.  For Johnson, when Stalin declared, “Mistakes are not the issue: the issue is 
conceptions different from our own,” the Soviet leader opened conflict for reasons of 
                                                 
10.  See “Fragmenti” ASCG Savez Komunista [CK] IX 119/I K.2 45–90, folder 56.  “Ali smo već 
videli da je bilo razloga.  To je pitanje naših interesa prema Koruškoj u odnosu na Trst, gde je u Parizu – je 
neću o tome, to će drugovi, osle reći – pitanje reparacija.” 
11.  See Jeronim Perović, “The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence,” 
Journal of Cold War Studies 9:2 (Spring 2007), p. 60.  Perović has acknowledged that no document has 
emerged yet definitively pointing to Soviet intentions, but, “the most useful source currently available” was 
a report sent by Stalin to the Czechoslovak leader Klement Gottwald on 14 July 1948,” which emphasized 
the near-term goals for dealing with Tito: “I have the impression that you [Gottwald] are counting on the 
defeat of Tito and his group at the next congress of the KPJ.  You suggest publishing compromising 
material against the Yugoslav leaders. . . .  We in Moscow are not counting on the early defeat of Tito and 
have never counted on it.  We have achieved the isolation of Yugoslavia.  Hence, the gradual decline of 
Tito’s Marxist groups is to be expected.  This will require patience and the ability to wait.  You seem to be 
lacking in patience. . . .  There can be no doubt that Marxism will triumph in due course.”  The main 
problem with this source is, of course, that it is not internal correspondence and thus was drafted more 
likely to keep the Czechoslovak leadership on edge rather than justify the Soviet leadership’s policy of 
isolating Yugoslavia and not immediately forcing Tito’s hand.  Furthermore, evidence that I found from 
meetings between Khrushchev and Tito in 1955 has revealed that Gottwald was in fact being threatened by 
Stalin, who told Gottwald at the time that his support was expected and that he needed to “answer for 
Czechoslovakia!” See “Fragmenti” ASCG CK IX 119/I K.2 45–90, folder 56. 
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power politics and ideological reasons.12  Unlike most authors, Johnson saw a trend of 
independent action among Yugoslavs thanks to the peculiar rise to power of Tito and his 
party; meanwhile Johnson traced Tito’s “legitimacy to an essentially socialist revolution” 
that was dependent on the existence of the Soviet Union, but argued that the actual role of 
the Kremlin had been negligible.13  As a result, Yugoslav thinking from the beginning of 
the war of liberation against the Nazis stood on a direct collision course with Stalin’s 
conception of ideological unity within his socialist world; what came in 1948, then, was 
the freedom for Tito to realize completely his doctrinal potential. 
This chapter will first explore how a particular Yugoslav socialism came into 
being, and then analyze the path that Yugoslav leaders navigated in order to define 
themselves in light of the initial Cold War standoff between sharply divergent ideologies.  
Tito’s solution, as it evolved by the end of the 1950s, was an emphasis on reform that 
would make his Marxist system a viable and legitimate alternative to the Soviet model.       
 
TITO’S BANISHMENT FROM THE COMMUNIST INFORMATION SERVICE  
When evaluating the Soviet threat to the United States and mapping out an adequate 
response, the American diplomat George Kennan saw “a subtle connection between 
traditional Russian habits of thought and the ideology which has now become official for 
the Soviet regime.”14  Because of this hybrid notion of ideology’s constitution, his regard 
                                                 
12.  See A. Ross Johnson, The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case, 1945–
1953, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972), p. 51.  
13.  Johnson, Transformation, p. 52.   
14.  George Kennan in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of 
American National Security Policy During the Cold War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 
A Struggle for the Hearts and Minds  32 
for ideology as a force of and for itself was small.  Despite that, Kennan observed that 
communism provided key roles for the party elites.  Primarily, Marxism served to 
legitimize an illegitimate government by supplying a historical imperative for ruling.  
Second, communism provided an outlet for both extreme sacrifice by the people and 
simultaneous repression by the state, especially enhanced if surrounded by hostile 
elements.15  In the wake of worldwide devastation after 1945, Kennan recognized it as an 
ideology that could speak to emerging peoples throughout the world, especially as 
decolonization efforts seemed already overwhelmingly led by leftists while Soviet 
credibility peaked following the Nazi defeat.  As a capstone to his thinking, Kennan 
astutely defined ideology as the “product and not a determinant of social and political 
reality,” which caused him to see an inherent flexibility within the international 
communist movement.16    
While much of what Kennan diagnosed turned out differently, the notion that 
communism could act with flexibility proved both right and wrong.  The events in 1948 
between Stalin and Tito validated Kennan’s hope for separate deals with postwar 
communist countries.  Yet, in the long term, Tito’s example made little impact in Europe 
and actually served as an incentive for the Kremlin to enforce an ever-tightening grip 
over the rest of Eastern Europe.  But, the Tito–Stalin split did unveil a wave of hope 
among U.S. government elites seeking an alternative to a long-lasting cold war.  While 
                                                                                                                                                 
32.  Cited by Gaddis as unpublished paper, “The Soviet Way of Thought and Its Effects on Foreign 
Policy,” 24 January 1947, from the Kennan Papers, Box 16.   
15.  See, for example, the tremendous sacrifice of the Soviet people in Stephen Kotkin’s Magnetic 
Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).  
16.  Kennan (from 1947) in Gaddis, Strategies, p. 33.    
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Western observers—along with most in Yugoslavia—were, at first, genuinely taken by 
surprise by the Soviet condemnation in light of the feverish pace of Yugoslavia’s 
construction of communism, the results affected U.S. policy in an unsurprising way.  
Yugoslav leaders, while not abandoning communism, embarked upon a policy that led to 
a series of deals with the United States whereby Yugoslavia could remain outside of the 
Soviet orbit thanks to billions of dollars worth of American aid—$2.2 billion in economic 
and military aid between 1950 and 1965 to be more precise.17   
 
TITOISM, YUGOSLAVISM, OR SIMPLY PARTICULARISM? 
In painting Yugoslavia as a state of ideological traitors, the Soviets forced the Yugoslav 
leadership to respond in the only manner possible—with ideology.  Unable to open up the 
question of Yugoslav territorial aggrandizement since he could find comfort in neither 
East nor West, Tito had to abandon his plans of actually bringing Albania under his 
control.  Moreover, Tito knew that he had to do something to withstand Soviet pressure, 
and so he first trumped up the patriotism still fresh from World War II on the one hand, 
while still adhering to Marxism by pressing forward with collectivization and rapid 
industrialization on the other.  Tito successfully tapped into and used the people’s 
collective memory from the recent past in his portrayal of foreign powers trying to 
dominate Yugoslavia.  Harping on the issue of national pride was easy for Tito, not least 
because whether Yugoslavs agreed with him or not, they knew Tito as a man who fought 
against the Nazis and for national liberation.  Tito’s use of pan-Yugoslav nationalistic 
                                                 
17.  “US Policies Toward Yugoslavia,” Department of State Memorandum, 15 July 1965.  LBJ 
Library.  
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rhetoric also fit within a larger anti-Soviet design, which had clear roots in the interwar 
period.        
 The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, a discreet, revolutionary group, operated 
throughout the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslav with little success and even less popular 
support.  The royal dictatorship imposed by King Aleksandar Karađorđević, along with 
the numerous inter-ethnic and inter-party disputes, negatively affected all political 
parties, but these events profoundly stigmatized the communists as illegal and subversive.  
This negative campaign produced unusually chilly relations between the Russians and the 
Yugoslavs that lasted through World War II.  Part of the problem facing the Yugoslav 
communists during this time rested on a general hostility towards the Soviet Union 
thanks to an extraordinarily large and outspoken group of tsarist émigrés residing in 
Belgrade.  This scenario set the tone for a general anti-Russian mood, upsetting the prior 
friendship and realigning Yugoslavia with the Central and West European powers.  A 
rather active stance outside the country by communists contrasted with a generally low 
level of activity within Yugoslavia.  Army sources revealed that 1,664 Yugoslav 
communists traveled to Spain to fight in the dramatic struggle against General Francisco 
Franco.  About half of that number perished in the war while 350 returned to Tito’s side, 
with the rest having begun resistance movements in other countries.18  Nevertheless, this 
                                                 
18.  See “Da li znate”? Vojnoistorijski glasnik 8 (Vojnoistoriskog instituta, 1970), p. 52.  These 
Spanish Civil War veterans, while failing to defeat General Franco, did earn valuable war experience and 
helped with Tito’s Partisan and postwar efforts.  For more, see Vjeran Pavlaković, “‘Our Spaniards’”: 
Croatian Communists, Fascists, and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939,” PhD diss., University of 
Washington, 2005.    
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effort at preventing fascism from triumphing in Spain proved a fruitless cause and further 
separated the communists from the prevailing political moods in Eastern Europe.19   
 Soon after Franco’s victory and the banishment of leftist opposition from Spain, 
Hitler unleashed World War II in Europe, and, by 1941, Axis forces had invaded and 
occupied Yugoslavia.  Tito liked to point out after 1948 that during the period of 
occupation the Soviet Union provided little support for his Partisans.  More aid had come 
from the Americans and the British than from the Soviets, but owing to a lack of Western 
troops in the Balkan theater of operations, it was the Soviet Red Army that helped the 
Partisans liberate Belgrade and it was to the Soviet Union that Tito and his entourage 
held passionate allegiances.  Because of the limited assistance that the Soviets had 
provided Tito, though, and indeed the limited contact with the Yugoslav Party more 
generally, the Yugoslavs understandably felt rather self-sufficient and could easily tap 
into that independent mood after 1948.20  In addition, the leading pro-Soviet factions 
within the Yugoslav Party—indeed many prewar Communist Party members—largely 
                                                 
19.  There has been some exciting new work coming out on the influence that the Spanish Civil 
War had throughout the world.  While much activity has been devoted to the Cold War as an ideological 
nightmare wrought with zero-sum games, the battle between fascism, democracy, and communism should 
not be passed over.  While it looked at a point that fascism might triumph, it ultimately failed and crumbled 
with Hitler’s Germany.  Being pro or anti-fascist meant a lot for deciding political careers, even in the 
United States.  For more see, Michael E. Chapman, “Arguing Americanism: John Eoghan Kelly and the 
Spanish Civil War” PhD diss., Boston College, 2006.    
20.  Ivo Banac has claimed, on the one hand, (with good reason) that the declaration of a 
provisional government in the Bosnian town of Jajce on 29–30 November 1943, was against the wishes of 
Stalin (at least at that time).  Banac has argued that Tito was self-sufficient during the war and emphasized 
that point explicitly.  See Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav 
Communism, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 11.  In contrast, Perović has argued that while this 
might be the case, recent work verifies that Tito was in contact with the Soviets and they knew of Tito’s 
intentions.  See Perović, “The Tito-Stalin Split,” pp. 36–37.         
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perished during the war.21  What emerged then was what Edvard Kardelj, chief Yugoslav 
ideologue and confidant of Tito, later described as a feeling of how the struggle for 
liberation against the enemies of Yugoslavia determined the independent nature of Tito’s 
communist regime.  Kardelj logically linked the self-sufficient revolutionary struggle 
with the postwar socio-political reform stemming from the events of 1948.22   
 
A YUGOSLAV WAY EMERGES 
Enormous tensions bubbled inside Yugoslavia as leaders fought a two-front struggle on 
behalf of the regime during the initial years following the split between with the Soviets.  
On the one hand, there existed the effort to consolidate the party by getting rid of the so-
called Cominformists and, on the other hand, Tito knew he needed to build a credible 
military deterrent against a Soviet-led invasion.  Kremlin operatives fueled these fires by 
attempting to drive rifts within the Yugoslav Party and inciting numerous border 
incursions into Yugoslav territory from Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania.23  
                                                 
21.  The number of Communist Party survivors following the war was relatively small, but worse 
still was any influence that pre-war members might have had came under attack thanks to a tremendous 
influx of hundreds of thousands of new members.  Some who had survived would perish or face 
imprisonment after the Tito–Stalin split, as was the fate of long-time Serbian Communist and then army 
General Sreten Žujović. 
22.  See Edvard Kardelj, Borba za Priznanje i Nezavisnost Nove Jugoslavije: 1944–1957, in 
Sećanje, (Ljubljana i Radnička štampa, Beograd: Državna založba Slovenije, 1980), p. 11. “A 
jugoslovensko socijalistička revolucije je bila narodna, demokratska, samoupravna.  Bez takve revolucije, 
Kardelj je to više puta isticao i naglašavao, ‘ne bi mogli nastati takvi oblici samooupravnih demokratskih 
odnosa kakvi su izgrađeni u posleratnom razvitku Jugoslavije.’” 
23.  See M.S. Handler, “Yugoslavia Tense over Balkan Rift,” New York Times, 16 September 
1948, p. 7. Yugoslavia had officially sent notes of protest to Romania and Hungary because of what 
Handler quoted as “attempts to stir up a revolt against Premier Tito”; see also, Zimmerman, Open Borders, 
p. 20.  Zimmerman has a number of 1500 incidents with Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria in 1948–50.      
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While Yugoslav sources reported “thousands” of border incidents, the fear of actual 
invasion among Yugoslav elites decreased with each passing day, purportedly because of 
a strong Yugoslav resolve in sealing the frontier.24  When the Yugoslav secret police 
uncovered several high-ranking military and political figures as covert Soviet agents, Tito 
used the opportunity to fight a high-profile campaign against all of his opponents, thus 
leaving him an enviable position of control of the country by the early 1950s.25  Yugoslav 
sources staked this early power on the “politically pure, unified,” and “monolithic,” army 
that prevented the “undermining” of the “great confidence and love of our peoples” 
towards the armed forces, and, by extension, the state.26  American aid, though slow to 
come, arrived in spades during the early 1950s when the U.S. government recognized a 
potential ally in Tito.27  Some Yugoslav decision-makers even declared a preference to 
                                                 
24.  Banac cites 7,877 border incidents; a reasonable figure.  See Banac, Cominformist, p.130.  
There were many reports of instability at all frontiers, and, after 1948, the Albanian and Greek borders with 
Yugoslavia were especially troublesome thanks to other unfinished revolutionary activity there.   
25.  See M.S. Handler, “Deserters of Tito Being Organized,” New York Times, 23 September 
1948, p. 13.  Handler noted that “Additional evidence of the lack of success of the Cominform’s drive is the 
substantiated fact that not a single member of the Yugoslav Politburo, or Central Committee, is known to 
have deserted.”  An exception to this was the desertion of a couple of army leaders, including Colonel 
General Arso Jovanović, who officials shot near the Romanian frontier in an apparent attempt to flee the 
country.  A situation report made during September 1948, took note of the success of Tito’s appeal to 
nationalism: “There appears no doubt that Marshal Tito gained considerable popular support among 
elements previously opposed to him when he was excoriated by the Cominform.”  Cited in C.L. Sulzberger, 
“Anti-Tito Trend is Absent in Yugoslavia, Experts Say,” New York Times, 6 September 1948, p. 6.  
26.  “From the Session of Representation of CC LCY For Organization of LC in Army,” 
Komunist, 29 September 1966, p. 3.  Yugoslav Subject Files I [YSFI] Army [A] Army 1953–66 [A53–66], 
container [cn.] 23. 
27.  For the impact at the time, see M.S. Handler, “U.S. Help at Once Held Vital to Tito,” New 
York Times, 29 December 1948, p. 10.  Much later, General Ljubačić—the Yugoslav Secretary of 
Defense—petitioned the U.S. government for aid as news of Tito’s ailing health spread and his death drew 
nearer.  While the most significant American aid ceased after the mid-1950s, such payments, gifts, or 
subsidies continued until the very eve of Yugoslavia’s demise.  Ljubačić noted in 1980, a similar dilemma 
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join forces with the West and fall under the American nuclear umbrella already in place 
to protect Western Europe from Soviet aggression.28  The tensions eased over time but 
the fundamental problem faced Tito and his loyal revolutionary band lingered on: What 
to do in the face of Soviet charges of heresy?  If survival meant that Tito would have to 
adopt a new line—one based upon elaborating the particular Yugoslav characteristics of 
revolution—then, they said, so be it.  The groundwork for an ideological break already 
existed and all Tito needed to do was emphasize the errors committed by Moscow’s elite.  
With vast changes to the Yugoslav Constitution put into place in 1953, the two systems 
separated and the LCY soon began flirting with a new ideological position, which, thanks 
to Stalin’s actions, rested on a newfound unity within the Yugoslav federation; anything 
else would have been “an ugly dream” for the leaders in Belgrade.29     
 
CHANGE BECOMES EVIDENT   
When Stalin declared that under no circumstances would the Soviets intervene after the 
                                                                                                                                                 
facing the Yugoslavs, that is, how Yugoslavia was in a “complicated position” between both international 
and domestic troubles.  He solicited a “special arrangement” with the U.S. government that would facilitate 
a system of credits that could be used to purchase weapons from the American military in case of crisis 
within or nearby to Yugoslavia.  See “General Graves’ Meeting with Yugoslav Secretary of Defense 
Ljubacic [sic],” 11 February 1980, American Embassy, Belgrade.  Carter Library.   
28.  Yugoslav Colonel General Dapčević stated to the Associated Press in an interview in 1951 
that “Yugoslavia is ready now to defend herself against any aggressor,” and he suggested that they “would 
like to have some United States atomic bombs,” and that Yugoslavia “could build more air fields for 
strategic bombing of Russian targets if given United States material.”  See “Yugoslavia Wants U.S. Aid To 
Include Atomic Bombs,” New York Times, 31 October 1951, p. 4.    
29.  See Marko Nikezić, “Stenografske beleške sa sednice Komišije CK SKJ za Informisanje, 13 
September 1968,” ASCG CK SKJ XXVI K.1 6, p. 27.  The “disunity of Yugoslavia” for him, was “an ugly 
dream.”  
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war in the internal affairs of other people, he established a basis for Tito to demand 
unquestioned independence.  Tito outlined his maverick nature as early as during his 
speech in Ljubljana on 27 May 1945, when he declared World War II a, “just war and we 
have considered it as such,” which gave them the right to “demand that everyone shall be 
master in his own house.”  “We do not want to be used as a bribe in international 
bargaining,” Tito said, and “we do not want to get involved in any policy of spheres of 
interest.30  Soviet leaders, of course, took note of the tone in the speech and were 
offended.  I.V. Sadchikov, the Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia, cried out that Tito’s 
speech was an “unfriendly attack on the Soviet Union” and that another instance of such 
insubordination would be met with “open criticism in the press” and disavowal.31  Such a 
warning, though, failed to rein in Tito’s individualism bring about a subservient attitude 
among Belgrade elites.   
The years following victory in World War II failed to alter drastically the balance 
of power in the Balkans.  Relations between Moscow and Belgrade were often affable, 
but also frequently chilly.  Tito’s hostile actions in demanding large sums as war 
reparations, alongside his brazen attempts to extend Yugoslav territory and influence 
among his neighbors, put Stalin’s position at risk as the Great Power in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  Soviet responses continued to caution the Yugoslavs about their foreign 
policies, but the answers Stalin received constantly affirmed obedience, but without 
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drastic changes in policies.32  Nevertheless, when Stalin had enough by early 1948, he 
wanted a way to discredit Tito; the Cominform grounded its response in Marxist rhetoric 
and considered that the basis for these and other Yugoslav “mistakes” grew out of the 
“undoubted fact that nationalistic elements” influenced the leadership of Yugoslavia.  
Moreover, Moscow’s vanguard believed that Yugoslav elites considerably overestimated 
their domestic supporters and their influence, thinking that, as a result, “they can maintain 
Yugoslavia’s independence and build socialism without the support of the Communist 
Parties of other countries,” chief among which, was the Soviet Union.  The path for the 
Yugoslavs, so the story went, rested with “healthy elements” within the party who could 
“return to internationalism and in every way to consolidate the united socialist front 
against imperialism.”33  In response to this and other condemnations by the Soviet Union, 
U.S. President Harry S. Truman finally wrote Congress a letter in 1952 stating, “I have 
determined that Yugoslavia is a country which is of direct importance to the defense of 
the North Atlantic area.”34  The Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided much the same prior to 
Truman’s declaration on behalf of Yugoslavia: “it is in the important interests of the West 
that Tito maintain his resistance,” but the United States government needed to foster “the 
reliability of the Tito Communist regime as an instrument of United States policy toward 
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the USSR.”35  By the early 1950s, Yugoslavia’s place rested securely in the middle; with 
even tacit American support, Tito gained freedom to maneuver and construct a new 
legitimacy in the wake of devastating crisis.   
In the aftermath of this contest between Yugoslav and Soviet leaders, the 
repercussions mandated that ideology shift.  The Kremlin lashed out against the 
Yugoslavs by noting that nationalism was rampant alongside a lack of democracy in the 
Communist Party and the corrupted security forces.36  Tito responded by charging that 
Stalin had perverted the Soviet Union’s path to communism and perpetuated, rather than 
weakened, the interests of the state, concluding that no resemblance to “state machinery 
which is withering away” yet existed in the USSR.37  The Soviets continued to harangue 
the Yugoslavs for the next thirty years, but, in general, their position grew more moderate 
following the death of Stalin.  But, Stalin’s first actions after 1948 sought to destroy 
Tito’s appeal and strengthen his own position among the remaining eastern European 
satellites.38   
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In this dire challenge to his credibility, Tito found justification in the form of what 
would become his own ideology—Titoism—coupled with encouragement from the 
United States government.  By the mid 1950s, Tito had even elicited the tacit approval of 
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who justified the idea of a heterogeneous communist 
movement and reaffirmed Stalin’s stated policy of non-intervention.  Yet, Khrushchev 
sorely misjudged the ramifications of an independent Tito when they jointly pronounced, 
“that the roads and conditions of Socialist development are different in different countries 
. . . that any tendency to impose one’s views in determining the roads and forms of 
socialist development are alien.”39  That joint pronouncement opened the way for 
doctrinal change in the communist world and legitimized a new multipolarity. 
The freedom Tito enjoyed rested, though, on the laurels of American declarations 
of support and Moscow’s hesitation to test American resolve.  Especially after the Korean 
War unleashed a general condemnation of aggression coupled with a determined military 
response by the Western powers, an invasion of Yugoslavia by the Soviet Union or its 
allies seemed unlikely.40  While in 1951, American analysts still thought such an invasion 
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possible, and notably so did Yugoslavs who called for vocal American support—even for 
American nuclear arms—that assessment significantly decreased by 1952 as the U.S. 
government saw Tito had consolidated domestic power.41   
While the main American concerns over aggression faded in 1952, the threat of 
instability in the Balkans remained a distinct possibility.  Moreover, American 
policymakers worried throughout the early 1950s about the continued success and 
expansion of communism because not only did the devastation of war in Eastern Europe 
combine with the Soviet presence to weaken American influence there, but both France 
and Italy possessed influential communist parties that caused concern for American 
policymakers; after all, a dangerous cohort of “Marxian Socialists,” who have 
“consistently looked on the USSR “‘in spite of all its faults’” as the hope of the world” 
remained influential in those countries.42  The U.S. government reviewed the situation in 
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1952, and noted several key features of the Yugoslav situation: “The assassination or 
death of Tito would weaken the regime and would afford added opportunity for the 
USSR to exploit political confusion and discontent, but would be unlikely to break the 
regime’s hold over the country or to produce fundamental changes in its foreign or 
domestic policies”;43 that “from the outset, the regime has placed a heavy strain on the 
population, particularly the peasant majority”; but that “current and future peasant 
discontent will be firmly handled on a local level”; and, finally, that “a coup d’état 
directed against Tito by high members of the CPY [LCY], the armed forces, the security 
forces, or by other dissatisfied elements is unlikely.”44  The American government 
asserted that Tito had solidified his position as leader after having combated domestic 
competitors and that by 1952, he commanded, “the loyalty and obedience of the party and 
the armed and security forces, and even opponents of the regime apparently prefer it to 
the reestablishment of alien control from Moscow.”45  With a secure power base thanks to 
his loyal police and officer corps—recognized by American policymakers as 
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strengthened by “confidence in themselves,” and a “particularistic pride in their own 
achievements”—and international recognition by the United States, Tito enjoyed the 
flexibility to pursue his own policies with a much-needed vigor.46 
  The U.S. policy of supporting Tito in the early years after the split paid off.  
Intelligence officials credited the efforts by the United States as key in convincing the 
USSR “that an attack by the adjacent Satellites would involve not only serious risk of war 
between the US or UN and these Satellites, but also the danger that such a conflict would 
develop into a general war.”47  American officials determined that “without doubt,” the 
Soviets would instead “exploit all possibilities short of war to liquidate the Tito 
regime.”48  The estimates of the Kremlin’s assessment of Tito and his successful 
resistance against its overtures led the Soviets to prevent further resistance from 
undermining their control in other East European countries.49  No doubt disappointing to 
American policymakers, this realization of further Soviet crackdown stood in stark 
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contrast with what was hoped on 30 June 1948—at the outset of the Tito–Stalin split—
when policymakers such as Kennan and institutions such as the Central Intelligence 
Agency—indicated that if Tito won “substantial concessions from the Kremlin or is 
successful in breaking away from Kremlin control,” then the Satellite countries would 
find it difficult to control their “nationalist” elements, who were reportedly “already 
rebelling against blind obedience to the Kremlin.”50  Although, by 1956, John Foster 
Dulles received a letter from the U.S. ambassador to Italy that Tito’s “triumphant entry 
into Moscow,” that year had helped him become “the physical symbol of this Brave New 
Day of a reformed, reconverted and peacefully evolving communism.”51  Something 
seemed to have worked from an American perspective. 
  
THE YUGOSLAV PERSPECTIVE OF TITOISM 
Yugoslav political elites struggled to maintain a high-level of awareness among their 
members and, as a result, reach deeply into larger society to build support for the regime.  
Tito’s most intimate supporters recognized that the best method for constructing a 
popular legitimacy rested on the policy of reforming Marxism vis-à-vis socialist self-
management and decentralization of power.  When political elites rejected the reforms 
that worked towards realizing self-managing goals, Tito removed them.  Much later in 
1966, Aleksandar Ranković, vice president of the federation and heir apparent to Tito, not 
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only used the power of his influential security service (UDB-a) for his own political 
agenda, but also made frequent public and private statements against decentralization and 
the path of Yugoslavia’s socio-economic development.52  Unable to tolerate such 
behavior, Tito removed Ranković, and created a stir inside Yugoslavia that firmly 
solidified the course of reform and forever banished authoritative totalitarianism.  Self-
management became more than a rhetorical device for LCY leaders.  Central Committee 
member Nijaz Dizdarević “stress[ed]” that it was necessary to put forth the question of 
the ideological awareness of the LCY members, because it was “of essential importance,” 
for the LCY’s role in society to “help the working man in his struggle for self-
management.”53  This emphasis on the individual was markedly different from the Soviet 
case, where decrees by the elite vanguard managed the lives of the workers.    
One of the primary institutions that touched all families in Yugoslavia, the army, 
also served a vital role in the construction of a Yugoslav ideology.  The Yugoslav 
People’s Army pledged that its members would be “uncompromised fighters for the unity 
of the Yugoslav Socialist society, brotherhood and unity,” and the “development of social 
self-government” in a democratic society.54  Owing to the nature of the revolutionary 
armed struggle during World War II, the army’s role in the state—vis-à-vis the LCY—
was paramount.  During the 1960s, a critical time in the history of the Cold War, a 
sharpening of laws and policies in the League of Communists emerged, but also 
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alongside the adoption of a series of educational courses to indoctrinate members of the 
armed forces.  Educators introduced a course entitled “The History of the LCY” with a 
special emphasis on understanding the conditions of social development.  The syllabus 
for the course outlined the “dialectic approach and solution of complicated problems” in 
the period of preparations and carrying out the revolution, as well as in the period of the 
“construction of socialism”—including a direct emphasis on the position of the individual 
in socialism; namely, Yugoslav socialism.55 
The roots of a particular Yugoslav identity remain clouded by the events of the 
1948.  How reliable are the sources that have painted Tito as a maverick unwilling to bow 
to Stalin?  Moreover, what did Stalin think he was going to achieve by expelling Tito 
from the Cominform?  While Yugoslav sources typically have painted Tito as 
independent-minded from the beginning, no sources prior to 1948 describe a unique 
Titoist ideology—as a sort of Yugoslav Communism in contrast to the communism of the 
Soviet Union.56  The latter emerged because of the split; this is undeniable.  What 
happened, though, in Yugoslavia after 1948, was not just a blind groping for survival; 
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rather, a deliberate system materialized that not only built legitimacy for itself, but also 
maintained a logic and consistency.   
Self-managing socialism lasted the entire life of Tito’s state and as it progressed, 
so did all other aspects of ideology and practice.  When the army reformed in the late 
1960s, it did so according to self-managing principles; likewise, with decentralization of 
the federal apparatuses came a reliance on local leaders that encompassed hundreds of 
thousands of Yugoslavs into the direct management of the state.  While not without its 
inefficiencies, defects, and other tensions over control of resources and authority, self-
management quickly became the mantra of Tito’s reform regime.  While domestic 
policies took center stage for self-management, the important changes that Tito 
introduced into his system greatly expanded into all spheres of Yugoslav life.   
Because of the far-reaching reforms towards further decentralization and self-
management, a parallel foreign policy promptly emerged.  In 1955, when a group of 
newly independent Asian states met at Bandung, Indonesia, Tito latched onto and helped 
develop the principles that these leaders formulated.  The resulting Non-aligned 
Movement spoke of lofty goals and primarily influenced change in the 1960s, including 
having spearheaded the fight against new colonialism (vis-à-vis a binding alliance with 
Moscow or Washington), domination, racism, and any interference in a country’s 
domestic affairs by another state.57  The last point is obvious from Tito’s own experience 
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with Stalin and the resulting Yugoslav fear of Soviet or Soviet-bloc invasion.  The 
Kremlin leaders kept this fear real with the suppression of riots in East Germany in 1953, 
protestors in Poznan, Poland, and the 1956 invasions of Hungary, which were meant to 
protect socialism; but also much later in 1968, when events in Czechoslovakia involved 
Red Army intervention.   
 A Yugoslav path necessarily opted out of either course laid out by Moscow and 
Washington.  As a working alternative to choosing sides, this third way naturally had the 
most potential in the Third World, those countries “liberating themselves from colonial 
slavery,” who only desired “to formulate their own policies, to be equal in international 
affairs, and to preserve freedom of action.”58  Yet, as history has shown, Yugoslav 
socialism failed to export itself as a political model for emulation.  Its limited success in 
drawing in members of the newly liberated countries of Africa and Asia towards a 
friendly relationship succeeded only as long as Tito could supply economic aid alongside 
moral and political advice, such as the delivery of arms to Indonesia or Egypt.  As Odd 
Arne Westad has argued, during the Cold War there existed two blocs, along with a host 
of revolutionaries whom all courted yet no one could control.59  The revolutionaries took 
sides according to the level of economic, military, and political aid dispersed.  Tito 
unfortunately had little money to finance a successful Non-aligned Movement and use 
that as a vehicle to export his worldview.  Tito had only words, and in international 
                                                 
58.  See “Belgrade: Nonalignment – Antithesis to Policy of Position from Strength,” Radio 
Belgrade, 11 June 1968, HU OSA 300–10–2 YSFI NAFP1, 64–68, cn. 286. 
59.  See Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Intervention and the Making of 
Our Times, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).   
A Struggle for the Hearts and Minds  51 
relations, words are cheap.  Traveling to Africa and Asia as part of goodwill missions, 
Tito tried also to promote trade, but his economy was never large enough to finance 
revolution.  In the important Yugoslav daily, Komunist, Gavro Altman said that “the 
lasting political interests of our own country and the well conceived interest of our 
economy” calls for a further involvement with fellow unaligned countries.60   
Indeed, Yugoslavia’s trade in the mid-1960s heavily favored the United States 
and Western Europe with forty-eight percent compared to thirty-three percent with the 
Soviet Union and its satellites and a mere nineteen percent with the nonaligned 
countries.61  Altman’s call for an increased Yugoslav economic presence across the world 
mirrored the hopes of politicians who saw trade as an innocuous manner of expanding 
Yugoslavia’s influence throughout the world.  Tito declared, “Yugoslavia has its own 
ambitions,” including what he termed as the “interests of further development of 
socialism and the furthering of the revolutionary development of all progressive 
people.”62  One path towards that goal of leading the way among all so-called progressive 
people rested on Yugoslavia’s economic expansion; with a healthy and diverse economy, 
Tito could have looked to selling his ideology along with his country’s products.   
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RECOGNITION OF DIFFERENT PATHS 
A tremendous success for Tito’s reform program and the construction of his ideology 
after the 1948 split came not merely from a willing domestic audience, but with 
recognition from outside sources.  While the American government saw Tito as a useful 
force and supported him in the overall fight against the Soviets, Tito could not rely on 
support from Washington alone to sustain him.63  In 1955, a summit between top leaders 
from the Kremlin and Belgrade met to hash out their differences and achieve a working 
relationship again.  During this Soviet–Yugoslav summit in the summer of 1955, Vice 
President Edvard Kardelj stated that the Yugoslavs believed that diplomatic relations 
with all countries stood out as a moral and socialist objective.  As a result, he supported 
international socialist parties in addition to communist parties, whereas Kardelj 
harangued the USSR’s elite for supporting only those under their control.  Such a policy, 
according to Kardelj, was foolish.64  Dizdarević also voiced his willingness to 
“collaborate with all socialist countries,” but, in particular, those familiar “countries in 
the socialist camp and the Warsaw Pact.”65  The Yugoslavs defended their position 
because, as they saw it, support for social-democratic parties would help draw those 
parties away from the capitalists, while the opposite would occur if left isolated.66  This 
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position supported the Yugoslav sense of sovereignty and cooperation, but it also fit 
within the larger dilemma of European security, especially in light of the creation of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with West Germany’s inclusion in 1949.  
Khrushchev and Tito alike had jointly recognized the German problem as the bane of 
European stability and social development.67  The difference in the positions of the two 
leaders, though, revealed themselves with the proposed solution.  Obviously, Tito had 
less to lose by recognizing one Germany whereas the Soviets needed to have East 
Germany—as a sovereign German state—legitimized by other parties.68  But the Soviets 
could gain little ground in the West, according to the Yugoslavs, because with secrecy 
and exclusion, Western Europe—in particular countries such as Britain and France—had 
more to fear from the Soviets than from a resurgent Germany.   
From the Yugoslav point of view, the Soviet brutalization of other parties stood as 
a testament as to why the LCY had to remain steadfast on ideological questions.  
Yugoslavs could not tolerate such a hierarchical system within self-management, but 
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said, “That means, the question of resolving the German question is closely bound with the question of 
European security at the same time.” (Znači, pitanje rešenja nemačkog pitanja usko je vežano sa pitanjem 
evropske bezbednosti, u isto vreme).  See “Fragmenti” ASCG CK IX 119/I K.2 45–90, folder 56.    
68.  See also “Magnetofonske beleške i materijal sastanka Izvršnog bira,” ASCG CK SKJ IV K.7 
7, 1971, p. 96.  The discussions at this 1971 meeting outlined the thoughts of the committee in terms of 
Brezhnev’s visit to Yugoslavia in that same year.  It coincided with a “definite turn to solve the German 
problem” and finally rest easy regarding security in Europe.  The Soviets had ratified talks in Bonn, which 
maintained the status quo and agreed to set a time in the near future for what would become the Helsinki 
Accords and put an end to the uneasiness over borders in Europe.  
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while admittedly different compared to the Soviets, the founding members of NATO told 
Tito that Yugoslavia was ineligible for membership because of its one-party system.69  In 
some instances, Western governments afforded Tito some flexibility and held out 
stimuli—the Italian government, despite its territorial dispute with Tito over Triest, 
followed the Americans’ lead and encouraged Tito with a commercial agreement.70  For 
the West, Yugoslav leaders fit the original Joint Chiefs’ declaration of anti-Soviet 
attitudes that would benefit U.S. foreign policy; importantly, though, because Tito 
refused to abandon Marxism and embrace the American system prohibited his inclusion 
into multinational systems such as NATO and, later, the European Economic Community 
(EEC). 
The appreciation shown to Tito by the West, while in effect allowing Tito to 
reform his Marxist principles in peace, underscored the larger problem of legitimacy for 
the dictator.  The lack of real inclusion into a foreign system or association helped 
reinforce the fear in Belgrade over their position in time of war.  Yugoslavs could easily 
question how far the West would go to save Yugoslavia if attacked and how much 
economic and military aid the Yugoslavs might receive in the future without abandoning 
Marxism.  Uncertainty plagued the West on this score too, and George Kennan had 
already noted in 1949 that the U.S. response to an independent Tito needed to avoid 
                                                 
69.  Tito told Khrushchev, that the forming members of NATO told him that Yugoslavia cannot 
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56.      
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“extremes.”  Americans could neither “beseech” Tito’s favor and ruin his domestic 
standing nor “repulse” him and cause a victory for the Kremlin.71  Leaders in the West 
tried, though, to modify Yugoslav domestic politics because of the critical aid provided 
during the post-1948 Soviet economic blockade—Khrushchev criticized Tito in 1955, 
saying, “If the Americans gave you help, they did not do it for good publicity.”  Tito 
defended himself to Khrushchev when he explained that he had not been a fool; in fact, 
as Tito declared, “It was not only that they used us, but we used them too.72  Over time, it 
became clear that Tito used this ongoing uncertainty shrewdly to extract concessions 
from both sides; the problem in the early 1950s rested on the need for someone to 
recognize Tito as the undisputed leader of his Yugoslavia.   
True to his revolutionary character and the socialist principles for which he and 
his followers fought, Tito strengthened his credentials as a Marxist and, in 1955, was 
granted something completely unforeseeable since the summer of 1948—recognition by 
the Soviet Union.  The results of the Soviet–Yugoslav summit in 1955 opened up new 
avenues for Yugoslav policy and helped to consolidate the legitimacy of Tito’s 
communism.  Having admitted that “our ideological development has always stuck with 
Marxism-Leninism,” but that the Yugoslav system has employed different means to 
realize the Marxist-Leninist vision, Yugoslav leaders successfully negotiated for a series 
of concessions and admissions from the Soviet party, including the notion that different 
paths to socialism existed.  Yugoslavs then successfully debunked the myth of an 
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immaculate Soviet design, and secured guarantees by the Soviet Union not to mingle in 
the internal affairs of other countries—including economic and ideological affairs.73  
With the stroke of a pen, Moscow held up Tito’s system as valid.  The Kremlin’s 
recognition of Tito as an independent socialist actor paved the way for further reforms 
and strategies for Yugoslav ideologues to perfect the new Yugoslav system under the 
communist umbrella.  While within less than a year, Soviet tanks would roll into Hungary 
to protect socialism there against so-called “reactionary elements” of the Hungarian 
party, Tito could nonetheless rest easier than at any time since 1948.74   
The result of this reassurance of sovereignty meant that for Tito and the LCY, a 
further revision of their principles and methods could proceed unhindered.  By the early 
1950s, the LCY dominated the state and Tito reigned supreme without serious domestic 
competition thanks to the unswerving loyalty of the armed forces and police.  Tacit 
acknowledgement by the West of Yugoslavia’s security and recognition of independence 
by the Soviet Union gave Tito the freedom to experiment with ongoing reforms to help 
perfect his new self-management system without risk of Soviet intervention.  Initially 
serving, after 1948, as a way to make the Yugoslav system different from its Soviet 
progenitor, self-management—the idea that workers would theoretically own the means 
                                                 
 73.  “Soviet–Yugoslav Communiqués on Policies and Party Aims,” New York Times, 21 June 
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Socialist development are different in different countries,” relations between progressive forces throughout 
the world should be based “on complete freedom of will and equality, on friendly criticism and on the 
comradely character of the exchange of views on disputes between our parties.” 
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of production and have a larger voice in the administration of the state at all levels—
quickly grew to dominate the political geography and define Yugoslav socialism.   
Edvard Kardelj asserted in 1953 that the Yugoslav Federation had become, 
“above all a bearer of the social functions of a unified socialist community of the 
Yugoslav working people.”75  The assertion of the rights of the working people was 
deliberate, because elites regarded them as the backbone of Yugoslavia and the ones who 
would take the initiative and work towards communism.  To that end, the Constitutional 
Law of 1953 stated in Article 2 that, “all power belonged to the working people, who 
exercised their power either directly (social self-management) or indirectly, through 
representative organs.”76  The decade following the enactment of the 1953 Constitutional 
Laws displayed to Yugoslav elites that a more thoroughgoing reform platform needed 
implementation because society had not progressed as thoroughly as they wanted.  The 
resulting constitution in 1963 sought to clarify the role of worker in factory units and the 
nature of a working administrative system that could adapt to the changes.  The basics of 
self-management as originally described meant that people would work to satisfy both the 
personal and common needs.  Framers defined people to acknowledge workers as the 
cornerstone of the country’s ongoing success.  The introduction to the 1963 Constitution 
noted that the “peoples of Yugoslavia” were “aware that the further consolidation of their 
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brotherhood and unity” was necessary and that to accomplish that task they “have 
founded a socialist federalist community of working people.”77 
Self-management took center stage alongside the recognition of worker’s 
predominance in Yugoslavia.  Self-management gave each Yugoslav citizen a stake in 
the government and served to boost the popularity of the regime in the wake of 
ideological contradictions following the split with Stalin.  The workers became the de 
facto center point of Yugoslav politics and represented the ideal Yugoslav identity that 
leaders vied for because, as Veljko Vlahović, a member of the committee on socio-
political relations stated, the profound “strengthening among worker’s organizations and 
a quality grasp on our self-management” will uplift all of Yugoslavia.78  LCY members 
desired reactions from the people and took input seriously as part of self-management’s 
continual transformation—when people pointed out negative aspects of the Yugoslav 
system, elites countered with a boilerplate charge that reform was incomplete and 
“intensive” changes needed to flourish in the rest of society.79  Despite all of the rhetoric, 
a clear gulf existed between theory and practice and as people responded favorably to 
reforms leaders recognized that their new socio-economic system might solve all of their 
problems.   
In constructing a Marxist state, the chief Yugoslav ideologues turned towards a 
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policy of self-management that stressed the nature of a decentralized administration of 
industry, agriculture, and government.  At first, self-management spoke to merely the 
working class, but the concept expanded to include virtually every sector of society with 
the exception of the armed forces (and then until 1968, when army leaders adopted the 
same within the defense sector).80  Representative of the Yugoslav spirit of reform, 
Miljenko Živković, a Yugoslav military thinker, reckoned self-management to be the 
answer to questions of divisions throughout society.  Because “self-management and self-
directing societal relations form the basis of the unity of the classes, political and national 
interests, as well as all nations and nationalities,” Yugoslav leaders confidently boasted of 
their success in uniting the citizenry and building Marxism.81  Leaders might have begun 
to win over people to Marxism, but the more important question was whether Marx had 
the formula for a successful and lasting society.    
In attaining self-government, the regime assigned the duty of the working people 
in the social-political communities to “decide on the course of economic and social 
development, on the distribution of the social product, and on the matters of common 
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concern.”82  Self-management would continue as the primary means of state-driven 
ideology and, as such, play a commanding role in giving people a stake in the system and 
incorporating them indefinitely into it.  What Yugoslav leaders at the time did not 
envision, though, was how dangerous constant reform of a one-party state might 
ultimately prove. 
 
SELF MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE 
Tito’s system had emphasized decentralization so much that any desire to centralize 
moved “backwards,” in the minds of certain leaders, and created an “extremely 
dangerous” scenario for “the development of self-management.”83  When the party 
experienced an increase in participation and membership in the early 1970s, leaders 
called the time a “renaissance” that sprang from the LCY’s “positive program and the 
prospects it offers society.”84  The more pressing reason for increased participation came 
after the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia because of the popular fear that 
Yugoslavia was next on Leonid Brezhnev’s list.  Whatever the case, the overall value of 
participation in government vis-à-vis self-management—despite the convoluted 
rhetoric—showed itself through the logical consistency with the overall Yugoslav notion 
of independence.  When Tito rejected Soviet control of the Yugoslav economy through 
joint-stock companies and import-export deals, Tito rejected the entire platform whereby 
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a central authority directed the state and the economy.  Self-management grew to become 
the rhetorical and ideological personification of Tito’s independent mood.  Giving more 
power to the workers in an abstract sense meant that more people would have some sort 
of say in how Yugoslavia progressed, but also that leaders respected diversity.  As a 
result, centralism became a synonym for “neo-Stalinism” and “dogmatism,” and thus 
solidified the logical base of Yugoslav planning.85     
 Local solutions to local problems destined that no central planning board ever 
determined quantities of goods or laid out specifics regarding worker productivity.  While 
the party always had goals and expectations, the reality ensured that workers operated 
alongside managers in what became an intricate system of shared authority.  Because 
elites pressed this logic of catering to local interests throughout Yugoslav society, it also 
becomes clear how between 90 and 100 percent of Serbs in Kosovo learned Albanian, 
whereas Serbs in Vojvojdina or Croatia would have had neither any reason nor 
availability to do the same.86  When it came to discussing how to help farmers within 
different regions and populated by different ethnicities, the Commission on National 
Minorities member Geza Tikvički declared, “the federation does not have any kind of 
possibility nor does it have the instruments to help”; instead, areas such as Kosovo or 
Macedonia needed to rely on local government.87  Strahil Gigov agreed with Tikvički and 
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noted that the state had not “yet realized such instruments” and that differences between 
the regions and the entire country posed unique problems.88  To that end, the idea that 
each region, or larger commune, would have a “Common Investment Fund,” to help 
modernize or improve other aspects of the locality took hold as a potential solution to 
foster growth.89  Naturally, the “question of cadres,” became an important sticking point 
for the LCY, as it needed to maintain a certain amount of “moral” influence within each 
worker commune.90  After all, Comrade Laća emphasized at a committee meeting that 
“we cannot insist that everyone conform to a single rubric.”  “We are,” Laća said, 
“looking at things in a practical way.”91  That so-called practical nature helped create the 
intricate self-management regime that would touch almost every Yugoslav at one point or 
another despite problems of cooperation or a lack of an overarching authority.92 
 Because the central problem in Yugoslavia was supposedly “economic” in nature, 
the character of self-management as an economic system had tremendous influence in 
shaping Yugoslavia’s entire development.93  Moreover, because the leadership rested on 
their credentials as directors of the Communist Party, the question of ideology remained 
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paramount.  Self-management, as it first developed in the early 1950s, tackled the 
economic issues facing Yugoslavia, and was the first step in a larger attempt to gain 
credibility from the people in light of Soviet repression.  Once the system began to 
function normally, managers saw room for improvement and, by 1959, leaders saw 
further reform as necessary to create new economic units (make the size of the work 
commune smaller), and to build in the costs, quality control, maintenance of capital, and 
profit sharing techniques within the larger business environment.94   
Before 1948, Tito could always look to the Soviet Union to legitimize his 
situation, no matter how popular, or unpopular, he was in Yugoslavia.  After 1948, 
though, Tito’s only chance for achieving the kind of general legitimacy he so desired 
rested with the people of Yugoslavia.  With this idea of reaching out to the people, self-
management strove to provide people with the tools to realize their stake in the regime 
and reaffirm Tito and his LCY as their councilor, naturally in accordance with Tito’s 
flexible prescription of Marxism.  While self-management later touched all aspects of 
Yugoslav society, an examination of how it functioned within factories or larger work 
communes gets to the crux of the issue of how, in the Yugoslav case, labor employed 
capital instead of vice-versa.95  In a factory setting, it was typical for the workers there to 
have several organizations of authority.  The most important factory organizations were 
the workers’ council and the managing board.  These two combined to represent all the 
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employees at the factory and gave workers a chance to cooperate within a structure of 
shared authority.  Complementing these two organizations, the labor union committee, 
youth organization, and the League of Communists organizations served as further 
avenues for advancing the cooperative spirit that leaders desired alongside trusted 
government auxiliaries.96  While LCY members typically formed a minority on the 
workers’ councils, they represented a powerful voice in the overall system, and workers 
likely reelected LCY members to key positions within the decentralized factory 
management system.  Depending on the size of the factory, the workers’ council might 
have eclipsed the power of the labor union committees—the smaller the factory, the more 
likely the workers’ council catered to need individual needs of workers, whereas the 
larger the factory, the more likely bigger management issues would preoccupy the 
workers’ council.  Devolved authority, though, meant that a worker possessed multiple 
avenues for compensation and recourse.97  Furthermore, to manage the rights of workers 
and prevent against an overwhelming management led by university graduates, or other 
white-collar workers, the law mandated that at least three-fourths of all members of the 
workers’ councils be production workers and no more than one-fourth in any sort of 
office or management position.98  Finally, derived from the workers’ council, the 
management board—also in accordance with the same job-specific regulations as the 
workers’ council—served as the executive organ of the council.  The management board 
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implemented policies from the larger body and it was this group that developed monthly 
operational and production plans.99   
 The laws allowed management boards flexibility in operation that gradually 
worked to establish a general economy based on market socialism.  But, because 
Yugoslavia could never open up to a true market economy, the limitations on industries’ 
ability to prosper and grow became apparent during global recessions or price increases 
on energy.  Despite that, reacting to the market and using supply and demand along with 
world prices helped these firms develop and prosper in a way that the Soviets or their 
allies in Eastern Europe could not.  Nonetheless, the party was always in the background 
and served to communicate the directives set down by the government to the workers and 
urged them to comply with socialist aspects of development.100  
 An interesting consequence of the self-management system led to a common 
disparity in earnings among not only different industries, but within industries as wages 
depended on the success of the individual enterprise.  Because the workers’ councils 
determined what to do with excess capital—pay out extra wages, increase existing wages, 
make capital improvements, or hire more staff—being part of a profitable company could 
yield great financial results regardless of individual performance.  In contrast, a 
struggling firm might not reward a good worker because the employer could not compete 
in that industry or suffered with some sort of larger problem such as high energy or 
transportation costs.  In such cases where the company ran a deficit, the local commune 
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or regional government would typically loan money at a favorable rate to help reverse 
matters.101  Often, though, such financial guarantees by the state kept management in a 
business-as-usual mindset and failed to spur credible ingenuity to respond correctly to 
market forces.  
 In summary, the Yugoslav self-management system allowed for and adapted to 
diversity, and succeeded in bringing common folk into the decision-making system.  
While the LCY served as a guiding ideological institution, it did not monopolize workers’ 
councils nor did it dictate all policy.  It did set limits and worked to increase its own size 
in Yugoslavia as a truly popular party that could, as leaders liked to boast, with unity of 
purpose and dedication, uplift Yugoslavia.  A partial market system, though, did create 
inequality in a system that was supposed to liberate and draw support for the regime 
among its core group of supporters—workers.  Perhaps most importantly, self-
management served as a bellwether of consistency for the ideological position of Tito’s 
system—it helped differentiate between the Soviet and Yugoslav systems and legitimized 
Tito’s reform package in the post-1948 environment that could continue indefinitely so 
long as reforms moved towards prosperity.   
 
TOWARD A UNIQUE YUGOSLAVIA 
This description of events following Stalin’s 1948 polemic banning the wily Yugoslav 
dictator from the Cominform shows Yugoslavia’s unique place in the community of 
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nations.  Tito’s survival—in any form—meant that reform of Marxism would take on 
critical importance in his regime as he first sought to re-mold communism into his own 
system and then perfect it over time.  The reform agenda that came about in the early 
1950s never ceased as Yugoslav leaders recognized the transformative nature of identity 
at all levels, public and private.  Claiming never to have strayed from the tenets of Marx, 
Tito sought to make his rule legitimate in the eyes of his people and throughout the 
world.  Yugoslavia’s identity fluctuated over the years, but elites compared themselves to 
their neighbors in the East.  Twenty years after his banishment by Stalin, Tito’s comrades 
understood that the focus of their comparison always rested on how Yugoslav 
Communism—principally vis-à-vis self-management—was better than the Soviet variety.  
As a member of the LCY’s Commission for Information and Propaganda, Marko 
Nikezić, outlined this view following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; he stressed 
how the Warsaw Pact leaders “intervened in the first place because” of their own 
dysfunctional systems.  In stark contrast to the “very closed system” in the Eastern zone, 
the Yugoslavs had a less systematic bureaucracy and proceeded by way of a positive 
spirit of reform.102 
 Having tied the Yugoslav identity to the existence of a failing, hostile, Soviet 
Bloc, elites in Belgrade established the concept of a menacing other to highlight the 
progressive nature of their own system.  At each juncture during the remainder of the 
Cold War, Yugoslav elites pointed to political mishaps, economic misery, and social 
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unrest as part of a generally unpopular existence under the Kremlin’s control.  Dramatic 
events such as the invasions of Hungary in 1956, or Czechoslovakia in 1968 enhanced 
these opportunities for propaganda victories, having given the Yugoslavs fuel to prove 
the differences between the two systems.  Yugoslavs argued in the press and in private 
about these stark differences between the socialist systems, such as the openness and 
liberalism in Yugoslavia compared to “other socialist countries,” with closed frontiers 
and harsher standards.103   
Soviet power, though, scared the Yugoslav elite and set a mood of caution among 
party members in Belgrade.  Despite this, LCY managers were on a quest to make 
Yugoslavia something that contrasted with their estranged cousins in the Kremlin.  
During normal times too, the two ideologies stood apart.  Nijaz Dizdarević, another 
member of the Commission for Information and Propaganda, reaffirmed the superiority 
of what set Yugoslavia apart; that is, self-management, because “it solves all dilemmas,” 
and that “reform is key to success.”  The challenge, though, to the course of reform and 
the course towards what leaders like Dizdarević described as “democratic socialism,” 
required genuine success and popularity among the Yugoslav people.104  Soviet leaders 
spoke of the LCY as “revisionist” partly because of the problematic nature of foreign 
capital infused within their command economy; but, Yugoslav elites could parry such 
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offensives because, according to Nikezić, the LCY isolated itself from the Soviet Union 
by pointing out the lurid hypocrisy emanating from Moscow.  As a capstone, Nikezić 
added that importance rested with the public seeing reality as it truly was and this was 
possible only in Yugoslavia and would solidify the course towards progress.105  
 While Tito could always outline the differences between his system and the West, 
he needed to work a bit harder to differentiate how and why people needed to look to him 
as a socialist leader instead of the vanguard in Moscow.  Tito’s task grew easier over the 
years following 1948, especially as Yugoslav elites pieced together their own unique 
interpretation of Marx vis-à-vis their commitment to socialist self-management.  Tito had 
in fact created his own worldview, but the contrast to the Soviet Union made an 
important difference when defining what it meant to be a Yugoslav.  They were 
wealthier, freer, allowed to go to church, had more control over their daily lives, and thus, 
could be considered happier than their counterparts in the Soviet-controlled East.  
Yugoslavs, while not quite Occidentals, were not exactly Orientals either, and that 
mattered greatly as identities underwent constant refashioning.  Pivotal for leaders was 
that in contrast to its eastern neighbors, “socialist practice and socialist theory” in 
Yugoslavia existed, “in harmony” because “dialogue” was “completely open.”  Yugoslav 
secret police, of course, kept track of just how “completely open” dialoague was among 
anti-regime elements, but the Yugoslavs were correct to note the contrast between the 
domineering Soviet police state with their own.   
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The prevailing view of Tito’s state during this period—indeed until 1966—is that 
the state underwent a centralization program by the LCY in order to solidify its reign.106  
This is also what historian Ivo Banac has referred to as Tito taking on Stalinist trimmings 
in the wake of the 1948 split.107  Only after 1966, this view has contended, did Tito relax 
the reins of power and allow for self-management and decentralization to take place 
without question.  This period of openness then ended quickly once the anti-regime 
protests in Croatia mandated a return to central control over Yugoslavia’s constituent 
republics in 1971.  A general review of the armed forces supports this view since army 
officers only embraced self-management in the army—vis-à-vis the Territorial Defense—
in the late 1960s and then quickly moved to recentralize.  Although this view has merits, 
an exhaustive search in the archives of former Yugoslavia shows that this centralization 
program was neither so expansive nor such a large part of Titoist history.  Instead, elites 
constantly reformed Marxism to fit the changing needs of the country—before and after 
1966.  Eric Kocher, the interim U.S. Charge d’Affaires in Belgrade in 1965, held that 
domestically, “Yugoslav socialism has departed from many Marxist norms and is now,” 
and seems ready to continue to be “devoted to a search along ways of its own choosing” 
as a vehicle to “perfect its identity.”108  Self-management—as outlined from the 
beginning—by definition meant devolution of authority from the center and provided 
people more of a voice in their own lives and the affairs of the state.  While in the initial 
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years following the split, Tito sought rearmament and used his police to crack down on 
Cominformists, this was but a brief effort to stabilize the regime to face the greater fear—
that is, a dangerous and aggressive Soviet Union.  Reform was the hallmark of Tito’s 
system and while the system moved back and forth at times in response to different 
threats, a reformist agenda was nonetheless always present and as Kocher noted, already 
well established by 1965.  This move for constant reform distinguished Tito’s Marxism 
from any other at the time.  Soviet leaders always remained reluctant to speak of reform 
and they made no bones about it, telling Tito in a 1967 meeting, “they saw no reason to 
change [a] system which had been effective for fifty years.”  Moreover, Tito’s endless 
tinkering with his political-economic views strengthened the Soviet sources of 
disagreement.109     
 
CONCLUSION 
When Hitler committed suicide in his besieged Berlin bunker in May 1945, fascism as a 
viable worldview went up in flames alongside his charred body.  The two remaining 
competitors—communism and market capitalism/democratic liberalism—thereafter 
possessed awesome power over molding the direction that the new Europe would take.  
For a time following the end of World War II, it looked as if the entire world was going 
to fall into two categories and another great conflict would soon engulf mankind.  Not 
only did World War III grow farther from reality with each day, but the notion of 
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infallible control from the two centers of the postwar world also proved to be false.  
Much of the Third World entered global politics without pledging allegiance to either 
side, because the period after 1948 gave birth to the possibility of a competing socialist 
system, providing that Tito remained in control of Yugoslavia and continued his active 
criticism of both blocs.  The documents clearly show that Tito’s real revolutionary nature 
came of age after 1948 as he fought to not only survive as the uncontested leader of 
Yugoslavia, but also affect wider change throughout the world.  His break from Stalin 
reinforced already independent motives of his LCY comrades and gave them the freedom 
to embark on a reform campaign to refashion Marxism’s identity to fit their special 
circumstances.  At home, the logic of self-management grew to become the hallmark of 
the reformist agenda that would last until the last days of Yugoslavia; meanwhile, 
intersecting with self-management’s principles at home, several key Yugoslav officials 
reached out and found ideological compatriots abroad.   
After 1948, the Soviets made Tito a wanted man.  That he survived meant that the 
Cold War, still in its infancy, needed realignment.  Titoism as a viable ideology 
confidently emerged by 1953 with the passage of numerous constitutional amendments 
but Titoism as a “separate path to socialism” meant that throughout Eastern Europe and 
especially in the emerging Third World, the Soviets moved to the defensive.  Building 
upon the success of those initial reforms, the LCY continued to adapt and cater to 
changing environments; nevertheless, the party always remained the sole interpreter of 
Yugoslav thought.  A particular Yugoslav system, once emerged, sought legitimacy at 
home, and then abroad as a third way—Titoism represented a complete Weltanschauung, 
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which implied a distinctive foreign policy, tied heavily to the principles of peaceful-
coexistence and sovereignty for all nations.   
The changes that the Yugoslavs put into practice fundamentally shifted the 
rhetoric of the new state from that of a tight, federalist system based upon Stalinist 
principles, to one marked by a decentralized administration, self-managed communes, 
and worker rights.  Yugoslavia truly stands out in the history of Cold War-era European 
politics with the emphasis placed by the LCY on the world’s stage vis-à-vis 
nonalignment.  Tito’s system thus gained a voice among the decolonizing peoples and 
those newly free from colonial rule.  I argue that a multipolar world reemerged soon after 
1948, because neither the Red Army nor its patrons in Moscow were seen as invincible, 
perfect, or unquestionable—nor was the West the only opponent: Those illusions died on 
in the summer of 1948 when Stalin exiled Tito and his party.
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CHAPTER TWO: NONALIGNMENT AS YUGOSLAVIA’S ANSWER TO BLOC 
POLITICS 
 
Yugoslavia is permanently and fatefully committed to the policy and movement of non-
alignment … In the case of Yugoslavia, to renounce non-alignment would mean to 
reconcile itself with the gradual loss of freedom and independence and of the right to 
determine independently its way of internal development. 
—Yugoslav scholar Ranko Petković1   
 
When Stalin waved his little finger at his opponents, they had an uncanny way of 
disappearing.  Before World War II, when the Soviet leader sought to consolidate his 
power and fortify his regime, his fellow citizens well understood the power of that wave.  
But when the conclusion of the war brought Soviet control farther West than any of the 
Russian tsars could have ever dreamed, Stalin’s wrath had a grander purpose of 
incorporating Eastern Europe into the Soviet system.  Stalin thought that in 1948, through 
his employment of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), the banishment of 
Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito would mean the return of pro-Soviet elements to the 
leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party.  That this did not happen proved to have 
far-reaching consequences for Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and the broader Cold War.   
As the Yugoslav Party struggled in the wake of this challenge to maintain its 
sovereignty in light of aggressive Soviet towards rhetoric and actions throughout Eastern 
Europe, Tito undertook an ambitious reform program of his communist system that 
would eventually sever any resemblance to its Soviet cousin.  For ideological reasons, 
though, reforms could never bring Yugoslavia into line with the competing model offered 
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by the West; therefore, surviving between the awesome Cold War superpowers meant 
making tough choices, not least of which included navigating a successful course outside 
of competing bloc politics.2  Tito and the regime he created suffered from grave threats 
from outside—primarily from the Cold War standoff—and from within the country.  
True to his revolutionary nature, Tito could never be content with simple survival—he 
needed to affect greater change and, as a result, he sought a legitimate and powerful 
outlet for his ideas that could, at the same time, provide much needed flexibility despite 
the rigid international political environment.  While some in the West described 
nonalignment as simply part of Tito’s “groping towards a conception of world society,” 
Yugoslavs did see a global perspective at hand—namely, in the way operating outside of 
blocs allowed leaders to “exercise their sovereign right to choose freely their internal 
ways”—most especially, “their own way of socialist development.”3  This chapter 
contends that Tito’s quest for legitimacy and confidence compelled him to help establish 
the Non-aligned Movement to determine a genuine third force in world affairs in a larger 
effort to strengthen his regime. 
 Scholarly work on the Non-aligned Movement is rather limited in nature, as most 
authors wrote contemporaneously with roughly three competing viewpoints: a Marxist 
interpretation, Yugoslav moralism, and political realism.  The Caribbean political 
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scientist A.W. Singham took the Marxist perspective in his argument over the roots of 
nonalignment in having underscored it as a powerful social movement fighting against 
the capitalist and nation-state formulations of the capitalist world.  Nonalignment for 
Singham was not a political move taken by political actors to secure some sort of peace 
and cooperation, but rather an institutionalization of the “redistribution” of wealth that 
eventually would claim victory in a brutalized Cold War world divided by a struggle on 
the part of “European capitalism trying to resurrect itself,” combined with what Singham 
hinted at as a racist program to destroy the ‘“Asiatic tyranny’” of communism.4  Beyond 
his emphasis on economics and social classes, Singham did correctly allude to the real 
power of nonalignment—that is, one where national liberation movements (presumably 
beginning with Tito’s) gained “international legitimacy” through cooperation.5    
 Leo Mates, former Yugoslav ambassador to the United States, wrote in 1972 that 
nonalignment was not a predictable policy for the Yugoslav government to accept; rather, 
as soon as Stalin banished Tito, the Yugoslavs found themselves in an isolation that 
forced them to reevaluate their tenuous plight between both blocs.  The result inspired 
LCY leaders to cooperate with newly independent actors in the Third World—initially 
Burma, Ethiopia, and India.  What Mates emphasized, though, was how the cooperation 
began as economic and only made strides in the political domain “soon after,” which 
fomented into a clear policy of nonalignment.6  While Mates accepted that Yugoslavia 
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“played a fairly important role” in the formative period of the Non-aligned Movement, he 
retreated on how Yugoslav leaders manipulated foreign policy as part of a larger project.  
“Through the policy of nonalignment,” Mates concluded, Yugoslavia “could not hope to 
achieve anything other than her affirmation in a quite general sense of developing ties 
with countries with which she felt a kinship.”7  Seen by Mates as a sort of disinterested 
observer lending merely moral support, he has rejected the idea that Yugoslav leaders 
saw practical benefits in their association outside of the blocs and had more at stake than 
simply kind words.  
 Finally, then, the look at nonalignment from a realist perspective understands 
power politics as an arbiter of change and recognizes the intersection between 
pragmatism and conformity with a dynamic Yugoslav ideology.  Yugoslav scholar Alvin 
Rubinstein wrote a compelling thesis on Tito and nonalignment, which outlined three 
primary goals for the Yugoslavs: “to reinforce Yugoslav efforts to end its position of 
relative diplomatic isolation”; “to link Yugoslavia to the “‘progressive’” forces in the 
world”; and to “develop the markets Yugoslav enterprises thought they saw” in the Third 
World.8  But, Rubinstein failed to identify the desire by party elites to export their 
ideology; instead, he stalwartly denied that Yugoslav leaders tried to ever ‘“sell’” their 
model because of what he termed a “psycho-political climate conducive to the leisurely” 
exchange of ideas.9  He confused the idea, though, and quoted Tito as having urged 
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economic expansion in developing countries, “so that Yugoslavia would be an exemplar 
of equality, dependability, and disinterested involvement in the strengthening of 
socialism and mutual ties between states and peoples.”10  As was Tito’s view of the 
power of economics influencing political change, this chapter will later unveil high-level 
conversations between Yugoslav leaders that point directly to their desire to “sell” 
Yugoslav socialism to the rest of the world. 
 Political scientist William Zimmerman correctly linked the internal development 
of self-management as a domestic ideology with similarities in nonalignment’s foreign 
policy.  But, Zimmerman took the two policies and argued against what he termed as the 
popular Western and Yugoslav view of development; namely, instead of nonalignment 
coming out of self-management and the chaos since 1948, he saw self-management as 
having come from nonalignment.  He theorized how a “primacy of foreign policy 
considerations” was overwhelming, because the Yugoslavs needed to find a way to 
position themselves between the blocs—the “domestic expression” of that need became 
“self-managing socialism.”11  Zimmerman got it right when he saw the fluidity between 
the two spheres of policy, but what neither he, nor any other author, have linked together 
was how these policies—whether related or taken separately—articulated a deliberate 
attempt on the part of the regime’s elites to construct a tangible legitimacy for themselves 
and the worldview that they purported to have.  That this process was dynamic shows the 
pragmatism of the Yugoslav leaders in their quest for survival and success, but in any 
                                                 
10.  Rubinstein, Yugoslavia, p. 221.  
11.  William Zimmerman, Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution of 
Yugoslavia, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 28.  
Nonalignment as Yugoslavia’s Answer   79 
 
case, it was from this concern for their right to rule that they sought the vindication of 
their efforts by the Yugoslav people.  If others in the Third World—or any other for that 
matter—cared to recognize them, the better.12 
  
THE DYNAMIC OF CHANGE INSIDE YUGOSLAVIA  
The internal challenges in Yugoslavia following Stalin’s condemnation of Tito and his 
comrades forced a dramatic realignment in Yugoslav political thought.  As a result, elites 
dedicated themselves to molding Marxism to fit best their needs and took a bold new step 
in creating a fresh trend in socialist thought outlined as socialist self-management.  The 
seriousness with which people took this new Yugoslav approach inside the country was 
real, at least for elites.  Yugoslavia needed to be different from the Soviet Union and if it 
became apparent that Soviet tendencies entered the new political life of the Yugoslav 
Communist Party (LCY), then Tito’s loyal followers immediately attempted to rectify 
matters.  Yugoslav politicians branded the great Soviet evil, as represented by 
bureaucratic chauvinism, “an expression of non-democratic and bureaucratic relations” 
that emerged in a “period when it became clear that it was impossible to continue 
developing socialist democracy and self-government relations in society,” while at the 
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same time retaining a hierarchy with power concentrated in the center.13  In contrast, the 
Yugoslav system, according to General Ivan Gošnjak, head of the Yugoslav People 
Army’s (JNA) security service, relied on “progressive thought” formed because of “the 
party and its forums,” but also out of “self-government organizations” instead of 
hierarchical and archaic bureaucratic processes.14  Ceda Kapor, a member of the Central 
Committee from Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH), argued, “everything should be done” so 
that communists and working people realize that the “implementation of the decisions” 
meant “struggle for the further development of socialism and socialist social relations, 
not only one for clearing up the national problems and relations.”15  Reform in 
Yugoslavia had become, in fact, the only reality for leaders to construct a popular and 
legitimate system and reform operated as the watchword of progress and the solution to 
all cantankerous dilemmas.     
 
NONALIGNMENT’S PREHISTORY 
In the spring of 1953, at the beginning of decolonization, Asian socialist leaders met in 
the capital of newly independent Burma.  The Conference of Asian Socialists in Rangoon 
included representatives from states across the world, including China, India, Indonesia, 
Israel, Japan, Kenya, and observers from the recently renamed League of Communists of 
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Yugoslavia.  At the opening of the conference, conscious of the potential for creating 
change, the Israeli delegate, M. Stein, called forth a prayer that the conference “lay the 
foundations of a “Third Force” which shall alter the existing balance of power and shall 
prevent a new world catastrophe.”16  Global war, particularly nuclear war, was high on 
the list of participants’ worries—Japan’s delegate Suzuki called atomic devastation a 
“major problem”—but leaders also worried about the continued movement to lift the 
“foreign yoke” from colonies across the world.17  When Comrade Aleš Bebler from the 
LCY rose to make his statement during the opening ceremonies, he recited the recent 
struggles fought out in the heart of Europe between his party and the Kremlin, because, 
for Bebler, conflict set the tone for socialists worldwide.  He took for granted a general 
animosity among the conference participants for the Soviet Union—complete with its 
“socialist and peace loving mask” used to trick hapless Marxists as part of a larger 
“insatiable hegemonistic appetite.”18  To prevent Soviet aggression into this awakening 
Asian and African paradigm, Bebler reiterated the struggle against all types of 
oppression, equality among peoples, and peaceful international coexistence.19 
 Influence from the small Yugoslav delegation of just three men—Milovan Đilas, 
Aleš Bebler, and Anotelko Blažović—made a noteworthy difference in the direction that 
socialists worldwide would take in the coming years.  Many of these leaders no doubt 
desired simply to exercise neutrality in political and economic disputes, but most of them, 
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partly thanks to speeches like that by Bebler, helped to push for a more proactive, non-
neutral foreign policy.20  Real neutrality was difficult in the Cold War environment—
indeed, branded “immoral” by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles—and the Third 
World leaders who met at Rangoon, formed a nucleus of actors who took the concept of 
neutrality and moved it forward by using a non-allied status to gain concessions from 
multiple world powers.21  The increased contact between the parties from India, 
Indonesia, Egypt, and Yugoslavia in particular also helped form such new methods of 
political thought despite the zero-sum attitude of the early Cold War, because the rhetoric 
emphasized the sovereignty of all countries and the resistance against forming lasting 
alliances—regardless of ideological similarities.  Yugoslav leaders shared a common fear 
among the newly liberated leaders in Africa and Asia of dominance by superpowers and 
had begun as early as at Rangoon to foster cooperation with an eye towards resisting 
directives from stronger powers.  In that spirit, if anyone at the conference held out 
positive ideals about the Soviets, Bebler strongly condemned Moscow by asking people 
to look no further than the “Yugoslav experience” to learn the evils of supremacy by any 
group.22   
While the short conference set the groundwork for how socialists could compare 
notes and cooperate in all respects, many of the foreign-policy statements that arose had 
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logical links with the broader principles of the Yugoslav brand of socialism coming into 
its own based on socialist self-management.  Beginning in Rangoon, elites had found a 
way to extend their principles to the sphere of foreign policy, because of the unique 
circumstances between the competing Cold War blocs and the compelling desire of many 
leaders of the recently independent or soon-to-be independent countries to maintain their 
sovereignty.  The Cold War dilemma was not the only problem, facing leaders in 
nonaligned countries.  Competition over political control from domestic challengers also 
forced the hand of these leaders, including Tito.  LCY leaders overtly boasted about how 
their influence in foreign affairs gave them credibility and such rhetoric surely worked 
for dual goals; that is, not only did nonalignment boost support for the regime among 
Yugoslavs, it also marginalized any potential opposition group.  With this balance 
between foreign and domestic forces, the work of political scientist Steven David has 
proven important.  His concept of omnibalancing has taken into account traditional 
balance of power considerations, but also employed the need of Third World (and 
Yugoslavia’s) leaders to counter “all threats.”  David has recognized how most of the 
Third World states faced primarily external threats from one or the other superpower; but, 
moreover, “the needs of leaders to appease secondary adversaries as well as to balance 
against both internal and external threats” marked the quest for political survival.23  A 
common feature for the Third World leaders, as outlined by David, was the idea that 
leaders were “weak and illegitimate,” and therefore, the stakes in domestic politics 
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trumped those of external threats.24  Such logic applies to Yugoslavia too, but more so 
with respect to the issue of legitimacy rather than the weakness.  Tito had handily 
defeated his domestic enemies and while he spoke out against fringe groups at times of 
crisis, the reality saw his loyal army and police in unquestionable positions of dominance.  
Nonetheless, the idea that nonalignment served dual masters and that these leaders 
employed omnibalancing has considerable merit.  Without any other positive foreign 
policy and in tandem with the construction of a positive, ideologically driven legitimacy, 
the profound consequences of nonalignment stood out as critical aspects of state relations 
during the Cold War.       
Attending the conference in Rangoon meant that each of the participants desired 
international legitimacy for their regimes and for their worldviews.  By sending a 
delegation, the Yugoslavs attempted to break out of their isolation and align themselves 
with a movement shielded against condemnation by either the United States or the Soviet 
Union.  Asian socialists largely already understood the dangerous situation facing the 
world and thought about how they could alternate between Moscow and Washington—
and the emerging power in Beijing.  Tito’s flexibility to move within these Asian 
circles—for example, with respected party members such as Vladimir Dedijer visiting 
India as early as 1948—grew as tremendous help from the United States government 
arrived in depth throughout the early 1950s, which mainly served the American interest 
in weakening the power of the Soviet Union.25  Despite poor harvests and potential 
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upheaval by allies of Stalin, Tito had survived and his top ideologues and comrades—
Edvard Kardelj and Milovan Đilas—were hard at work to create a better socialist system.  
But much work still remained as Kardelj unveiled his new constitutional restructuring in 
1953 as a means to further distance Yugoslavia from the Soviet Union—not only for the 
Yugoslavs but for socialists throughout the world.  
 
FROM RANGOON TO BANDUNG 
Two years after the Rangoon meeting of 1953, many of the same leaders organized the 
Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, and boldly proclaimed a new spirit 
guiding foreign affairs.  The attendees at Bandung cried out that they did not “want any 
domination either by force or by ideology,” but, instead, simply “genuine peace.”  The 
path to peace rested in a “willingness and determination” to live together, exude “mutual 
respect for each other’s national sovereignty,” to foster the “abhorrence of aggression,” 
and never to interfere in “each other’s domestic affairs.”26  Five guiding principles of 
Bandung’s meetings set out to change the face of global politics: Mutual respect for each 
other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in 
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each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence.  
Building on the long struggle of independence from Asian and European colonial powers, 
the meeting sought to establish a new system free of entangling alliances and hostilities.   
India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru proved an important figure in 
establishing the basis of what these ideas would come to mean for the conference 
participants, thanks to his experience leading an independent India since 1947, and 
having played a significant role as a leader among South Asian states (specifically, as 
part of the Colombo Five).  While Nehru at first denied the centrality of India’s role in 
Asian geopolitics following India’s independence, he quickly discovered the complexity 
of his country’s importance once the Communist Mao Zedong proclaimed victory over 
his nationalist rival Chiang Kai-Shek in nearby China.  With two massive empires in Asia 
furthering the cause of international communism, Indian leaders, despite a modest degree 
of sympathy for Marx’s ideas, clearly felt enormous pressure to succumb to a 
combination of Soviet and “belligerent” Chinese force.27  Nehru felt that Indian foreign 
policy before independence was a product of British imperialism and that India possessed 
                                                 
27.  See George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian–African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 
1955, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 5.  Kahin argued in his summary that the conference 
participants “envisaged the Conference as providing an opportunity for working towards three important 
objectives of their foreign policies: (1) avoidance of war, most immediately between China and the United 
States; (2) development of China’s diplomatic independence of Soviet Russia; (3) containment of Chinese 
and Vietminh military power and political influence at the southern border of China and the eastern 
boundaries of Cambodia and Laos, and the combating of illegal and subversive Communist activities in all 
non-Communist Asia, particularly in their countries.”  In the mid-1960s, Tito noted in a conversation with 
Governor Averell Harriman and Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick that China stood opposed to the policy of 
nonalignment and, “in fact, the belligerent Chinese do not want to promote peace in the world but wish to 
aggravate the international situation.”  See Department of State Airgram, “Conversation between President 
Tito and Governor Harriman and Ambassador Elbrick,” 30 July 1965.  LBJ Library. 
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no historic hostilities with any people in the region, and, as a result, he attempted to shape 
policy accordingly, while also placating the diverse religious, ethnic, and linguistic 
interests under his control.  He swiftly recognized the advantages in a coordinated policy 
of neutrality that would weaken any so-called artificial hostilities because of an alliance 
with either Moscow and Beijing or Washington—to that end, Nehru coined the term 
nonalignment during his April 1954 visit to Colombo, Sri Lanka.28  
The global political realignment that occurred following the end of World War II 
gave a voice to many formerly underrepresented actors.  While some European countries 
fought to hold onto their earlier possessions, most were too broken at home to deal with 
troublesome appendages half a world away.  One-by-one, the old colonies broke free.  In 
a flurry of excitement, local leaders—including a wealth of pragmatic revolutionaries—
declared the independence of new countries and set on a path towards building new 
states.  While India was a tremendous new addition to the global community during the 
first stage of decolonization, another significant Asian country to emerge was Indonesia.  
On the island of Java, the new government, led by the nationalist Sukarno, took form and 
soon encompassed almost all of the former Dutch East Indies; but, as in India, the idea of 
a united vision for a diverse state proved troublesome.  Unlike Nehru, Sukarno could 
avoid civil war and partition, but his foreign policy could not avoid the reality of both the 
obvious Cold War divide and the emerging significance of Islam as a political force.  
Like Nehru, Sukarno desired a foreign policy that could allow for flexibility and relieve 
the embattled country of any problematic alliances.   
                                                 
28.  See Richard L. Jackson, The Non-aligned, the UN, and the Superpowers, (New York: Praeger, 
1983), p. 6.   
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Finally, the other major leader to seek an independent foreign policy and grow as 
a regional power surfaced in the turbulent Middle East.  Despite certain Western leaders 
having promised a Jewish homeland in Palestine since the Zionist movement took shape 
in the late nineteenth century, the real embodiment of this pledge only appeared at the 
end of World War II.  While the region itself hosted some of the battles during the war—
most notably in Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia—the postwar power vacuum fostered a 
eruption of independence movements.  A focused and anti-Western Muslim attitude soon 
developed with the establishment of Israel by the Western powers.29  Unable to expel the 
Jewish settlers, most of these newly emboldened Muslim leaders nonetheless tried to 
resist the change as best they could.30  As one of the most populous and potentially 
                                                 
29.  See Synopsis of the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, (Cairo: Information 
Department, 1964), p. 4.  Abdel Khalek Hassuna, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, argued that 
Arabs were, in 1964, “still fighting against imperialism, which has driven the people of Palestine from their 
own land and established Israel as an instrument of aggression, threatening the security, unity and progress 
of the Arab hope.”  I would argue that Western support for Israel from day one has defined most of the 
history of the modern Middle East.  From the beginning, anti-Israeli feelings were rife among Muslims and 
the important support from the United States of Israel made sure that while certain Arab regimes found a 
friend in Washington—thanks to the importance of oil—no truly positive partnerships could be created.  
While Saudi Arabia, for instance, would become a staunch U.S. ally, Saudi motives rested in large part by 
the ruling elite seeking to win international backing against revolutionaries and other popular anti-regime 
elements inside the kingdom.  True alliances between Arab states and America remained difficult to forge 
and maintain partly because of the pro-Israel position of the U.S. government.  The contradictions were too 
clear to allow for American aid to beget American-style regimes in the Middle East and the entire region 
had fallen easily as potential prey to the Soviets.  Soviet success was limited partly because of the posturing 
by Nasir that helped to strengthen Tito at the expense of Moscow.  The ramifications of American policy in 
the Middle East, of course, have become clearer as the Cold War ended; the United States still finds 
difficulty in forging positive, popularly accepted partnerships in the region because of continued support 
for Israel, and, moreover, having suffered for so long without real economic reforms to enrich the people of 
the region, none of the states are economically viable or stable in an integrated, global environment.  
30.  While Israel was invited to participate at the conference at Rangoon, the rhetoric there from 
the delegates from Egypt and Lebanon drew lines of controversy that continued at Bandung; at the latter, 
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powerful nations in the Middle East, Egypt soon became the foremost place for advocates 
of Arab positions.  The personification of this new voice, Gamal Abdel Nasir, attempted 
to bring his impoverished state to a higher level using the Cold War dilemma to his favor 
by gaining high technology and modern weapons to create a new Egypt.  But Nasir faced 
not only the tremendous handicap of bordering a powerful and motivated Israel; indeed, 
he also fought for contested space in Lebanon and later merged with Syria to form the 
United Arab Republic as a way to change the overall balance of power in the Middle 
East.  The results of the meeting at Bandung, coupled with the complex and rapid pace of 
change across the globe, had persuaded Nasir of the benefits of seeking closer ties outside 
of the Cold War divide.  Nasir’s logic—similar to a Nehru or a Tito—rested on the idea 
that if enough leaders of small states could organize and resist overtures from the 
superpowers, they would not only break free of traditional neutrality but by so doing, 
would guarantee their own sovereignty and build their economies through trade and 
concessions from both blocs.  But prior to, and again at Bandung, Indonesia’s Prime 
Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo asked pointedly, “‘Where do we, the peoples of Asia and 
Africa, stand; and for what do we stand in this world dominated by fear?”’31  Over the 
next few years, Tito revealed his provocative answer. 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Pakistan effectively blocked the participation of Israel despite Burma’s and India’s desire to have Israel 
there.  See Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, p. 3; and, Ahmad Hussein in First Asian Socialist, p. 28.  
Hussein of Egypt equated socialism with justice and therefore could not “recognize Israel” because 
Egyptian leaders could not “tolerate imperialism in any form.” 
31.  Sastroamidjoj in Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, p. 12.  
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YUGOSLAVIA AND THE THIRD WORLD 
When the French demographer Alfred Sauvy created the term Third World in 1952 to 
describe the areas of the world ravaged by poverty, high birthrates, poor infrastructure, 
and the like, he sought a comparison with the distraught Third Estate of the French 
revolutionary period of the late eighteenth century.32  The comparison struck a chord 
among the leaders of the emerging states, and the organizers of Bandung adopted the 
term at the conference to describe their plight and raise awareness over these issues that 
most affected them.  With that in mind, Yugoslav participants must have felt out of place 
at Bandung and afterwards, when delegations travelled and spoke with Nehru, Sukarno, 
and Nasir—all Asian leaders who faced profoundly differing challenges.   
 Yugoslavia had, though, two critically important reasons for becoming involved 
with the organizers of Bandung.  The more pressing of the two was the incredible 
promise that these third-world statesmen held for reinforcing independence and resisting 
bloc domination.  Having an already abundant store of rhetoric speaking to issues such as 
sovereignty, non-intervention, and peaceful co-existence, from their diatribe with the 
Soviets and their reform of Marxism that set into place socialist self-management, 
Yugoslav leaders pinned their hopes on making these statements politically important and 
bringing their foreign policy agendas to the forefront of decision-making across the 
globe.   
During the early 1950s, leaders all over the world molded ideology to fit their 
own unique needs—including Tito in Yugoslavia.  With decolonization, new movements 
                                                 
32.  See Nathan Keyfitz, “Alfred Sauvy,” Population and Development Review 16:4 (December 
1990), p. 729. 
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searched for a way to organize the economic and political system that they fought to 
control.  When the Socialist Conference of Asian Nations opened in Rangoon in 1953, 
men such as Tito saw it as a venue for shaping the future.  He sent one of his most trusted 
colleagues at the time, Milovan Đilas, who played a prominent role in the initial 
transformation of Yugoslav ideology following the Tito–Stalin split.  Years later, of 
course, Tito persecuted Đilas for advocating for reforms that Tito saw at the time as too 
radical.33  That other world leaders held out sympathetic notions for Tito’s project and 
encouraged by his success at thwarting Moscow without succumbing to the promise of 
American aid should not be surprising.  The significance of Đilas in Rangoon and a 
Yugoslav delegation at Bandung shows the convergence of ideology and global politics 
as systematic and deliberate rather than reliant upon whimsical or idealistic leaders.  
Leaders throughout the Third World, and in Belgrade, assigned great value to a united 
non-bloc foreign policy and leaders like Tito used it to reconcile problems with domestic 
affairs. 
While Yugoslavs began to reach out into the Third World in the early 1950s, the 
domestic arena also underwent great reform and proved critical for understanding the rest 
of Yugoslav history.  Edvard Kardelj, the well-placed Yugoslav politician and theorist, 
had noted how peace relied upon “the struggle for real independence,” and for a “gradual 
abolition of the backwardness which divides the developed and underdeveloped nations.”  
In other words, Kardelj vied for more partners in the quest to unite his message with 
                                                 
33.  See Slobodan Stankovic, “Tito and the Nonaligned Summit in Colombo,” RAD Background 
Report/166, 28 July 1976, HU OSA 300–8–3 Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research 
Institute [RRFE/RLRI], Background Reports [BR], cn. 186.  
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those in the Africa and Asia.  To achieve the goal of peace, “great political struggles and 
many social forms” would come to the fore, but of course, Kardelj envisioned the victory 
of his socio-political system.  Nonetheless, in two simple thoughts, Kardelj had 
anticipated much of Bandung’s spirit and automatically made Yugoslavia a natural ally of 
the emerging nations in Asia and Africa.34  Joining hands with the statesmen at Bandung, 
and using issues such as cooperative neutrality and peaceful co-existence as a working 
policy, not only opened up trade possibilities with emerging states, but more importantly 
helped Yugoslav leaders fight continued Soviet pressure with moral and spirited rhetoric.  
While not accepted as official conference policy, the words of Sir John Kotelawala, the 
Prime Minister of Ceylon, certainly vilified the Soviets when he loudly declared at 
Bandung that everyone should voice their opposition to “Soviet colonialism as much as 
Western imperialism.”  After all, Kotelawala asked in perplexity about “Hungary, 
Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland,” 
were these countries somehow different from the “colonial territories in Africa and 
Asia?”35  To the partners of Bandung, there certainly was no difference.      
The second key reason that Yugoslav leaders latched onto the idea of 
nonalignment and involvement with the Third World rested on the regime’s manipulation 
of positive ideals to help build legitimacy for itself, vis-à-vis foreign-policy related 
                                                 
34.  Titoism and the Contemporary World: Edvard Kardelj’s Speech to the Fourth Congress of the 
People’s Front of Yugoslavia, (New York: National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc., 1953), p. I.13. 
35.  Text of the Address on Colonialism to the Political Committee of the Asian-African 
Conference made on the afternoon of Thursday, April 21, Bandung 1955: Addresses to the Asian-African 
Conference and Statements to the Press by the Rt. Hon. Sir John Kotelawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon, 
(Colombo: Government Press, 1955), p. 18. 
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victories.  The examination of the domestic reforms enacted by the Titoist regime in the 
wake of the Soviet threats after 1948 has shown that Yugoslav elites sought to establish 
something that was both different and meaningful.  In response to Soviet indictments, a 
Yugoslav ideology surfaced that not only promised to “build a better life” for the people, 
but also began to deliver at least the semblance of progress thanks to American aid in the 
early 1950s, and the movement away from collectivization that together, jumpstarted the 
Yugoslav economy and allowed self-management to show real promise.36     
Yugoslavia’s path outside of Soviet control brought with it a different kind of 
responsibility in foreign relations.  Acting independently meant that on one hand, the 
difficult task of making tough choices rested on Yugoslav shoulders and answers could 
not simply mimic the declarations of others.  On the other hand, meanwhile, 
nonalignment allowed the Yugoslavs and other participants to avoid pressing questions 
and tense foreign-policy dilemmas.  Foreign Minister Koca Popović declared that 
independence and good relations with all was the most desirable policy for his country.  
In fact, Yugoslav political elites understood their legacy of independence since Tito’s 
Partisans took to the battlefield with liberation on their minds as the LCY had taken 
“upon itself” the “historic responsibility for the fate of the peoples of Yugoslavia.”37  
                                                 
36.  Tito in “Speech of J.B. Tito at Labin,” Vaclav L. Benes, Robert F. Byrnes, and Nicolas 
Spulber, eds., The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute: Full Text of Main Documents, (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Publications, 1959), p. 256. 
37.  Fabijan Trgo, “KPJ i obrana zemlje do aprilskog rata 1941,” Vojnoistorijski glasnik 2 
(Vojnoistorijskog instituta, 1970), p. 30; Edvard Kardelj directly linked the later policy of nonalignment 
with the Yugoslav experience in World War II.  He saw the power in independent thought and national 
liberation movements when he mentioned that in “China, Yugoslavia, Vietnam” had genuine “people’s and 
socialist revolutions” as an “outgrowth of national liberation wars,” and making themselves “as one of the 
significant factors in resolving world problems and antagonisms.”  See Edvard Kardelj: The Historical 
Nonalignment as Yugoslavia’s Answer   94 
 
Popović surmised that if the Yugoslavs kneeled to one or another power then they would 
not be acting in a “correct” manner, therefore exposing their position as a genuine force 
in world politics and jeopardizing the delicate construction of legitimacy (vis-à-vis self-
management) from within.38 
The preeminent goal of the Yugoslav leadership rested with an understanding that 
they needed to reconcile their domestic policy and its currents with the direction of the 
country’s foreign policy.  To that end, Kardelj observed that Yugoslavia must fight to 
change the world, because “the world will not change by the dissolving of blocs but blocs 
will disappear with the changing of the world.”39  Kardelj’s opinion, of course, rested on 
the newfound morality of Yugoslav socialism as it had developed since 1948.  That same 
year when Kardelj presented the address at the Fourth Congress of the People’s Front of 
Yugoslavia, he outlined the nature of global politics as he saw it.  Having recognized 
evils in both Soviet imperialism and Western economic might, Kardelj promptly 
redefined Yugoslavia as special.40   
Just as in Yugoslavia and elsewhere, the notion that policy justified the right to 
rule, Kardelj recognized the dilemma facing the Soviet Union.  He hypothesized that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Roots of Non-alignment, Nikolaos A. Stavrou, ed., (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), p. 
42.  
38.  Cited in Elie Abel, “Fresh Arms Step Proposed by Tito,” New York Times, 1 January 1958, p. 
2.  
39.  See Edvard Kardelj: The Historical Roots of Non-alignment, p. 60.  Kardelj further elaborated 
the Yugoslav idea of what nonalignment meant by understanding the movement as “not only a form of 
international policy and action, but also a form of social, class, economic, political and cultural 
redeployment of the modern world.”  To Kardelj, the Non-aligned Movement was consistent with the idea 
of Marxism’s progress towards reaching utopia.     
40.  See Edvard Kardelj in Titoism and the Contemporary World, pp. I.9–I.10.  Kardelj claimed 
that the Soviets must seek greater domination as the “only method of preserving” their system   
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Soviet leaders used their system of “extremely aggressive, menacing, coercive” behavior 
and the “immense concentration of military and political power” to “justify” their 
existence before their “own society” because they had “exhausted all possibilities of 
progress” inside their “own country.”41  Kardelj sought to refrain from military repression 
and thus favored positive reinforcement as the means for progress in Yugoslavia.  
Toward the same end, justifying a special and unique place for Yugoslavia laid the 
groundwork for the vocal foreign policy that would embody the Non-aligned Movement.  
Moreover, the place for Tito’s Yugoslavia would be in influencing the further expansion 
of socialism and future revolutionary developments of “all progressive people,” living in 
those countries “liberating themselves from colonial slavery,” who only desired “to 
formulate their own policies, to be equal in international affairs, and to preserve freedom 
of action.” 42  Vice President Svetozar Vukmanović, in an interview with the New York 
Times, downplayed the consequences of opposition with the Soviets when he observed 
that the ideological differences between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union represented a 
                                                 
41.  Edvard Kardelj in Titoism and the Contemporary World, p. I.10. 
42.  See “Fragmenti” ASCG CK IX 119/I K.2 45–90, folder 56.  “Jugoslavija ima svoje ambicije, 
da ona hoće da igra tako neku naročitu ulogu u socijalističkom svetu i da prema njoj treba drugačije 
postupati nego prema drugim socijalističkim zemljama.  Naime, drugim rečima, ja mislim da treba tako 
postaviti odnose ne samo specijalne prema Jugoslaviji nego uopšte u socijalističkom svetu.  Ja govorim u 
interesu daljeg razvijanja socijalizma i daljeg revolucionarnog razvoja i omogućavanja okupljanja svih 
progresivnih ljudi...” (Yugoslavia has its own ambitions, that it wants to play these idiosyncratic games in 
the socialist world and that towards this it must be different than towards other socialist countries.  Namely, 
in other words, I think that it must situate relations not only especially toward Yugoslavia but also in 
principle in the socialist world.  I am talking in the interests of further development of socialism and 
furthering revolutionary development and the possibilities of gathering all progressive peoples....)  See 
“Belgrade: Nonalignment – Antithesis to Policy of Position from Strength,” Radio Belgrade, 11 June 1968, 
HU OSA 300–10–2 YSFI NAFP1, 64–68, cn. 286. 
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“normal occurrence,” and that such differences should not interfere with general policy.43  
Following the Tito–Stalin controversy in the summer of 1948, while the Yugoslav 
leadership consistently reaffirmed the pledge neither to join other blocs nor to submit to 
outside pressures from any side, they did flirt with temporal regional alliances, but once 
nonalignment took off as a credible alternative, the LCY abandoned those too.  In 
response to controversial bickering between the Cold War Goliaths, the Yugoslavs 
stressed peace and disarmament that fed on the intense fear of nuclear devastation.44 
 
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: INSTITUTIONALIZING LEGITIMACY 
Racked by external and internal challenges since Stalin discarded Tito and publicly called 
for his ouster, Yugoslav leaders had struggled to retrieve momentum and build a positive 
legitimacy based on popular support of Tito’s right to rule.  By using nonalignment as a 
vehicle for legitimacy, though, the Yugoslav leadership managed to vocalize their unique 
views of Marxism, but, most importantly, Tito could take the lead regarding so-called 
progressive thought and advocate on behalf of Yugoslavia to a global audience.  On a par 
with the kind of ideological changes within Yugoslavia, the LCY used its newfound 
international voice to sponsor its leadership in global ideology; in 1958, the LCY 
pronounced, “Marxist thought in the course of the last two decades has not kept in step 
with the advance of contemporary society.”  In other words, the Soviet Union fostered an 
illegitimate version of Marxism ruined by “bureaucracy and statism,” and its attempt to 
                                                 
43.  Elie Abel, “Yugoslav Lauds U.S. Relationship,” New York Times, 11 January 1958, p. 3. 
44.  See “Yugoslavs Issue Party Platform; Affirm Own Road to Socialism,” New York Times, 14 
March 1958, p. 3. 
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build an “ideological monopoly”; both factors that perverted true Marxism, according to 
the Yugoslavs, who recognized the dynamism of ideology and, as a result, fostered a 
system that would keep pace with society’s constant transformations.45  Tito’s logic 
behind nonalignment rested on equality among states because, as he put it, 
“internationalism means respect for equal relations,” among states and the indivisibility 
“into camp and non-camp groups”—just like how Titoism spoke about equality and 
respect, internationalism was also “universal.”46 
 Nearly a decade later, in 1968, Central Committee member Nijaz Dizdarević 
buttressed Tito’s argument for nonalignment by hailing its “universal character” as 
representative of the LCY’s aspirations to find solutions to “major, vital questions” 
plaguing the world, such as threats to peace and stability.47  The Soviet threat remained in 
force despite periods of goodwill and normalization.  One such ebb in relations came in 
1955, when Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, flew to Belgrade and worked out a 
deal with a stronger and more resolute Tito.  While the Soviets recognized that “separate 
paths to socialism” existed, they declared that they would not threaten Yugoslavia as they 
once had; but soon, in 1956, the invasions of Hungary harkened back to the days of 
overwhelming Soviet power.48  Use of force by the Soviets in 1956 left Tito hesitant to 
                                                 
45.  “Tito’s ‘Do-It-Yourself’ Program Annoys Soviet Communist Chiefs,” New York Times, 23 
April 1958, p. 11. 
46.  Elie Abel, “Tito Tells Soviet to Stop Meddling in Yugoslav Rule,” New York Times, 23 April 
1958, p. 1. 
47.  “Dizdarevic: Non-alignment is not only for Small Countries,” CMD, 27 December 1968.  
HU OSA 300–10–2 YSFI, Non-aligned Foreign Policy 1964–68 (2 of 2) [NAFP2, 64–68], cn. 286.  
48.  When in 1955, Tito and Khrushchev recognized and pronounced the idea of “separate paths to 
socialism,” they again renewed their stance the following year in 1956, during a visit to Moscow by Tito.  
The joint declaration from 26 June 1956 reasserted, “the path of socialist development varies according to 
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condemn forcefully any of the parties involved as a way to maintain influence in 
Budapest but his lack of any meaningful pronouncement hurt his credibility.49  In the end, 
Tito had held out lukewarm support for both the actors in the first invasion, and then for 
the Soviets in the second (when the Soviets moved in to prevent the removal of socialism 
as government policy); as a result, he robbed himself of any outlet for lofty critique that 
resonated among his Third-World friends.50  Tito had remained too hopeful for a peaceful 
solution prior to armed intervention and in fact supported the Hungarian government in 
its quest for a separate path until he realized that leaders there directly challenged 
Communism’s success in Budapest.  While he lent some moral support and then 
recognized that things had gotten out of control, it was clear to see that Tito was 
indecisive and therefore too clouded on policy to make a decisive statement.   
Nonetheless, time and again, Yugoslav leaders reacted from personal experience 
against Soviet overtures, and they would not find themselves again in such a chaotic 
position as they had in 1956.  Shortly thereafter, in 1958, Tito called for a Communist 
Party Congress for Yugoslavia and set the stage for another ideological clash with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
country and conditions,” and furthermore, that “the multiplicity of forms of socialist development tends to 
strengthen socialism.”  See “Declaration on Relations Between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia 
and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” in The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, p. 9. 
49.  Department of State Intelligence Report, “Yugoslav Relations with the Kadar Regime,” 28 
February 1957.   
50.  Tito took great pains to avoid placing blame on the events in Hungary and reconcile his 
confused position.  An excellent example of this is during his speech in Pula, on 11 November 1956, when 
he condemned the first intervention as unnecessary and the second premature.  In a rare moment of resolve 
on this issue, he declared, “it was a great mistake to call the army of another country to give a lesson to the 
people the country, even if there had been some shooting.”  See Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury, eds., 
The Soviet–Yugoslav Controversy, 1948–58: A Documentary Record, (New York: Prospect Books, 1959), 
p. 72. 
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Soviets.  At this congress, Vice President Edvard Kardelj mentioned the Soviet Union 
specifically when he assailed interference in another’s internal affairs.  According to 
Kardelj, the LCY recognized the need for “solidarity among Communists,” but rejected 
the “idea that one party should impose its dogma on another.”51  With that, Kardelj had 
set the stage for renewed conflict with the Soviets over ideology. 
With an improved ideological vigor claimed by the Yugoslavs, the Soviets not 
surprisingly retaliated with words and sought to limit the power and persuasion of 
Yugoslavia’s messages.  A second Soviet–Yugoslav dispute then emerged, pitting the 
veteran Tito against the already embattled Khrushchev.  Scandalous ideological attacks 
marked this largely academic and journalistic debate.  But while the first split in 1948 
enabled Tito to strike out on his own and mold Marxism to fit his own desires, this 
second split was significant not just for the solidification of Titoism inside Yugoslavia 
but as the impetus for Tito’s movement in calling forth the first Non-aligned Conference 
a short three years later.  The second Soviet–Yugoslav split paved the way for a true 
change in world politics and emboldened Yugoslav leaders—themselves more secure in 
their sovereignty—to make the morality of the Bandung Conference into something 
more.  Renewed Soviet pressure against the Yugoslav ideological position in 1958 
effectively gave birth to the Non-aligned Movement as a political institution, especially 
as it coincided with other ideological and security threats to Tito’s Bandung partners. 
 Following Stalin’s critique of Tito in 1948, the Yugoslavs responded with 
pronouncements aimed at demonstrating the unity within Yugoslavia against any invader.  
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April 1958, p. 2. 
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As a result, Milovan Đilas enthusiastically announced at the Fifth Party Congress in 1948 
that his fellow party members should be proud of their “unwavering” adherence to the 
principles of “Marxism-Leninism,” because they did “not fear any hardships in the 
struggle for their victory.”52  At the outset of the second Soviet–Yugoslav dispute, Tito 
expanded the message into the realm of foreign policy, praising the universalism and 
unity of the LCY’s message.  He emphasized with confidence what he saw as the rock-
solid “unity” of the LCY members and peoples of Yugoslavia, declaring that no one was 
beset by “narrow national interests,” but instead rested upon, and responded to a feeling 
of “international solidarity with all the labor and progressive movements,” including the 
important “colonial peoples who are fighting for their freedom and independence.”53  
When Tito uttered those words to the LCY Congress, he not only attacked the Soviet 
Union, but he also made himself the ostensible protector of “colonial peoples” then 
struggling for their independence—much like he himself did against the fascists during 
World War II, and the Soviets after 1948.  Immediately establishing the Yugoslav 
position as one with international interests and significance meant that the rhetoric 
needed meaningful action to follow.  Ever since the Rangoon and Bandung meetings in 
1953 and 1955, respectively, Tito had kept in close contact with Third World leaders 
such as Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasir; but, by 1958, the time was right to make the rhetoric 
into reality and bring together the powers of many into an organization that could speak 
for broader issues. 
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Tito attempted to ground his new position on “principle,” both in “international 
and in internal matters,” and tried to forestall any Soviet attacks as something that would 
cause “damage to all” socialist states.54  Since the successful Yugoslav resistance in 
1948, and the relentless path towards communism as the country’s guiding ideology, the 
leaders in Moscow had a great deal to fear.  The events of the early to mid 1950s—the 
East German rebellions, the riots in Poznan, Poland, and the 1956 invasions of 
Hungary—left the people living under Soviet communism without doubt regarding 
Moscow’s desire to control international Marxism.  In the Third World, the devastating 
shock of the combined assault of the Suez Canal in 1956 by the Israelis, British, and 
French forces made leaders like Nasir even more cognizant of their relative weakness 
compared to either bloc.55     
Responding to the Soviet declarations against Tito’s position in 1958, his 
supporters in the proto Non-aligned Movement raised their voices in unison.  During May 
of that year, Nehru denounced Soviet criticism of Yugoslavia’s position, and he argued 
that such negative and abusive rhetoric represented foreign interference in another’s 
domestic affairs.  In a display of even greater camaraderie with the besieged Tito, Nehru 
expressed his approval of the idea of “separate paths to socialism,” by stating its 
                                                 
54.  Elie Abel, “Tito Bids Soviet Talk, Not Berate,” New York Times, 27 April 1958. 
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consistency with Indian political norms.56  The proof that Tito’s vocal stance outside of 
the Soviet system allowed for a third way as a plausible movement showed itself in 
spades during the last half of 1958.  Nasir visited both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
in short sequence following the outbreak of the second Soviet–Yugoslav dispute, and, 
therefore, strengthened the Yugoslav position by symbolically treating both as equals.  
Egypt played a large role in any Soviet strategy in the Middle East and if Yugoslavia 
successfully courted Nasir, then Moscow feared that it might lose a valuable ally in a key 
position in the world.  This trend of Soviet leaders posturing for allies in the Third World 
would continually menace them and have long-lasting consequences for the nature of the 
Cold War.  While many nonaligned participants sympathized with Marxism and even 
received aid from the Soviet Union, most leaders in the Non-aligned Movement 
successfully thwarted attempts to fall under the direct sway of Moscow.  Refusing direct 
Soviet power a platform for expansion hindered Moscow elites in the overall Cold War 
struggle because no victory in this sense equaled a defeat.  On a micro level, Nasir’s own 
drive towards a formal policy of nonalignment must be treated as similar to that of his 
peers—that is, it cannot be seen apart from his experience in opposition to regional and 
global powers.57 
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  Nasir’s joint displays with Tito clearly showed his attempt to maneuver between 
the competing superpowers.  By 1958, Nasir and Tito had met four times, and their July 
1958 meeting laid the groundwork for the first formal Non-aligned Conference, 
scheduled soon thereafter in Belgrade in 1961.  Cementing their ideas of peaceful 
coexistence at Tito’s villa on the Adriatic island of Brioni, Nasir and Tito called for a 
summit to end the production and testing of nuclear weapons, and they cried out for 
adherence to the United Nations Charter as the basis for state relations and the 
“cooperation among nations on the basis of independence and equality.”58  
New York Times journalist Elie Abel evoked great enthusiasm for new foreign 
policy that was developing in the late 1950s, when he recognized Tito as the “storm 
center of the Soviet bloc,” while Nasir was at the “vortex of the turbulent Middle East.”  
With these words, Abel recognized the power of unity when he declared, moreover, that 
not one of the besieged statesmen alone was in a “position to influence” a decisive 
solution—instead, a joint force might create tremendous headway.59  A few months after 
the flurry of activity between Tito and Nasir, the premier of Indonesia traveled to meet 
with both leaders and worked out a plan of mutual action and, as a further boon to the 
Yugoslav position of independence, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower continued to 
uphold support for keeping Yugoslavia free of any foreign domination.60  Tito needed 
every bit of potential support against renewed Soviet aggression in Europe, especially 
                                                 
58.  See Paul Underwood, “Tito and Nasser Ask Summit Talk,” New York Times, 11 July 1958, 
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when tensions over Berlin threatened to unleash hostilities.61  Conflict thus set the tone 
for the political turn of nonalignment’s founders as each of the statesmen faced a new 
round of pressure in 1958: Nasir felt the need to win support of the other Arab countries 
and therefore deter an aggressive and powerful Western-backed Israel; Sukarno needed 
fresh support for his conflict against Holland over Dutch New Guinea; Nehru faced ever-
increasing tensions with China over Tibet and the Sino–Indian border; and finally, Tito 
feared a Soviet-sponsored invasion of Yugoslavia following the second split.   
The culmination of fears over renewed international conflict became apparent 
when Nasir and Tito issued a joint communiqué in July 1958, which stated that following 
a favorable development towards a relaxation of international tension, “a tendency in the 
opposite direction” had emerged in the form of an arms race and a pronounced trend of 
breaking the sanctity of sovereignty.  The leaders of the newly emerging states saw the 
Cold War as a tremendous menace to world security and tried to use the popular fear of 
war throughout the world to build support.  Among the important demands that Nasir and 
Tito called for was the “need of holding a summit conference” to ease tensions.  This 
clearly laid the foundation for a formal establishment of the Non-aligned Movement, as it 
would take form in the early 1960s.62  Finally, the last part of the 1950s ended as Tito 
embarked on a grand world tour to gather support for this movement, which spanned 
two-and-a-half months and included far-away Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, 
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and finally the United Arab Republic—all states that would participate in the upcoming 
Belgrade Conference.63  
 
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN PRACTICE 
While Tito deserves little credit for inventing the concept of nonalignment—that should 
go to all of the original participants at Bandung—he did ensure that Yugoslavia would 
play a commanding role in shaping the Non-aligned Movement by solidifying its political 
presence and ideological underpinnings, at least during the 1960s.  After a series of visits 
between Nasir, Nehru, Sukarno, and Tito during the latter 1950s, and several joint 
pronouncements of the need for a conference to address issues affecting world peace, 
they finally met in 1961.  The city of Belgrade hosted the event, drawing official 
delegations from twenty-five countries—from Afghanistan to Yemen—and promoted a 
mood of progress and hope in a world dominated by fear.  The opening statement decried 
the conflict and trepidation that had brought them together and noted that the participants 
must fight instead for a united approach toward solving their common problems.  Summit 
contributors recognized inaction as the most dangerous response because ever since in the 
late 1950s, “international events have taken a turn for the worst” and “seriously 
threatened” world peace as a consequence.64  They felt the need to act and stand together 
to avert the destructiveness of war. 
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Echoing the Yugoslav pronouncements of the 1950s in justification of their 
peace-loving ideology, the conference members understood the world as “characterised 
by the existence of different social systems,” which should not “constitute an 
unsurmountable [sic.] obstacle” for peace provided that others abstain from interfering in 
the “internal development of other peoples.”  As a logical extension, “all peoples and 
nations have to solve the problems of their own political, economic, social and cultural 
systems in accordance with their own conditions, needs and potentialities.”65  The 
similarities of these messages with what Tito had uttered to Khrushchev in 1955 show 
that a consistency had emerged regarding a Yugoslav ideology—both domestic and 
foreign policy had grown more connected and, with international recognition, Yugoslavia 
stood a great chance of securing a pivotal role as a new global force.66 
Yugoslav influence during the 1961 conference represented the heightened role of 
ideology in world affairs.  By then, branded by the world as an ideology, Titoism 
represented the unique way of attaining socialism vis-à-vis the Yugoslavs’ interpretation 
of Marx’s writings.  As a result, LCY officials noted that they were “aware that 
ideological differences” necessarily remained a part of the “growth of the human 
society,” but argued that people should “refrain from any use of ideologies for the 
purpose of waging cold war” or “imposing their will”—a direct attack on how they saw 
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Soviet policy used abroad.67  Such statements also advocated on behalf of the exportation 
of Yugoslav ideology among its Third World partners—for that, pronouncements of self-
determination were a critical first step.  The resolutions of the conference verified that, 
“all nations have the right of unity, self-determination, and independence,” through which 
they can freely determine their political status and pursue their “economic, social and 
cultural development without intimidation or hindrance.”68  Tito no doubt hoped that 
once the superpowers left the Third World alone, the LCY could step in and serve as the 
merchant and banker for progress and development.  
Attendees of the Belgrade Conference linked decolonization with a general trend 
towards the cessation of “foreign oppression,” and vigorously tied “national 
independence” to “equality.”69  Yugoslav leaders used nonalignment as propaganda for 
domestic consumption, claiming that “the problems of the developing countries have a 
special place in Yugoslav foreign policy,” because Yugoslavs could cooperate freely with 
their “honored” friends in Africa and Asia, recently relieved of their heavy colonial 
“burden of the past.”  Writers for Komunist confirmed, “Yugoslavia has closely 
collaborated with the developing countries” and has relied “on its own rich experience 
from the struggle for its own independence and economic development.”70  Yugoslav 
media outlets had in fact made a direct connection between their own struggle for 
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independence—from both the Nazis and the Soviets—with the struggle of colonial 
peoples in their quest for freedom and sovereignty. 
Three years after the Belgrade Conference, a second nonalignment conference 
convened in Cairo.  As a much larger and better organized conference, the Cairo 
meetings attempted to turn what leaders perceived as the moral success at Belgrade into 
political dividends, because while Nehru boldly proclaimed at Bandung that “moral force 
counts,” such force faced enormous amoral competition in the form of devastating 
nuclear holocaust.71  Recognizing that international tensions had decreased by 1964, the 
leaders of nonalignment nonetheless spelled out a cautious and proactive path for the so-
called peace-loving countries of the world.  Nasir told the crowd of diplomats in Cairo 
that with the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Cold War “had reached the peak of 
violence and brutality,” and had confronted the world with the possibility of a “definite 
nuclear tragedy.”72  The battle for missiles and strategic bombers had dictated the security 
concerns of the United States and the USSR and missile stockpiles continued to dominate 
the thinking of American and Soviet military elites.  Despite an easing of tensions by the 
time of Cairo, the threat of the Cold War erupting into devastatingly global conflagration 
drew even greater attention to a Non-aligned Movement strongly advocating for peace 
and cooperation without a seemingly larger agenda.  “It is not by coincidence,” the 
Yugoslav news agency Tanjug proudly boasted to its readers, “that news agencies and the 
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world public follow all news which emanates these days from Cairo and Belgrade,” 
because, ostensibly, Tito was a part of a global solution to Cold War.73  
At the height of the Non-aligned Movement’s influence in the world following the 
Belgrade Conference, nonaligned leaders won a seat at the global disarmament talks 
between the Americans and Soviets.  The Cuban Missile Crisis indeed, had brought the 
world to the brink of catastrophe and leaders in both blocs recognized a need to caution.  
That they included the leaders of nonalignment speaks to the significance that both sides 
gave to what Tito had helped create.  Nasir confidently concluded that the Cairo 
Conference marked an even greater progression toward world peace and boasted at the 
progress made throughout the world.  He noted that the “great Bandung Conference” 
directed attention to the “evils of imperialism,” while the “great Belgrade Conference” 
proclaimed the unity of peoples against the “perils of war,” and finally, he saw how, at 
Cairo, the world was achieving the “consolidation of peace through international co-
operation.”74  Nasir might have added that nonalignment had yet done little to ease the 
economic and social grievances among those who participated, but instead, he 
congratulated Tito for his strong role as a peacemaker.  Nasir and other Egyptian leaders 
simply had “expressed high tribute to the support that Yugoslavia and particularly 
President Tito himself” had given, based upon Tito’s “efforts to oppose” the “aggression 
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and external pressures and work for the consolidation of peace” throughout the world.75  
Tito did deserve credit for hosting and organizing meetings and placing several important 
Yugoslav ideologues at the disposal of nonalignment but Nasir saw the real value of the 
movement not only in logistics but also in the moral victory they had won on among 
other world leaders.  Ironically, the trend towards the dialogue between the Moscow and 
Washington advanced peace through greater cooperation that effectively derailed the 
Non-aligned Movement by robbing it of its greatest unifying force—the fear of global 
conflict. 
 
THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR POLITICAL NONALIGNMENT 
Threats of nuclear catastrophe throughout the 1960s spurred some nonalignment 
believers into action again despite the continued presence of American forces in Vietnam.  
The crippling speed with which the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces invaded 
Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968 caught many world leaders by surprise—
including Tito, who had met with the Soviets less than a fortnight prior.76  These events 
reminded the Yugoslavs of their own precarious position and, according to one German 
journalist at the time, the invasion of Czechoslovakia was an attempt by “the Moscow 
Polemics” to check directly against the successful “Yugoslav path to socialism.”77  
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Regardless of Soviet intentions against Yugoslavia, Tito expressed enough displeasure to 
call for a three-day long meeting to begin in Belgrade on 7 July 1969.  LCY elites hoped 
that such a meeting would “lead to a non-aligned summit”; after all, Tito had constantly, 
if not untruthfully, defended Yugoslavia as a comradely “socialist and non-aligned 
country,” that has “never hesitated when it was necessary for it to react to aggressions” 
against whomever.78  Despite the personal abhorrence of the Soviet actions against the 
government in Prague, representatives from Yugoslavia and several other countries were 
anxious that the meeting of nonaligned countries should not put too much emphasis on 
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia because they feared direct repercussions by 
Moscow such as removal of economic credits or revocation of treaties.79  Nijaz 
Dizdarević in fact, stated as part of a meeting of the propaganda committee of the LCY in 
1968, his aversion to taking too strong a stance against the Soviets lest they threaten 
Yugoslavia more directly.80   
Partly because of the complexities in outlining dangers to global peace without 
blaming obvious perpetrators, this Yugoslav push for a new direction for nonalignment 
failed to rally support.  Egypt had been humiliated again in the Six Days’ War against 
                                                                                                                                                 
die Jugoslawische Presse die bedeutung dieser Politik eroertiert.  Das ist nicht allein auf die durch die 
Sowjetische Okupation der CSSR entstandene Lage in Europa zurueckzufuehren, sondern auch auf die 
Moskauer Angriffe auf die Jugoslawische Politik der Buendnislosigkeit.  Man schenkt diesen angriffen hier 
in Belgrad beinahe eine groessere beachtung als den Moskauer Polemiken gegen den Jugoslawische weg 
zum Sozialismus.” 
78.  See Slobodan Stankovic, “Tito in Moscow: Roots of a Sudden Anti-Semitism,” p. 5.  Original 
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Israel in 1967 and Nehru had already died in 1964 so, without effective leaders in the 
Third World to both encourage and push Tito and the Non-aligned Movement, progress 
seemed stifled.  An unnamed Asian diplomat expressed this displeasure with the 
movement, saying, “the majority of nations present realize the futility of convening 
another summit—at least now,” because “there is nothing to say except generalities, 
nothing to be accomplished save words.” 81  Tito’s failure to rally support for a new 
conference also coincided with a failed effort to expand the reach of nonalignment to 
encompass non-state actors, newly independent states, and members of small defense 
pacts.  
Gradually, as larger numbers of African countries won independence but sorely 
lacked the resources to join the global community, they turned to the Non-aligned 
Movement and naturally pressed issues that dealt with development and economics, not 
political and ideological legitimacy.  The Lusaka Conference in 1970 epitomized this 
transformation of the movement.  The Swiss Review of World Affairs noted how “vague” 
nonalignment had become and indeed, classified it as a “negative” term because of the 
“highly variegated standpoints” of those present.82  President Kaunda of Zambia took 
pride in this concept, noting that the strength of nonalignment rested on the “unity in 
diversity,” but this was merely a rhetorical device.83  While Radio Australia’s 
correspondent noted the political potential of the program as a non-bloc entity, the real 
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emphasis, he concluded, was the “need for economic development.”84  What stood in the 
way of this economic development, for many in the association, including Kuanda, was 
the “imperialism, colonialism, and racial oppression and exploitation” present in southern 
Africa.85  Sir Seretse Khama, president of Botswana agreed with Kuanda and noted how 
the nonaligned countries needed a “greater awareness of needs and opportunities, a 
stronger determination to assist” one another, and “clearer understanding” of the 
problems facing the world.86  These African leaders, though, had a distinctive 
understanding of development and independence that clashed with the greater political 
goals first envisioned by Tito.   
Tito’s plan for nonalignment, especially in the wake of the Soviet moves against 
Czechoslovakia relied on his stewardship of the movement and the furthering of 
Yugoslavia’s economy and the attractiveness of the LCY abroad.  Taking a moral stance 
against the superpowers—such as with arms sales to South Africa’s apartheid regime—
would complement, according to Tito, the development programs that not only 
strengthened the African states, but also fostered growth in Yugoslavia too.  With the 
inclusion of Fidel Castro and his powerful place in nonalignment—coupled with Nehru’s 
earlier death—Tito stood alone without either the economic power to aid his nonaligned 
allies directly or the ability to champion his cause in the face of such an overwhelming 
contingent of poorer and underdeveloped fledging former colonies.  If successful, the 
Yugoslav plan for widening nonalignment further by including Titoist allies might have 
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saved the movement as a political force and kept it on the minds of policymakers in 
Washington and Moscow.  Instead, nonalignment drifted towards issues of lesser 
importance for the superpowers.  Nasir had clarified earlier that the goal of the Non-
aligned Movement’s policies should be to work with the competing blocs in solving 
problems and not to serve as a foreign policy base to leverage for “securing the highest 
portion of privileges” as a result of a “trade in the strife between the two blocs.”87  By the 
time of Tito’s rushed Belgrade meetings in 1969, nonalignment had already largely 
become what Nasir had feared most—isolated and weak in the political sphere. 
Still, the roadblocks Yugoslavia encountered in the wake of the Prague Spring 
made little difference toward changing the LCY’s goals for the international movement.  
The linkage between Yugoslav ideology and the existence of a vehicle to foster that 
ideology throughout the world remained too important for Tito and his chief advisors 
simply to abandon; after all, they were fearlessly carrying their ideas of “non-
intervention” and “peaceful coexistence” boldly into the future.88  For practical economic 
and political reasons, the Yugoslavs wanted to open up relations with the emerging states 
in the Third World and benefit from that relationship.  As Marxists, the Yugoslavs 
believed in the promise of their ideology and felt that fostering the organizations of 
likeminded people to mobilize for change under the auspices of the Non-aligned 
Movement was a good idea.  The LCY targeted the modern working class and 
revolutionary intelligentsia as a potential driver of change in the emerging Third World 
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because Yugoslav leaders recognized that “in most of the underdeveloped countries” the 
“class structure in practice makes impossible the forming of vigorous capitalist[s]” and 
“provides great opportunities for the development of progressive and socialist 
movements.”89  At the Fourth Party Congress in 1948, Đilas had explained that the “Party 
emerged victorious” in Yugoslavia because its members were “deeply loyal to the Party,” 
and because it “always connected ideological struggle with revolutionary practice.”90  
The challenge for Yugoslav leaders embracing nonalignment during the 1960s was to 
forge together the complementary notions of loyalty to the party and revolutionary zeal 
among their friends abroad.  As a result, the LCY clearly saw the 1960s as a period of 
opportunity despite the practical limitations facing the party, including the lack of money.  
LCY leaders thought, though, that the limitations in the Third World hindered capitalism 
and Soviet communism even more and allowed Yugoslavs room for expansion.  In the 
end, the Yugoslavs observed a promising outlook for the future because “the declarations 
for socialism in the underdeveloped countries” were often louder than their realization; 
for the Yugoslavs, it was now their job to export ideology and make declarations into 
reality.91 
The last conference to make a lasting contribution to a nonaligned political 
program occurred in 1970, in Lusaka, Zambia, a full two years after the Soviet repression 
of the Czechoslovak Communist Party leadership and the resulting occupation of that tiny 
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country.  Yugoslav leaders had been outspoken opponents inside Yugoslavia of the 
Soviet action, but despite that, Tito could not rally enough support to assemble at least 
what had seemingly become his moral community of states.  In an effort to make up for 
the lack of international condemnation the Yugoslav government—outside of the Non-
aligned Movement—flooded the domestic press with statements condemning the Soviet 
intervention as not only dangerous to world peace but also as “the greatest form of 
violation of the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of an independent country.”92   
Despite the concerns following the clear violation of Czechoslovakia’s rights as a 
sovereign nation, the Lusaka Conference ignored issues of politics and emphasized 
instead lofty principles such as cultivating the “spirit of self-reliance,” and focused the 
debate on racism and Africa’s economic plight.  Outspoken distress over continued 
American involvement in Vietnam also plagued the leaders gathered in Lusaka but 
politics took a largely secondary position.93  Only President Seretse Khama of Botswana 
noted the events—in passing—inside Czechoslovakia as invalidating the progress 
towards freedom.94  As the host of the conference, the president of Zambia, Dr. K.D. 
Kaunda, only went so far as to reaffirm the pledge against the “non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other nations, the urge for peaceful coexistence and for the pursuit of 
independent policies,” without naming any country specifically.95  The movement grew 
too clouded by individual events and effectively ceased to live up to its expectations; all 
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that it could do was utter generalities of little consequence.  Nonalignment, as Tito had 
founded it, faced challenges as the tremendous numbers of the new African and poorer 
Asian states eclipsed the original political meaning and spoke to a different set of 
realities.  Third World leaders simply worried more about economics than political 
posturing between power blocs and sought aid from whomever would give it—including 
Moscow and Beijing.  While the 1961 meeting strove to ease relations between 
competing blocs, the 1970 meeting inspired little confidence as to the movement’s future.  
Participants mused over “what non-alignment really means, if anything, or what shared 
goals the self-styled ‘non-aligned’ can best pursue collectively.”96  Tito’s challenge to 
this evident decline in nonalignment’s stature remained finding an alternative for this 
external source of legitimacy.  
By the early 1970s, the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia had stirred 
Europeans, and given Tito a renewed sense of urgency to institute a strong security 
regime against external threats.  This was part of the realization not just of the 
vulnerabilities of mounting an adequate defense against the Soviets, but moreover, part of 
an understanding of the critical strategic position of Yugoslavia.  Nijaz Dizdarević 
expressed his understanding of the heightened Soviet interest in the Balkans as a product 
of the “geo-strategic position of the region” and any dramatic change in Yugoslavia, in 
particular, was an invitation for Soviet aggression.  Dizdarević understood that in 
moments of weakness, the Soviets looked at how best they could benefit; after all, “they 
                                                 
96.  New York Times cited in Resolutions of the Third Conference of Non-aligned States, p. 42. 
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have their own interests in our internal situation.”97  For the members of the party 
hierarchy, Yugoslavia represented a pillar of resistance against Soviet designs in 
southeastern Europe and in the Middle East and they reinforced this logic as a foundation 
for their continued rule.   
 
BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF NONALIGNMENT AND THE COLD WAR 
In 1955, when the attendees of the Bandung Conference met to discuss issues that 
directly affected newly independent or struggling peoples, much of the world was at 
peace as neither of the two superpowers was embroiled in direct combat following the 
bloody and relentless stalemate in Korea.  Still, local conflicts abounded, and it was such 
small-scale struggles against former colonial powers, local elites, or neighboring tribes 
that had defined the tone of Bandung.98  The threat of larger involvement loomed, but 
until that came closer to reality, any sort of Non-aligned Movement seemed destined to 
generate only token support.  Nineteen fifty-six brought a return of hostility in several 
regions of the world; the British, French, and Israelis intervened to stop the 
nationalization program of the Suez Canal by Nasir, and the Soviets sent troops into 
Hungary as part of an effort to reaffirm dominance over the communist leaders there.  
                                                 
97.  Dizdarević in “Magnetofonske beleške i materijal sastanka Izvršnog bira,” ASCG CK SKJ IV 
K.7 7, 1971, p. 2. 
98.  At the 1970 conference in Lusaka, the official declaration mentioned the phenomenon 
whereby “the immediate danger of a conflict between the superpowers has lessened, because their tendency 
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the small, medium-sized and developing countries, or prevented the danger of local wars.”  See Resolutions 
of the Third Conference of Non-Aligned States, (Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International 
Affairs, 1971), p. 2.  In general, the ideological tone of nonalignment weakened as it gained more members 
and as the Cold War matured into normalcy. 
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Tito had mixed emotions over Soviet action in Hungary, and despite his assertion that the 
first intervention was “absolutely wrong,” he remained unsure over the implications of 
the second intervention and thus failed to take a strong stand against the Soviet Union 
because of his contradictory rhetoric.99  In part, this stemmed from his realization that 
some elements of the Hungarian ruling clique threatened to de-emphasize communism in 
its break away from Moscow—something Tito had never envisioned.  All this followed 
the important summit meetings between Tito and Khrushchev, which had recognized 
“separate paths to socialism” and relaxed tensions directly regarding Yugoslavia; as a 
result, Tito acted cautiously for fear of prematurely straining the new friendship. 
 “Separate paths” gave the Yugoslav leader the external legitimacy he craved but, 
moreover, the renewed friendly relationship with the Soviet Union relieved pressure on 
the Yugoslavs and opened up avenues for aid packages and cooperation in cultural and 
economic spheres.  Tito also flirted in 1956 with Third World leaders, but too many 
contradictions stemmed from Yugoslav inaction because of the Soviet crackdown and the 
resulting embarrassment of Yugoslavia’s position.  Tito needed to rectify this chaos 
regarding Yugoslavia’s domestic and foreign policies before he could proceed with a 
bold new global foreign-policy.   
After 1956, meetings with Nasir and Nehru emerged poised to clarify 
Yugoslavia’s views.  For the domestic audience, the presentation of nonalignment and 
Tito’s successful diplomatic missions and friendships with leaders across the world 
enhanced the credibility of the regime and, by extension, the Yugoslav communists, in 
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the face of ongoing ideological battles within the party.100  By drawing popular attention 
to events outside of Yugoslavia and placing Tito’s foreign policy as a premier piece of 
Yugoslav policy, negative features of the regime waned in comparison.  In a continual 
effort to court supporters among the many Yugoslavs unconvinced about Tito and his 
system, the forceful entry into a meaningful foreign policy discredited opposition.  Miloš 
Žanko, a member of the Central Committee of the LCY, noted as late as 1967, that “for 
us, it cannot be black and white,” and “our system is in a crisis.”101  Tito’s answer rested 
with success outside the country to reinforce his legitimacy as a world-class statesman.  If 
he could solve the world’s problems the argument went, then he could solve 
Yugoslavia’s.   
With plenty of hostility against Tito and his system in place throughout 
Yugoslavia, a large foreign-policy victory, such as with the resulting Non-aligned 
Movement, promised a quieting of the opposition.  The pomp surrounding Tito’s trips 
and his hosting of world leaders dazzled the Yugoslav press and presented the impression 
that Yugoslavia was of pivotal importance in global politics.  No matter what, though, the 
regime combated antisocialist forces because Yugoslav leaders understood well—from 
                                                 
  100.  The Croatian Communist, Vladimir Bakarić, admitted in 1964 that ideological problems in 
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“On the Eve of the Sixth Plenum of the Yugoslav Central Committee,” Radio Free Europe/Background 
Report, HU OSA 300–8–3 RRFE/RLRI, BR, cn. 124. 
101.  See “Komisija CK SKJ za pitanja društveno-političkih odnosa, 1967–1968. godina,” ASCG 
CK SKJ XXIII K.4/4, folder 56 (Beleška sa santanka prve radne grupe “Problemi razvoja društveno-
političkog sistema”).   
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their own experience—the danger of giving any opposition group a legitimate political 
outlet.  Kardelj argued within the same 1967 Central Committee meeting as Žanko that, 
“in today’s phase neither our democracy nor our entire system can be open for 
antisocialist and similar elements.”  Furthermore, if “we open up, if our system expands 
with democratic forms,” we must, at the same time “fight against a breakthrough by 
antisocialist forces.”102  Taking the fight abroad solved many problems for Kardelj and if 
successful, Yugoslavia might have served as a beacon among Third World leaders and 
the axis of a third force. 
A salient feature of these Yugoslav machinations remains the degree of change 
that followed from Tito’s posturing.  While Moscow had little to fear from a renewed 
campaign in Eastern Europe, several statesmen maneuvered for the least bit of flexibility 
and independence for their states—Romania having been the most successful.  
Nonalignment certainly aided these moves, but while no other Warsaw Pact country 
could fully accept nonalignment’s consequences, those states could manipulate popular 
rhetoric for their own good.  Romania drifted the furthest from Moscow’s orbit by the 
mid to late 1960s, but always stayed just close enough to avoid the fate of a Hungary, or 
later, a Czechoslovakia.  Leaders in Prague and Budapest stood apart from others in the 
Eastern bloc, because, as Romanian scholar Ghita Ionescu has aptly argued, the “logical 
nexus between internal national communism [i.e., not emanating from Moscow] and 
external neutralism” brought such significant challenges for Moscow that armed 
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intervention could not be avoided.103  It was apparent that with the death of Stalin, the 
leaders in the Kremlin worked with their clients in Eastern Europe and understood—
certainly following public rhetoric of appeasement and pluralism—that not all countries 
under their control needed to follow their political line exactly.   
Moscow’s policymakers surely considered the geo-strategic repercussions as 
paramount compared to some internal fuzziness in ideology.  They simply accepted the 
primacy of foreign policy and would return to this mantra with the Helsinki Accords a 
decade later.  This became even more perceptible when men such as Nikita 
Khrushchev—described by deposed Czechoslovak leader Ota Sik as a believer in “ideas” 
with a “propagandistic” personality—and Leonid Brezhnev, the simple bureaucrat with 
“no imagination” and “incapable of ideological creativity,” had both ignored internal 
issues affecting their East European allies so long as they did not seriously threaten the 
ruling communist regimes there or advocate a withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.104  
Ionescu has pointed out that the Romanian leadership understood the line along which 
they could proceed and recognized concepts such as absolute neutrality to be so 
dangerous as to carry a death sentence.105     
At the height of Tito’s search for legitimacy, Khrushchev criticized him for 
having attempted to tie “unrelated issues”—Yugoslav ideology and its path toward self-
management and an independent foreign policy—together and deceive people as part of a 
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campaign for self-aggrandizement.  Khrushchev deplored the “prattle about a ‘nonbloc’ 
policy” as a deliberate method to fool the “people and obtain their approval” for Tito’s 
ignorance of socialism and his concurrent boost of the Yugoslav “policy of neutrality.”106  
Nonetheless, Tito defended himself by stating that he had put together his “foreign 
policy” based upon the “principles of coexistence” and the need for cooperation with “all 
countries” without catering to any sides besides his own.  Kardelj and Dizdarević voiced 
their willingness to “collaborate with all socialist countries,” but, in particular, those 
“countries in the socialist camp and the Warsaw Pact.”107  The way it turned out, Tito’s 
characterization of Khrushchev as the one filled with foolish thoughts proved truer.108   
Once again under attack in 1968 following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 
Non-aligned Movement needed to justify itself as a viable organ for world peace.  Even 
Yugoslavs noted the trend away from their goals for nonalignment and defended 
themselves by exclaiming that attacks on nonalignment merely represented an 
“expression of fear of the principles of peaceful coexistence” by political leaders who 
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maintained an alliance with one or another bloc.109  After all, Yugoslavia had—according 
to Zagreb radio—dealt with two decades of “unscrupulous attacks” by the Soviets that 
failed to alter Yugoslavia negatively.110  Yugoslavs argued that when Tito met with Nasir 
and Nehru at his vacation complex on Brioni Island, the statesmen regarded hostile 
international actions as “momentous,” but argued that they themsvelves stopped short of 
creating a “third bloc.”111  The creation of a third bloc, though, was precisely what made 
their neutrality different and enabled nonalignment to make positive gains in world 
affairs.  Finally, Yugoslavia’s existence outside of Moscow’s control served as 
encouragement to any sense of individualism among her neighbors but the dynamic of 
change had limited growth potential.  According to Soviet scholar Adam Ulam, Stalin’s 
successor would find himself thrust into a world where the battle with the United States 
demanded quick and popular results.112   
Khrushchev—Stalin’s titular successor—unleashed a new era, which meant for 
the USSR an “introduction of enlightened totalitarianism” with a “conscious effort to 
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dispense with the pathological, uneconomic, and plainly unnecessary aspects” of 
Stalinism.113  One of the underlining points of this chapter has been that while Tito 
clearly inspired reaction from the Eastern-bloc satellites in light of direct and often 
overwhelming Soviet control, Tito’s real significance was that he unleashed ideological 
change throughout the Marxist world because of his successful existence outside of 
Moscow and his ideological advances through the Non-aligned Movement.  For this 
reason, Khrushchev followed Tito’s lead regarding socialism and reacted to changes in 
both communist ideology and the uses of that ideology throughout the world.  Whereas 
many scholars have looked at Titoism as an ideology and the Non-aligned Movement as 
an agent of progressive change for the Third World, few have yet understood how 
interrelated these two concepts were and how they both served as pillars of Tito’s quest 
for legitimacy.114  Ulam’s work, dating from the height of the Cold War, pointed out 
contradictions in the postwar Soviet state in light of alterations to totalitarianism and the 
fluid nature of domestic and foreign policy in a high-stakes, conflict-driven world.  
American diplomat George Kennan also saw hope in the immediate aftermath of World 
War II that eventually communist forces would recognize the fallacy behind the 
ideological assumption of the collapse of capitalism, because “no mystical, Messianic 
movement—and particularly not that of the Kremlin—can face frustration indefinitely 
without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of 
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affairs.”115  Tito’s survival in Europe added to the woes of those in the Kremlin, and 
Tito’s success in helping bring together diverse forces from across the world to face the 
troublesome nature of the Cold War proved damaging to Soviet credibility.  This, though, 
would not become obvious until much later in the Cold War, when the political phase of 
the Non-aligned Movement had already served its course. 
 
CONCLUSION: NON-ALIGNMENT IN PERSPECTIVE 
When Sukarno came to Belgrade in January 1958, he and Tito advocated for a series of 
proposals, including a cessation of the “senseless armament race and the perfecting of 
weapons of colossal destructive power.”116  Despite the call for peace, the two leaders 
agreed to a weapons deal, whereby the Yugoslavs would sell the Indonesian Army small 
arms.  The Indonesians needed these guns because they were engaged in a bitter and 
violent dispute with Holland over the continued Dutch presence in New Guinea—an area 
claimed by the Indonesian leadership.  This shows that, at some level, the kind of 
cooperation between countries meant more than the peace-loving rhetoric—rather, it 
demonstrated an attempt to establish some sort of third bloc, in which the countries could 
rely on each other for trade and develop independently of Moscow or Washington.117  
                                                 
115.  Ulam, New Face, p. 127;  Kennan as cited in Ulam, New Face, p. 141.  
116.  See “Tito and Sukarno Spur Neutralism,” New York Times, 19 January 1958, p. 6.  
117.  Tito noted in a letter from 1955 sent to Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin that U.S. 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had informed Tito of the delicacy required to maneuver between 
Israel and the Arab world, Egypt in particular.  Because of Israel’s existence, the United States government 
could not sell arms to the Egyptians and Dulles implored Tito that it was his job to “work for the peace 
between Israel and Egypt.”  “But,” Tito pointed out, “we must think that it would be a very unhappy idea to 
create in the Middle East some form of pact which will never have another effect except for the division of 
the Arab unity and the creation of permanent conflict in that part of the world.”  Tito would later sell Nasir 
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Belgrade stood directly in the center of this system, since Yugoslavia—in contrast to her 
Third World partners—possessed a sizable industrial sector centered on weapons and 
heavy machinery, both excellent items for export.  According to Yugoslav sources, in 
1961—the time of the Belgrade Conference—Tito extended credit in the sum of $20 
million to Nasir to purchase equipment and, in 1964, during the second nonalignment 
conference, Tito doled out another $35 million to Nasir.118  Although Tito had already 
stopped receiving aid from the United States by then, his financing Nasir came at a 
domestic expense of making positive improvements at home.  Furthermore, Yugoslavs 
noted that the countries of the developing world represented a “potential and very 
important partner” for Yugoslavia.119  Unfortunately for Tito, any significant export 
economy dwindled once technology outpaced any capacity for Yugoslavia to produce 
viable weapons by the middle 1960s.120  The Soviets gave away the same equipment and 
the Americans subsidized higher-value arms to their allies during a time when oil prices 
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rose dramatically—something that by the 1970s had severely handicapped Yugoslavia’s 
industrial sector.  While an arms trade among so-called peace-loving nations seems 
paradoxical, it rather shows the pragmatic views of nonalignment’s founders and speaks 
to their hope in creating a working political system to balance against the superpowers 
and establish an independent legitimacy.  In any case, a politically based nonalignment 
could only exist as a concept in a conflict-driven world beset by uncertainty and mistrust 
between Moscow and Washington.   
The 1960s was the heyday for the Non-aligned Movement; the two most 
important conferences met in Belgrade in 1961 and in Cairo in 1964, but both failed to 
establish any cohesive bloc of like-minded statesmen representing the participating 
countries.  The movement organizers took advantage of the tense rivalry between the 
superpowers and the frustrations of smaller countries in Africa and Asia, but the bonds 
were not lasting.  But a bloc of united and staunch fighters for world peace and the end of 
the Cold War would have meant the creation of a competing bloc, against the wishes of 
the nonalignment elites.121  The movement remains a testament to the power of the weak 
in a world dominated by the strong.  Nonalignment lingers on into the twenty-first 
century but its bold stance and compelling leadership disappeared with the deaths of 
Nehru and the removal of Nasir, and the sidelining of Tito’s premier role by the end of 
the 1960s.  Conflict pushed Yugoslavia and its Third-World allies together during a time 
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of intense insecurity, yet only kept them together as a significant force during the 
remainder of the 1960s when global devastation threatened not just the supporters of 
nonalignment but also the entire world.  The last conference where Yugoslavia played a 
meaningful role—in 1970—occurred following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 
and the renewed concern over the new path that Soviet leaders would take, but Yugoslav 
delegates failed to make that the primary focus for the conference attendees.  Economic 
and social issues correctly transcended politics for many of nonalignment’s adherents as 
the Soviet Union retreated from the Brezhnev Doctrine’s employment in Europe and the 
1970s hosted a time of relaxation marked by détente.  With meaningful dialogue between 
the primary Cold War actors sparked under the turbulent and controversial Richard Nixon 
presidency, détente became a real possibility, and international tensions lessened.  Partly 
as a result of this, during the 1970s, and thereafter, the Non-aligned Movement shrank 
until it no longer played any noteworthy role in global politics and merely watched as the 
final collapse of communism brought an end to the Cold War—they themselves got 
caught up in the chaos and destroyed each other in a decade-long process of 
dismemberment. 
 Documents and statements by Yugoslav leaders show that Yugoslavia’s entry 
into nonalignment had taken the shared principles of Rangoon and Bandung to a political 
level in emphasizing issues of sovereignty, non-interference, and peaceful coexistence.  
Such rhetoric worked within the ideological transformations at home and reinforced the 
moralizing tone of the Titoist regime, especially in comparison to the Soviet Union.  
While Tito and his comrades held no monopoly on these concepts—men such as Nehru 
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took great pains to note the same phenomena—Yugoslav actions lifted the concepts to 
the center of the Cold War debate and made Yugoslavia a global actor with an important 
voice.  Milovan Đilas claimed that he was “instrumental in getting the Yugoslavs in 
touch” with these Third World leaders and he saw the Yugoslavs as the driving force, 
since as Đilas noted, he “would not take” these “so-called uncommitted people too 
seriously.”122  By the end of the 1960s, when the Cold War tensions eased, Yugoslavia’s 
political commentary ceased to matter as much and the Non-aligned Movement returned 
to its original Bandung spirit: “to promote goodwill and co-operation among the nations 
of Asia and Africa”; to “consider social, economic and cultural problems”; to find 
solutions to the “problems affecting national sovereignty and of racialism and 
colonialism”; and, finally, “to view the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in 
the world of today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace 
and co-operation.”123  At the same time, Yugoslav leaders struggled during the 1970s to 
not only deliver on their promise of reform and material wealth to the people, but also to 
co-opt the next generation of young people into supporting the regime.124 
At the beginning of the Cold War, George Kennan had commented that the Soviet 
Union could potentially identify with the aspirations and frustrations of discontented 
elements outside of Europe.  Kennan correctly noted the value of decolonization and 
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rightly feared that the Soviets would stake their ideology among those dispossessed 
masses throughout the world and create within the international communist movement a 
powerful instrument with which to project influence beyond the Soviet Union’s 
borders.125  The enormous potential that the Soviets had in extending their control into 
the so-called Third World could have changed the face of the Cold War.  This continued 
once it became clear that many within the Non-aligned Movement were nominally 
socialist or harbored sympathies in that direction.  The reality, though, was far different 
because the Soviets never derailed the Yugoslavs in their efforts to make nonalignment 
the logical derivative of their own unique communist ideology.  I argue that an 
independent communist Yugoslavia discredited the Soviets—although, not to the large 
extent that some feared and others predicted—but when Tito successfully latched onto 
influential third-world statesmen at an opportune time in Cold War history and used the 
Non-aligned Movement as a vehicle to popularize his opinions, the Soviets clearly lost.   
When Tito outmaneuvered the Soviet leaders, he created an international 
authority for nonalignment and peaceful coexistence as watchwords of progress, and won 
a huge moral victory.  At the same time, he used that external success to fortify his 
regime and create a lasting legitimacy that began in earnest with the domestic program of 
socialist self management.  That the Soviets failed to stop nonalignment might not have 
dramatically altered the course of the Cold War; not depriving Yugoslavia of a leading 
voice in the Non-aligned Movement during the turbulent 1960s, though, created a great 
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problem for the Soviets, as communism justifiably possessed multiple voices.  Tito’s 
actions and the establishment of nonalignment as a global force eclipsed Moscow’s 
monopoly on ideology, itself already reeling from Stalin’s death.  This Soviet weakness 
in the Third World would later become much more apparent after the numerous 
adventures by Soviet agents seemed to have worked; competition with China in Asia and 
Africa, primarily during the 1970s, strained the Soviets and helped exaggerate the reform 
process that Mikhail Gorbachev initiated a decade later.  The resulting strain on Soviet 
energy, finances, and political authority only added to the already overwhelmed Soviet 
system and led the Kremlin into seeking concessions (vis-à-vis détente) from the West to 
maintain the status quo.  While the Soviet revolution was clearly over, that reality still 
eluded many across the globe—including the Yugoslav People’s Army. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE POLITICS OF FEAR AND TOTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE 
 
 But if it comes to shooting, if we have to defend our achievements, the  
army too is here.1 
   —Josip Broz Tito, Thirtieth Anniversary of the JNA, 1971 
 
The guardian of Tito’s state and his helpmeet in attaining power, the army, underwent 
dramatic transformations in response to the threats against the Yugoslav regime.  First 
established to expel the reportedly 300,000 domestic quislings who cooperated with the 
Axis Powers to destroy Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) served as the 
model institution devoted to their commander, Marshal Tito.2  As the most loyal group, 
JNA officers acted as close confidants to their commander and made sure that they 
always would take an active role in state building at each stage of Yugoslavia’s history.  
With the dual role of defending the revolution against internal challengers and deterring 
and fighting against external aggression, JNA leaders sought to solidify their authoritative 
role in the state.  But, the army elite also had to deal with the powerful Communist Party 
(LCY), and while JNA elites remained the most steadfast pillars of the party, they also 
had to accept certain uncomfortable aspects of party rule.  In response to the success of 
socialist self-management since the early 1950s, military leaders could not continue to 
resist reforms in their own institution; as a result, they altered Yugoslav defensive 
doctrine to meet the decentralized reform regime.  The military solution implemented at 
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the end of the 1960s was the advent of Territorial Defense (TDF), which harkened back 
to the Partisan experience of World War II and drew common citizens into an active 
defense regime, described as completely “integrated with the social structure.”3  
Alongside the federal army, these territorial defense forces came from local sources and 
trained primarily in guerilla warfare techniques; the TDF soldiers represented the popular 
and large-scale reserve force that would supposedly unite all peoples while enhancing the 
defensive posture of the armed forces.  After having embraced reform in the army, JNA 
leaders initially saw the TDF as necessary to build a democratic and unified Marxist 
Yugoslavia, but they soon felt sidelined and attempted to reduce the influence of the TDF 
as nationalism appeared on the forefront of Yugoslav politics at the beginning of the 
1970s.  That the officers succeeded is a testament to the critical role that the army played 
in Titoist Yugoslavia—fear of Soviet invasion propelled all leaders into opting for a 
popular system of defense that could serve to align more people with the regime.  
Nonetheless, the critical question for Yugoslav leaders to answer was whom did they fear 
more: the Red Army or their own people? 
 In this chapter, I will argue that Yugoslav politicians ultimately shaped their 
policies according to the unrest and rebellion by their own people.  Following Stalin’s 
expulsion of Tito from the Cominform and the aggressive rhetoric that threatened the 
stability of Tito’s state from the outside, elites were concerned chiefly with rearming the 
military to counteract this threat.  With the critical aid from the Americans Tito had 
rebuilt the peacetime army during the early 1950s to reach towards the 800,000 men in 
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arms during World War II.  This external threat also had a small internal element, but one 
that Tito’s secret police (Uprava državne bezbednosti, UDB-a) handily controlled.  The 
series of arrests of potential internal enemies was so thorough that most accounts showed 
Tito in full control of the country by early 1952.4  Such control enabled the army to stand 
at the ready with newly acquired American weapons and with the de facto support of the 
Western nations in case of a broader European conflict; as a result, the internal reform 
process of the LCY had begun in earnest and proceeded in most other sectors of 
Yugoslav society.  Socialist self-management gained credibility as a method to secure the 
legitimacy of the regime among the people and as a way to deliver on the promise of 
material prosperity and social equality.  A vital aspect of this reformist system rested on 
how the army could help construct popular support for the regime.  As the only institution 
to touch virtually all people in Yugoslavia, the role of the army was potentially 
paramount towards securing a positive idea of the state among the common folk.   
“The strength of our doctrine,” boasted Defense Secretary Viktor Bubanj much 
later in 1970, “is that it is public and belongs to the people.”5  Bubanj’s comment came at 
a time when the fear of the Soviet Union returned to center stage following the 
intervention in Czechoslovakia when Yugoslav elites sought to reinvigorate support for 
the army.  Soon, though, the army elites and the party questioned bringing the people into 
the system and correctly recognized that Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev was 
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uninterested in crushing Yugoslavia with armed force.  But, with the onset of internal 
riots and nationalist uprisings in 1971, the regime reanalyzed the commitment to the 
JNA–TDF arrangement for defense and sided with a professional and unswervingly loyal 
officer corps at the head of the armed forces.  This prompt series of transformations of 
defensive doctrine in Yugoslavia—based upon an emphasis and then de-emphasis of 
popular participation—intersects directly with how the regime interpreted threats: 
External threats brought about a need for a more inclusive regime, whereas domestic 
challenges required the reliance on a trusted and unified cadre.  The outside aggressor 
united Yugoslavia’s peoples by drawing on their common patriotism and common 
struggle against historic external forces.  The internal challengers, meanwhile, proved the 
most dangerous because they brought Tito to alter the reform process in Yugoslavia and 
call into question the viability of his worldview.  With a clear disconnect between the 
LCY’s rhetoric and the reality in the country, the trust that the party and the army was 
supposedly building was frittered away and lost forever once defense became the focal 
point for the state’s stability. 
 
THE PARTY’S VISION 
The leaders of the LCY continually sought to build legitimacy for themselves in 
Yugoslavia; they showed themselves as a dynamic group and used both internal and 
external factors to rally people behind the cause of Marxism.  The Yugoslav People’s 
Army was the primary vehicle to achieve a lasting unity behind the party’s principles 
because as leaders insisted, the “JNA was for all of Yugoslavia,” and represented “every 
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people” and fought on behalf of “every republic.”6  In contrast to these claims, political 
scientist Ronald Krebs has argued over the value of this custodial role played by the 
military.  Krebs has stressed the need to revamp the entire study of civil-military 
relationships, abandoning Huntingtonian models that describe the military as profoundly 
influential during the state-building process.  For Krebs, the military aids the modern 
state in nation building thanks to its institutional integrity; nonetheless, he has discounted 
the three main theories of how the military has traditionally served as a nation-builder—
what he calls the contact, socialization mechanism, and the elite-transformation 
hypotheses.7  While potentially relevant for other studies, Yugoslavia’s multiethnic 
composition forced leaders to envision a proactive army that could in fact expose 
members of the various national groups to each other and build a unified identity 
according to Tito’s model.  LCY leaders repeatedly relied upon the army as their most 
loyal institution to maintain the strength of the party among the people and build a better 
Yugoslavia.  “It would be,” Bubanj argued, “a bad investment of our society,” if the JNA 
merely functioned during a time of war.8   
Historic roots from the struggle in World War II shaped the perceptions of the 
JNA as army leaders attributed the victory against the Nazis to a combination of the 
“large-scale participation of the population, moral-political unity,” and the “close ties 
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between the people and the fighting forces.”9  Such a combination, the theory held, would 
further reinforce the state and build a better society according to the real legitimacy that 
the army earned during the struggle against fascism.  Earlier chapters elaborated that this 
process was not static.  Reform was a primary facet of the Yugoslav system after it 
emerged from the Tito–Stalin split in 1948; constant transformation—at all levels—was 
an explicit defining characteristic of Yugoslavia.  Members of the armed forces were not 
static actors nor did they fight change; instead, they often prescribed methods of reform 
and served on the frontlines of building a genuine and legitimate Yugoslav community.  
The fact that the party and the army worked so closely together to forge and transform 
Yugoslavia made it clear that the army’s role in safeguarding the state took on a broader 
definition.  Army elites were proactive in their campaign to serve Yugoslavia and the 
continued focus on the army by officials throughout the state showed how important the 
“moral and political” status of soldiers was for the general wellbeing of Tito’s creation.10 
But the fear of nationalism drove Yugoslav leaders to maintain an overall balance 
and accommodate all Yugoslavs.  As Todo Kurtović, president of the Republican 
Conference of the Socialist Alliance of Bosnia-Hercegovina, explained to a fiery crowd 
in the town of Kakanj in late November 1971, “every aspect of nationalism, from simple 
traditional chauvinisms,” to the more dangerous “unitarist negation of a nation,” is 
destructive.  Yugoslavia would suffer, Kurtović emphasized, because of this renewed 
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sense of chauvinism, but he rested confidently on the unity of Bosnia’s “joint 
institutions,” and inter-ethnic cooperation. 11  In this vein of unity and cooperation, World 
War II, with all its divisive civil conflicts and massacres, forced Tito to downplay 
hostility and simply label all wartime casualties as “victims of fascism,” and “domestic 
traitors” instead of blaming any particular group.12  One of Alan Rubinstein’s works on 
Yugoslavia saw this fear of nationalism as the solution for everything.  It was, “indeed, a 
compelling argument” for the continued “one-Party system in Yugoslavia,” according to 
Rubinstein, as well as possibly having “provided Yugoslav leaders” with the impetus to 
promote nonalignment.13  It seems clearer still from Kurtović’s words that self-
management provided the people with a rhetorical device to propagate unity in the face of 
nationalism at local levels, but this issue generated even more tense discussion.  While 
nonalignment, the LCY, and even self-managing systems all seemingly fought 
nationalism, the army was the one institution that had the opportunity to affect change 
thanks to its inclusive and captive audience.  From the barracks, army leaders encouraged 
their soldiers to reach out to society and act as models of cooperation and socialism in the 
overall drive for a more equitable representation for Yugoslavia’s ethnic groups.14 
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But just what sort of people identified with the army and the regime?  Ethnicity in 
the JNA deserves attention since it was a major force conditioning the role of the army in 
Yugoslavia.  Numerous studies have pointed to the dominance of Serbs in the officer 
corps of the Yugoslav People’s Army.  Despite some debate on the issue, the fact remains 
that Serbs comprised the largest share of officers and non-commissioned officers in the 
JNA.  Historian John Lampe has stated “by ethnic origin, some 60 percent were Serbs 
and 8 percent Montenegrins.”15  He has noted also that as early as 1946, a still partisan-
led Yugoslav Army possessed a decidedly Serbian cast.16  This trend continued.  James 
Gow has argued in numerous works for a Serbian domination of the middle and junior 
ranks as late as 1990, with 60 percent of the total, leaving Croats with only 12.6 
percent.17  (See Appendix B for more.) 
Ethnic percentages demand attention because despite all the rhetoric on 
brotherhood and unity within official circles, the JNA needed to appeal to all members in 
the state in order to gain support for itself and then proactively support the regime.  Even 
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the military leadership realized that it was important to reduce any social divisions within 
the ranks.  As Admiral Branko Mamula explained, “facts of social affairs have a most 
direct influence on the army,” because the “negative features influence the 
consciousness” of soldiers as well as “their mood, motivation and conduct.”18  In 1983, a 
leading LCY newspaper, Borba, reported that despite the large threat to Yugoslav unity, 
the situation in the army was stable and good.  Included in the list of enemies for the 
army was nationalism, shown to be, without exception, the favorite costume for 
separatism, irredentism, or unitarism.19 
An ethnic key—or affirmative action program based on maintaining an equality 
among ethnic groups—powerfully influenced the army high command because, in 1971, 
of the twenty-four highest military commanders, “33 percent were Serbs, while 38 
percent were Croats.”20  But, in reality, “Serbs dominated the officer corps in the 
Yugoslav military, the civil service and secret police; Belgrade was Yugoslavia’s power 
center.”21  The theory behind equal representation in key institutions such as the army 
clearly differed from reality because despite a superficial realization of some goals—
personified by the ethnic balance in the army high command—Serbs remained in the 
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majority among government employees and especially among lower and middling ranks.  
In 1963, the army recognized the abundance of Serbs within that institution relative to the 
demographic reality in Yugoslavia (see Appendix B).22  Between 1970 and 1985, the 
ethnic imbalance in the military academy in Belgrade showed that among army cadets, 
Serbs again comprised the majority.23  Despite the presence of the ethnic key, Serbs 
simply outnumbered other ethnic groups and generally remained dominant at the lower 
and middle levels of authority.  While some high profile successes of the ethnic key—
notably the fact that Croats staffed 38 percent of the high command despite a smaller 
overall demographic balance—the consensus showed that continued work was necessary 
to bring in more non-Serbs into the government. 
 The army consistently acted as the bulwark of the regime and despite, or, because 
of, its ethnic imbalance, its members vigorously fought to maintain Yugoslavia.  A 1975 
program, outlined by the LCY organization within the JNA, encompassed ten points for 
adoption to aid in the “Socialist Self-Management in Yugoslavia.”  Point 7 emphasized 
the need for, “equality, brotherhood and unity of nations and nationalities in our social 
system.”24  This kind of spirit grew from the belief (even in 1984) that the army was in “a 
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struggle against counterrevolutionary works” acting in the name of nationalism.25  The 
revolution never ended according to army elites; but, while fighting on behalf of official 
party ideology, the army suffered from an uneven implementation of inclusive policies, 
such as the ethnic key.  Internal contradictions within the army only mirrored that of its 
partners and the reality of Yugoslav ideology. 
 A critical aspect of why leaders assigned the army such a profound role in the 
affairs of the state derived from the nature of the LCY organization in the army.  
Describe by the Yugoslav periodical, Narodna armija (People’s Army), as the “leading 
ideological force within the army,” the role of the party sought to increase the 
“ideological awareness and moral and political unity,” as well work towards “perfection” 
of the army’s military character.26  Outside of the army, the soldiers were “duty bound to 
actively and systematically participate” in the ideological activity throughout civil 
society.  Lieutenant Colonel-General Dane Petkovski, at the Third Conference of the 
LCY Organization of the JNA, emphasized how united and strong the army needed to be 
in the face of grave danger.  It was the “inflexible will of every individual” Petkovski 
said, to repulse the enemies of “our socialist community” and that required a high level of 
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awareness by soldiers.27  Apparently, Petkovski understood that a positive force in the 
army was the best way to counter a “psychological propaganda attack,” on the army and, 
by extension, on society as a whole.28  It was because army leaders saw “fairly strong 
links” between “outside” enemies—including intelligence services, extremist émigré 
groups—and the “anti self-management forces” inside Yugoslavia, that they called forth 
for such stalwart action; if these enemies succeeded in infiltrating “into the army” and 
made their “influence felt,” the destructiveness would help annihilate Yugoslavia 
altogether.29  As the protectors of the state from all enemies, army leaders naturally 
bound themselves to the party at all costs. 
 
CRISIS: CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968 
Events inside the Soviet Union defied any Western attempts to predict Soviet leader’s 
actions and reactions throughout the world.30  The first part of the 1960s brought the 
superpowers into conflict over the tenuous situation in Berlin, but events closer to 
America dwarfed the commotion over the skies of Germany.  The Soviet Union and the 
United States came to the brink of war over Soviet missiles in Cuba, as part of Moscow’s 
larger support for the Cuban revolutionary leader Fidel Castro and partly owing to Soviet 
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premier Nikita Khrushchev’s desire to win a strategic victory over the young President 
John F. Kennedy.  As the events unfolded and subsided with an American victory of 
sorts, Khrushchev’s power base further weakened at home in the Soviet Communist 
Party.  Owing to this defeat by Khrushchev—who Milovan Đilas described in 1961 as 
‘“not sure of his footing’”—along with the failed virgin lands program, his popularity in 
the Soviet Politburo continued to wane until the party finally replaced him in 1964.31  The 
new man in charge, Leonid Brezhnev, immediately attempted to regain the USSR’s 
position of parity with respect to the United States as well as regain the diplomatic 
advantage in Europe.   
 As a veteran of the Stalinist period and an astute political protégé of Khrushchev, 
Brezhnev signified a nominal return to conservative politics.  The butt of many jokes 
about his crude personality cult or his unresponsiveness towards positive change, 
Brezhnev nonetheless did contribute a lasting and potentially dangerous doctrine of 
thought on Soviet politics.  His Brezhnev Doctrine came as a formal response to actions 
already taken by the Soviet government and Warsaw Pact forces in quelling a nominally 
anti-Soviet, liberal communist regime in Czechoslovakia in 1968.  Appearing in the 
Soviet Union’s premier daily, Pravda, on 25 September 1968, the doctrine laid out the 
goals and limitations of Soviet Policy: At a time “when forces that are hostile to 
socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism,” then 
“it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned,” but a problem common to “all 
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socialist countries.”32  Brezhnev’s pronouncement caused great concern for Tito because 
this statement raised doubts about the long-term viability of the status quo and stood in 
violation to international law and the Charter of the United Nations, not to mention Tito’s 
mantra of nonalignment.  The idea that the Soviets could intervene to protect members of 
the “socialist commonwealth” made Yugoslavs uneasy because if the Soviets determined 
the geographic limits, they might seek revision and act aggressively for regime change in 
Belgrade.33  Yet for some Yugoslav leaders, this renewed fear of Soviet aggression 
provided an opportunity to use the alarming nature of intervention to correct some 
domestic ills troubling Yugoslavia. 
When Soviet-led forces entered Prague and reestablished order suiting the 
Kremlin, the world needed to evaluate what had happened and predict the ramifications 
of action for international politics.  The Soviet crackdown had the most influence among 
the states in Eastern Europe, but, of course, some leaders had more reason to worry than 
others.  For East Germans or Poles, living in areas with large garrisons of Red Army 
forces and important in the Northern Tier defense system, Prague was a disconcerting 
reminder that the Kremlin would not tolerate anti-Soviet behavior.  On another level, 
Romania continued to drift away from Moscow even after the crackdown in Prague, but 
Romanian leaders recognized the need to remain formally a member of the Warsaw Pact 
and COMECON—the military and economic unions among Soviet satellite states.  As 
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the only Warsaw Pact country not to have contributed to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
Romanians had little to fear from the Soviets as long as a general allegiance to Moscow 
remained.  Leaders in Bucharest understood that Romania was in no position 
geographically, economically, or politically to break away from the Soviets and succeed 
as Tito had after 1948.  Prague did serve as a reminder, though, to any Romanian, 
Bulgarian, or Hungarian that the maintenance of socialism and the allegiance to Moscow 
was of paramount importance.   
Yugoslavs reacted to the Soviet invasion with stunned rage.  In the wake of the 
intervention, the “patriotic spirit” would rise, according to the LCY, alongside either the 
“hajduk blood in the Yugoslav man” or the “partisan blood in our struggle.”34  While Tito 
felt confident from earlier meetings with the Soviets that aggressive action against the 
Czechoslovak leadership was unnecessary, he was upset to see the sovereignty of a 
fellow socialist country violated, not the least because “any unilateral move may 
encourage” intervention “in places where” the superpowers merely “think their interests 
are threatened.”35  Indeed, up until this time, LCY members exhibited a general 
confidence in their legitimacy abroad as peacemakers and statesmen leading the Third 
World.36  The typical Yugoslav response to the Soviet action, though, reemphasized the 
accepted viewpoint of different roads to socialism and the development of individual 
                                                 
34.  Unidentified speaker in “Stenografske beleške sa sednice Komišije CK SKJ za Informisanje, 
13 September 1968,” ASCG CK SKJ XXVI K.1 6, p. 61.   
35.  Colonel Vasilije Čerović, “Military Commentary: Consequences,” Politika, 8 September 
1968, p. 5.  HU OSA 300–10–2 YSFI, NATO 1967–1972 [NATO 67–72], cn. 283. 
36.  See “Magnetofonske beleške i materijal sastanka Izvršnog bira,” ASCG CK SKJ IV K.7 7, 
1971, p. 67.  Budislav Šoškić explained, “Ja bih ovde zabišao nesvrstanost, nego da idemo dalje, 
spoljnopolitičke akcije, aktivnost ovoga i onoga, pa onda prelazimo na ovo drugo.” 
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revolutionary movements while vigorously opposing third-party action: “the LCY has 
resolutely opposed the doctrine according to which the leading power, in defending the 
so-called higher interests of a bloc, has the right to intervene unilaterally in its ‘own zone’ 
for the purpose of establishing a state of affairs suitable to its wishes.”37  Privately, the 
Yugoslav leadership expressed profound disappointment and fear that their work over the 
last fifteen years was for naught—the morality of Tito’s foreign policy and the work of 
the Non-aligned Movement sought an end to such unilateral actions by powers if for no 
other reason than international disapproval.  Nonetheless, the events against the 
Czechoslovak leadership served to embarrass and discredit Tito’s actions as a sovereign 
mover in international relations.  The executive bureau of the party recognized that a 
victory for their party in such a hostile atmosphere would entail a simple reaffirmation of 
Yugoslavia’s separate path to socialism and the recognition of sovereignty.38 
Not only did Tito and the LCY cry out against the Soviet intervention in 
Czechoslovakia as wrong, but they also took note of what had happened to prompt the 
invasion.  Generally favorable on the idea of socialism with a human face, Tito also 
witnessed how a Slovak nationalism took hold and how the country’s leaders moved in 
the field of constitutional reform to broker change.  A prominent Czechoslovak reporter, 
Karel Jezdinsky, served as the Radio Prague reporter in Belgrade and spoke out strongly 
                                                 
37.  Živko Mijatović, “International Relations and Cooperation of the League of Communists in 
Yugoslavia,” Yugoslav Survey 10:1 (February 1969), p. 20. 
38.  Nijaz Dizdarević sought a reaffirmation of the Belgrade Declaration, as Buda Šoškić agreed 
that essentially “uspeli da očuvamo i ponovo afirmišemo poziciju socijalističke Jugoslavije kao nezavisne, 
nesvrstane zemlje sa samostalnim putem u izgradnji socijalizma.”  See “Magnetofonske beleške i materijal 
sastanka Izvršnog bira,” ASCG CK SKJ IV K.7 7, 1971, p. 45. 
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against his regime and, as a result, won a lopsided amount of public attention in the 
Yugoslav press, especially after he fled to the West.  As a proponent against the “greatest 
enemies of socialism” in Moscow, Jezdinsky saw Soviet policies at home and abroad as 
representative of their imperialism.39  He made himself a martyr for a larger cause, no 
doubt informing LCY leaders on the power of public opinion, despite his potentially 
dangerous message that noted, “internal opposition” was the “most important 
opposition.”40  Furthermore, Yugoslavs had to see how these changes had affected not 
only the Czechoslovak domestic scene, but also how the events had further distanced 
Prague from the voices tucked away inside the Kremlin.   
Warsaw Pact forces, at the behest of the Soviet Union, created new tensions 
among the Yugoslav leadership whose members realized that relations between socialist 
countries had fundamentally changed in a direction “under firm socialist 
internationalism” that necessarily compromised the Yugoslav thesis of independence and 
cooperation.41  Debate among Yugoslav elites in 1968 questioned whether the action in 
Czechoslovakia would serve as a precedent for Soviet forces intervening later in 
Yugoslavia or in other states within the so-called Soviet orbit of influence.  The 
reasoning behind this rested with the interpretation of what constituted a socialist state 
and to what lengths the Soviets would enact the Brezhnev Doctrine.  The policy outlined 
by Brezhnev implied that the Soviet Union held the monopoly on socialist decisions and 
                                                 
39.  Karel Jezdinsky in UPI, 20 September 1968.  HU OSA 300–10–2 YSFI, Czechoslovakia 
[CZ], cn. 104.  
40.  Jezdinsky in UPI, 20 September 1968.  HU OSA 300–10–2 YSFI, CZ, cn. 104.  
41.  Stane Dolanc in “Magnetofonske beleške i materijal sastanka Izvršnog bira,” ASCG CK SKJ 
IV K.7 7, 1971, p. 5. 
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that its vague policy could be used to justify otherwise geopolitical interests, such as 
aggression against states in the Middle East and Central Asia.42  While never again used 
in Europe, Brezhnev did employ his logic in 1979 to reign in the turbulence in 
Afghanistan, and thus eventually proved the Yugoslavs’ concerns as valid.   
Closer to Yugoslavia though, the invasion of Czechoslovakia had forced Tito and 
the leadership to reevaluate their position vis-à-vis Soviet interests and what the proper 
response should encompass.  While Tito knew of certain plans the Soviets harbored, he 
felt that the Soviets had abandoned all reason in what seemed a dangerously disruptive 
display of force.  Tito had warned the Soviets at a joint meeting in Bratislava prior to the 
use of force that a Soviet-led invasion would be a “catastrophe,” but the events in Prague 
obviously overruled him.  When Tito and acting Foreign Secretary Mišo Pavičević met 
with Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach in October of that year, Katzenbach 
reported that the Yugoslavs were concerned about Soviet intentions in the Balkans and 
greater Mediterranean region.  Tito realized that Moscow’s influence with Nasir in Egypt 
had, by 1968, surpassed his own, and that if the Soviets gained further momentum with 
respect to Bulgaria’s claims on Yugoslav Macedonia, the Balkans might once again 
become a “powder keg.”43  The idea that Yugoslavia held the key position regarding 
stability in the Balkans and stood at the door to the Middle East gave Yugoslav leaders an 
added burden of responsibility to maintain order.  Keeping the status quo meant decisive 
                                                 
42.  Stane Dolanc in “Magnetofonske beleške i materijal sastanka Izvršnog bira,” ASCG CK SKJ 
IV K.7 7, 1971, p. 2.  Dolanc said that Soviet “interes za Balkan, s obzirom na geostrateški položaj tog 
regiona, a pre svega u funkciji sovjetske politike i strategije na Sredozemlju i Bliskom istoku.” 
43.  See Nicholas Katzenbach, “My Meeting With Tito,” Department of State Telegram, (20 
October, 1968). 
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action and strong international influence, but Tito always remained handicapped by his 
foreign policy based on nonintervention and coexistence.  Although Soviet action in 
Czechoslovakia served to weaken Tito’s influence in the Non-aligned Movement, he still 
had enough credibility to remain involved in the complex process of European 
peacemaking throughout the 1970s because of his unique position between the blocs. 
 
TERRITORIAL DEFENSE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
In response to some of problems with the new strategy for defense in the wake of the 
Prague Spring, the military underwent reorganization in 1969, with the passage of the 
General People’s Defense (GPD) law.  The law created two equal elements for defense, 
the Yugoslav People’s Army and the Territorial Defense Force.44  While the JNA 
remained a federal institution, the TDF fell under various decentralized republican, 
autonomous provincial, and communal oversight.  This decentralization project of a 
significant portion of the nation’s defense forces fulfilled the goal of organizing the 
military along self-management principles that were already prevalent in other sectors of 
society.45  Such changes hindered the federal military, but cemented the role of the 
                                                 
44.  Article 1 of the General People’s Defense Law stated, “Every citizen who in war, in an 
organized way, participates with arms in the struggle against the enemy can be a member of the armed 
forces of Yugoslavia.”  Cited in Gow, Legitimacy, p. 46. 
45.  Elites in Yugoslavia repeatedly cited the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) as being the only 
Yugoslav institution that was not “self-managed.”  JNA leaders argued that a military could not function 
under self-management and thus excused.  Despite this, what is interesting to note is that self-management 
system based on self-directing principles served as one of the justifications for the creation and 
strengthening of the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF); namely, the TDF allowed Yugoslav citizens to 
participate in the defense of the country but in an organization that was inherently opposed to self-
management.  For examples of the kind of verbiage about the self-managed nature of the TDF, consult the 
following: Colonel–General Viktor Bubanj in Teritorijalna odbrana (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 
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policeman and a guerrilla militiaman within official policy.  Such a shift towards an 
emphasis on the citizen-soldier did fit within what Yugoslav theorists saw as an armed 
force with historic and communist-liberation roots; furthermore, the reorganization 
empowered the localities at the expense of the federation, but ultimately sought to 
strengthen the legitimacy of the state and self-management.  Tito argued that relations 
within Yugoslavia would improve once citizens organized defense to protect themselves 
and their state.46  Yugoslav sources showed how the federal budget benefitted from the 
new organization while people across the spectrum came together under the auspices of a 
single institution.47  Military analysts in Yugoslavia saw this arrangement as credible, not 
only as a real deterrent in the face of renewed Soviet aggression, but also in light of the 
poor U.S. performance in Vietnam against popular liberation forces.48  Yugoslav officers 
repeatedly declared that the JNA–TDF arrangement represented a “comprehensive 
defense,” comprising armed resistance, civil defense, armament production, and military 
                                                                                                                                                 
1970), p. 7; and, Miljenko Živković, Teritorijalna obrana Jugoslavije (Beograd: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 
1985), p. 180. 
46.  See, for example, Živković, Teritorijalna odbrana, pp. 7–9; Tito in Živković, Teritorijalna 
odbrana, p. 57.  “[K]ako to Tito kaže, ‘da udruženi proizvođači i građani organizuju odbrambene snaga 
društva kao svoje sopstvene.’” 
47.  Milojica Pantelić, “The Role of the Armed Forces in the System of National Defence,” 
Yugoslav Survey 10:4 (November 1969), p. 31; Also see Živković, Teritorijalna odbrana, p. 61.  
“Samoupravljanje i samoupravni društveni odnosi utemeljuju jedinstvo klasnih, političkih i nacionalnih 
interesa svih naroda i narodnosti, radnih ljudi i građana i na ovom segmentu društvene stvarnosti.” 
48.  Yugoslav analysts took into consideration, as did others around the world, how the United 
States performed in Vietnam against the Communist guerilla forces.  The success of Ho Chi Mihn’s forces 
against the American army led many to believe that such warfare tactics were credible against modern 
armies. 
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engineering, not least of which because the Yugoslavs understood the “human factor as 
the essential element” in the “ability of every individual country to defend itself.”49 
Despite Tito’s manipulation of leaders in both East and West, the Cold War 
division of Europe between the Warsaw Pact, backed by the Soviet Union, and NATO, 
backed by the United States, left Yugoslavia vulnerable and presented unprecedented 
complexity for Yugoslavia’s military defense.  Yugoslav military officers, recognizing 
their position in relation to the superpowers surrounding them, tried to adopt a credible 
strategy that could deter both neighboring countries such as Albania, while also deterring 
large powers such as the Soviet Union.  Such logic served as the reasoning behind the 
reemergence of guerrilla forces; namely, a popular struggle that could once again protect 
Yugoslavia from dominance by stronger neighbors and reinvigorate the population 
behind Tito as World War II had done almost three decades prior. 
Tito’s Partisan movement secured victory in World War II by conducting a 
limited, guerrilla war aimed at taxing and outlasting a highly overextended, more 
powerful enemy, while, at the same time, relying on other countries to fight the major 
battles to cripple Nazi strength.  This strategy remained plausible in light of what 
potential battle between the United States and the Soviet Union might look like alongside 
the expected devastation that would befall both powers.  JNA commanders felt that their 
role could never be to defeat decisively either superpower on an open battlefield; rather, 
they could delay the total capitulation of Yugoslavia for a few days or, at best, a few 
                                                 
49.  For these officer declarations, see Drew Middleton, “Belgrade’s Defense Strategy: Guerrilla 
War,” New York Times, 5 May 1980, p. A13; Colonel Vasilije Čerović, “Military Commentary: 
Consequences,” Politika, 8 September 1968, p. 5.  HU OSA 300–10–2 YSFI NATO 67–72, cn. 283. 
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weeks, by pinning down major enemy forces.  Meanwhile, following this scenario, the 
major burden would increasingly rest on the TDF thanks to a well-planned and 
strategically competent guerrilla war comprised of virtually the entire able-bodied 
population.  These two factors combined meant to convince external enemies that an 
invasion of Yugoslavia would present unreasonable complexities and an overtaxing 
burden in the event of war. 
Because of all the rhetoric about self-management and decentralization that would 
bring all the people together in defense of the nation, this JNA–TDF arrangement had a 
perfect ideological foundation.  With more people involved in the defense regime, the 
system would touch people more directly; and, moreover, bringing more people into the 
armed forces, even for short periods, would increase the contact with other economic, 
ethnic, and religious groups.  Exposure to a multiethnic, diverse Yugoslavia would, army 
leaders hoped, foster brotherhood and unity not only during wartime but also during 
periods of peace.  Yugoslav officers knew that they could never field a conventional 
army to match that of the Soviet Union and they surmised that the TDF became a 
necessary reality if leaders wished to claim a legitimate role in protecting the people of 
Yugoslavia from external enemies.  In line with the politicization of the armed forces, the 
National Defense Law of 1969 stated that it was the right and duty of the local political 
leader “to organize total national defense and to command the battle directly.”50  The 
Territorial Defense Forces “would play a particularly significant role in fighting off all 
kinds of air-borne attacks” as the force “always ‘on the spot.’”  Furthermore, as Milojica 
                                                 
50.  See A. Ross Johnson, Total National Defense in Yugoslavia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
1971), p. 3. 
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Pantelić noted at the time, “among its formations, the Yugoslav People’s Army has large 
partisan units”—the TDF—to drain enemy resources in the event of an invasion.51  In 
order to carry out a predominantly partisan-type war, though, that force needed to be both 
popular and self-sustaining.  This notion of popularity gave the impression that people 
would identify with the regime and gladly take to arms in its defense; accordingly, “The 
strength of our doctrine,” as Defense Secretary Bubanj boasted in 1970, “is that it is 
public and belongs to the people.”52   
Although Bubanj’s exaltation of his military’s strength seemed reasonable, it 
became problematic once the country faced new challenges.  Indeed, the power of this 
system became a liability as a problem in maintaining unity.  The two-tiered JNA and 
TDF defense strategy lessened the role of the federal government and gave more power 
to the republics.  Under the umbrella of the armed defense of Yugoslavia, the TDF and 
JNA forces were legally equal as two parts of a complete defensive system.53  Following 
the 1969 reorganization, the law clearly recognized the JNA as the premier defender of 
the country through its ownership of “extraordinary high striking and strategic, operative, 
tactical and maneuvering capabilities”; but, despite this, the JNA was “not the principal 
factor responsible for territorial defense and territorial operations, this being the principal 
concern of work organizations and socio-political communities.”54  Such language 
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52.  Viktor Bubanj quoted in Gow, Legitimacy, p. 47. 
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limited the importance of the federal mechanism for defense and caused many to question 
the proper role of the army.  Narodna armija directly took on such skeptics, who “from 
time to time” raised “very suspicious theses on questions which have been crystal clear 
for a long time.”  Declaring superfluous those queries over whether there was an 
“essential difference” between the JNA and the TDF, the newspaper meted out harsh 
critique against the “unscientific and anti-constitutional” statements that did no more than 
endanger the basic nature of the armed forces.55  LCY leaders must have taken note of the 
“downplaying and particularly the denial of a military threat” as a contributing factor “to 
a disorganization of the state and the people,” and a general mood of “universal 
pacifism.”56  Vigilance against enemies would continue to underpin the state, but only so 
long as everyone remained tied to the Titoist project.    
 
REFORM AGAIN 
Against whom was the army defending?  In the role of “protector of the state and 
people,” and as the creator of second Yugoslavia, the army needed to show that its 
defensive role was legitimate and necessary.  Leaders placed emphasis on not only the 
quality of work in the JNA, but also on how well the army protected the sovereignty of 
the state against border incursions and domestic harassment.57  Because the prospect of 
                                                 
55.  See “Army Committee,” Narodna armija, 23 September 1973.  HU OSA 300–10–2 YSFI, 
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overwhelming invasion from the Soviet Union worried the JNA, the establishment of the 
Territorial Defense Force gained credibility in light of the renewed stress from the 
Brezhnev Doctrine and the internal pressure for the military to conform to the broader 
reform regime in place since the early 1950s.  Once enacted, the TDF itself constantly 
underwent reform; its composition changed each year as the soldiers reflected changing 
demographics in each region or commune.  As a result, the percentage of TDF soldiers 
from Serbia increased from 17.83 percent of the total in 1980, to 24.69 percent in 1984, 
while some regions like Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina saw a decrease thanks to a 
declining population there.58  Most importantly, when speaking of manpower, the TDF 
outnumbered the JNA, with almost 700,000 soldiers in arms by 1970, and reaching 
almost one million a decade later.59  Although the idea of dividing the defense between 
the JNA and the TDF showed Yugoslavia’s ability to transform to meet changing 
realities, this division fueled confusion as to the proper roles and responsibilities that 
Yugoslav leaders faced during the hectic time following the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
until the last days of Yugoslavia in 1991.  Reform of the TDF system became necessary 
out of concern that too much power devolved from the central authorities and potential 
counterrevolutionary forces were benefiting from the local emphasis of Territorial 
Defense.  
                                                                                                                                                 
guarantor of direct security and activity through the fighting of existing problems). 
58.  Miljenko Živković, Teritorijalna odbrana, vol. 6, Razvoj Oružanih snaga SFRY: 1945–1985  
(Beograd: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1986), p. 174. 
59.  Živković, Teritorijalna odbrana, p. 106 and p. 157. 
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JNA commanders saw the constitutional reform that culminated with the last 
Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 as boosting their esteem because of the legal rejection of 
the overt reliance on Partisan-type TDF fighting forces.  The constitution reneged on the 
equal distribution of power between the JNA and the TDF outlined by the General 
People’s Defense Law of 1969 and resumed the JNA’s role as the preeminent fighting 
force in Yugoslavia under the federal government’s control.  As the new Yugoslav 
national defense laws in 1974 noted, “The supreme direction and command of the armed 
forces ensures the unity and inseparability of the armed forces and the armed struggle.”  
Important for the JNA’s high command, the president of the federation stood as the 
“Supreme Commander of the armed forces.”60  Reform centralized the command 
structure of the JNA and concentrated the armed forces in Belgrade rather than 
distributing them to regional centers.  Because of the profound ideological underpinnings 
of the Titoist system based on reform and a desire to retain a semblance of popular 
participation in government activities, the reorganization did not eliminate the TDF; 
rather, restructuring had streamlined the structure and introduced a series of small 
solutions to work over time.  JNA officers eagerly took on the dual role of commanding 
the JNA and the TDF, leaving the TDF without a forceful administration of its own.  
Even for such simple things as obtaining rifles or ammunition for practice, TDF units 
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needed to obtain permission from JNA authorities.  Yet, the popular notion of defense 
remained as constitutional designers reaffirmed total participation during wartime, 
because as Article 172 stated, “The defense of the country shall be the inviolable and 
inalienable right and the supreme duty and honor of every citizen.”61  Reforms to unify 
people behind a partisan-concept of self-defense failed, though, to address basic issues 
that allowed the TDF to operate as a semi-parallel military institution.  The constitution 
clearly laid out the role of national defense, in terms of the “right and duty of the 
communes, autonomous provinces and the republics” to organize and direct “national 
defense.”62  While this organization of total national defense fell under the JNA’s 
command structure, in practice, leaders allotted the burden to the individual territorial 
units.  Emphasizing this dilemma, the constitution noted that the federal army was the 
“common armed force of all the nations and nationalities and of all the working people 
and citizens,” but it stood alongside the “territorial defense, as the broadest form of 
organized total national armed resistance.”63  While the JNA was supreme, the necessity 
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of the TDF, according to Yugoslav theory, made it such that the reform affected broader 
social issues.  The ability of all people to participate leveled the so-called boundaries that 
formerly separated so-called important and ordinary people and continued the 
government’s program to destroy nationalism—the army simply represented a traditional 
melting pot and leaders hoped for success to go beyond the army and into broader 
society.   
Political reforms that came with the 1974 Constitution further secured the JNA a 
position within the LCY Central Committee.  At the federal level, each republic and 
autonomous province had a vote in the Central Committee, but the 1974 Constitution 
created a ninth member—the army.  Giving a greater voice to the 100,000 LCY members 
in the army, this move further solidified the two institutions and brought an increased 
military presence within the visible operations of the federal government.64  Despite 
increased political influence, all constitutions forbid army interference in the political life 
of the state by positioning it as a purely defensive organization.  Nonetheless, the idea of 
bringing the army and the party closer together simply made sense; after all, the “high 
political” and “patriotic consciousness” that had grown up during World War II 
supposedly reinforced the unity of the people behind the tenacity of the armed forces.65  
The National Defense Laws also revised an overall change in the civil-military 
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relationship.66  These 1974 reforms culminated in a new basis for future army 
intervention in maintaining the regime and lent further legitimacy to both the LCY and 
the JNA.  Thus, the 1974 Constitution legitimated Tito’s use of force to quell domestic 
opponents to the regime. 
 
CRISIS AGAIN: CROATIAN SPRING, 1971 
During World War II, Tito and his closest advisors contemplated what a multiethnic 
communist-led Yugoslavia would look like and their vision increasingly rested on a 
strong, meaningful legal framework.  Each successive Yugoslav constitution dealt in 
depth with issues such as political autonomy, ethnic representation, and various cultural 
issues.  The law clearly stood on the side of multi-ethnicity; to that end, any form of 
national injustice or incitement of hatred was unconstitutional and punishable under the 
law.67  Having a legal outlet to punish offenders guilty of ethnic chauvinism meant that 
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Tito’s state fully embraced a carrot-and-stick approach to solving its perceived ethnic 
problem.   
 Despite broad legal protection, some inter-ethnic tensions remained.  The largest 
challenge had occurred in 1971, when emotions erupted in Croatia growing out of largely 
cultural disputes.  The leading Croatian cultural organization, Matica Hrvatska, published 
a manifesto in 1967, which demanded changes in the federal constitution to more 
forcefully protect the cultural values of individuals within Yugoslavia.  Several literary 
scholars in Zagreb continued to emphasize that their particular version of the common 
Serbo–Croatian idiom needed reinforcement in the face of a more dominant Serbian 
dialect propagated at the federal level.  The cultural organization’s demands eventually 
came in the form of a document entitled, “Declaration on the Name and Position of the 
Croatian Literary Language,” which asked for an affirmation of Croatian culture within 
the state’s legal framework.68  From 1967 until 1971, the voices on behalf of a greater 
Croatian voice continued to rise and finally erupted into a broad-based challenge to Tito’s 
system. 
During the last half of 1971, this Croatian Spring represented the first potentially 
successful domestic challenge to Tito’s government since he had consolidated power in 
the wake of World War II.  Despite the state’s inclusive stance and legal safeguards 
against the misuse of power, a sensitivity to abuse or alleged injustice pushed events into 
the political sphere.  Demands transcended cultural lines and included economic 
grievances to the list of complaints because, as Croatia grew wealthier, an increasing 
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number of Croats became reluctant to continue to fund economic growth in the less-
developed areas of Yugoslavia, such as Macedonia and Kosovo.69  On many fronts, 
people rejected this argument as chauvinistic and selfish and recognized that it went 
against how Tito understood the continued economic development of Yugoslavia: 
Economic growth and cooperation between republics was for Tito “the logical 
continuation of the present policy of equality among our peoples.”70  In layman’s terms, 
Tito outlined his view that as soon as a “finger is pointed at another Republic,” issues 
went astray and that was “not right, and ought not to be.”71  To combat these separatist 
forces, Tito first relied upon the police to deal with individuals who spoke out against the 
regime.  But, because of the powerful potential of a large-scale challenge, the army also 
took on a powerful role in this conflict.  During the summer of 1971, the JNA held 
maneuvers in the vicinity of Zagreb—as part of one of the largest peacetime armed 
exercises, called “Sloboda ’71,” or Freedom ’71—and solidified an increased cooperation 
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between Tito and the top JNA leadership.72  The army’s visible presence made clear that 
officers were deadly serious in their support for Tito and foreshadowed an even greater 
role during their commander’s final years in office.73  I would emphasize too, that this 
overt show of force by the regime caused opponents of the regime to surface since 
“Sloboda ‘71” so clearly provoked and insulted the leadership in Croatia.  Tito had 
recognized that the rhetoric in Croatia grew worse since 1967, and sought to either quell 
it outright or bring the forces of resistance into the open. 
In an anonymous letter from Zagreb directed to the executive bureau of the LCY, 
a worker complained that “functionaries in this country do not speak in the name of the 
working class and working man” and that this “socialism is worse than capitalism in 
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which our workers labor three to five times harder.”74  A Milan Topalović from Mostar 
wrote to the party declaring that Croats in Hercegovina had acted unfairly and questioned 
everything, beginning with language, schools, the distribution of apartments, and the 
allocation of official positions.  In addition, another letter mentioned how Serbs in 
Croatia were in danger from those who sing chauvinistic songs and attack Partisan 
veterans.75  To the party, it seemed as if in the late summer and early fall of 1971, all 
Croats were attacking the system.76  These complaints gave real meaning to what students 
had protested at several points since 1968 as they sought to make their voices heard and 
affect change much as in Western Europe and the United States during this same period.  
What set the movement in 1971 apart from other student protests was that the Zagreb 
students wrote in their November resolution that they would only “accept the changes in 
the sociopolitical system” designed to make Croatia a “sovereign, national state of the 
Croatian people.”77  Zagreb’s students also called for their acceptance into the United 
Nations and for a separate Croatian army.78  Such a call for a reevaluation of Croatia’s 
place within Tito’s Yugoslavia crossed the line and guaranteed a stern rebuttal by LCY 
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elites and it prompted other students in Yugoslavia—principally in Kosovo—to demand 
similar anti-Titoist measures.79  At the end of the Croatian Spring, party leader Vladimir 
Bakarić, warned the Croatian communists, “you should tell us very clearly,” whether or 
not “‘we trust you,’” or that “‘we do not trust you.’”80  Fear had grown rapidly in the 
party to a point of no return. 
Widespread arrests in Croatia and purges from the Croatian LCY shook the 
foundations of the regime’s attitude towards stability and their legitimacy; as part of his 
search for answers and reasoning behind the protests, Tito alluded to the appearance of 
“foreign interference.”81  For Tito, his entire state-building project lay open for 
destruction at the hands of “hostile” elements active in Croatia who worked on behalf of 
multiple actors.82  Desire for an end to Tito’s reign also grew among Croats in the United 
States at this time.  Ohio Senator Robert Taft, Jr. petitioned Henry Kissinger for a 
meeting with representatives of the National Federation of Croatian–American 
Republican Clubs in early 1972, because of that group’s continued “frustration” with the 
Nixon administration’s reactions to the Croatian Spring.83  That organization’s national 
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secretary, Joseph Bosiliević, railed against Tito’s “inequitable, multinational” state with 
its “highly centralized power establishment and its divergent, antagonistic, and 
disfranchised people.”  While he employed rhetoric similar to Tito’s, Bosiliević’s goal of 
an independent (and, most likely, enlarged) Croatian state ran counter to Tito’s 
multiethnic project; namely, “nations, like people,” also have a “sense of self direction, 
and the freedom by which to develop” a range of “creative capacities” and to “assert their 
cultural identities” to avoid reactionary behavior.  Bosiliević’s definition of reactionary 
revealed the point of departure with Tito.  His organization felt remorse at Tito’s actions 
against so-called freedom-loving Croats and desired that the U.S. government pressure 
Tito to alter his repressive and multiethnic course.84   
Back at home in Croatia, anti-regime propaganda and illegal assembly by students 
had kept the police in Zagreb busy during the Croatian Spring with almost 200 arrests in 
just five days—criminal arrests that could lead to detention for “at least five years.”85  
Police also rounded up those who were “disturbing order” and “chanting slogans” in 
support of anti-Titoist forces.86  Of course, the criminal charges and euphemisms such as 
“hostile propaganda” masked the real nature of these charges as based on nationalism.  
Bakarić warned in November that in Croatia “an organized nationalistic group” was not 
extraordinary; instead, it was “crystallizing” and “rising” with each day from the bottom 
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up.87  Incidentally, the LCY hoped that Yugoslav society would develop self-
management and unity with just such “initiative from below.” 88 
The political grievances of certain Croatian politicians such as Miko Tripalo, 
Savka Dabčević-Kučar, and Pero Pirker brewed for some months prior to fall 1971—
arguably since the Matica Hrvatska began with its critical publications in 1967.  What 
made things different by late 1971, though, was the provocative stance the regime had 
taken to combat these voices of opposition.  Student strikes in late November rocked 
Croatia, and, to an extent, gave authorities in Ljubljana and Belgrade the impetus to deter 
protests at institutions there.89  Tito had spoken out harshly against the actions in Croatia 
and about the leaders of Croatia, who he saw as fundamentally against “our State,” and in 
favor of “some other one, of the Pavelić type.”90  Eventually, with the power of the police 
and the loyal JNA, the leaders in Croatia reneged on their particularistic views.  The 
student group at the vortex of the movement—at the University of Zagreb—met and 
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formed an initiative committee.  This group reaffirmed the Titoist mantra: “any 
nationalism and counter-revolutionary movement is alien,” because such behavior was 
“incompatible with socialist aspirations.”  The committee also concluded that events had 
gotten out of control thanks to a student body insufficiently “alert and active to suppress” 
anti-socialist forces.91 
When, in 1971, Tito spoke out that the state had suffered because of a lack of true 
democracy, the LCY listened.  Bakarić noted how Tito saw the events of the Croatian 
Spring as represented by “people” who were “fighting for something” and while the 
implementation of law was “very weak,” the party must turn again, to “reform” and 
“bring the worker from his place of work” into “political life.”  This was merely the 
“beginning of the development of self-management and of the mobilization” of “working 
people in daily political life”; not, the creation of a “movement with a firm” and 
unrelenting leadership.92  Even with a profound challenge to the Party’s legitimacy to 
rule, Tito focused his efforts and believed that the right path relied upon better reforms 
that could continue to induce more people into believing in the system.  While he would 
vacillate back and forth between conservative action and ongoing reform for a few years 
following the Croatian Spring, Tito decided on reform when he unveiled the last 
Yugoslav constitution in 1974.  Yugoslav media outlets purported that in principle, the 
“most dangerous side” of anti-Yugoslavism to appear in society was nationalism.  To 
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combat this, leaders told the people that they will best learn from history “to understand 
brotherhood and unity as a sine qua non condition, as the key of all keys, as the solution 
of all solutions for our survival, as the foundation of our country” and of peace and 
prosperity.93  Tito made sure that he equated “‘our’ nationalisms” in all “their variants” 
with the “ideology of capitalism” as a further means to ground his solution within his 
Marxist worldview.94 
 
TITO DOCTRINE  
When he confronted the Presidium of the League of Communists in December 1971, Tito 
stood ready to defend his revolution against all opponents.  Confident in his power base 
but fearful of losing popular legitimacy, Tito returned to the mantra of reform.  While in 
terms of military affairs, the civil-military relationship definitively shifted back to a more 
centralized character, the progression of the party vis-à-vis self-management and legal-
based reform continued, though with a slight pause, unencumbered.  Zagreb Radio 
broadcasted on 4 December 1971, that, “Yugoslavia’s unity is the common interest and 
responsibility of all Republics,” as a subtle reminder to World War II and the internecine 
fighting between the ethnic groups.  Tito managed to rise above nationalism, despite the 
slight Serbian demographic advantage among his Partisan fighters, because he fought 
during the war against the foreign invaders and in the name of brotherhood and unity of 
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all peoples.  Memories and legacies of the wartime struggle did give Tito credibility as a 
fighter for all of Yugoslavia and that spirit of unity became central to any working 
federation.  More simply, working together fit within Tito’s broader ideology and 
strengthened his rule—opting out of that system meant a declaration of war.95 
 Tito and the LCY had reacted to the Brezhnev Doctrine in the summer of 1968, 
when it appeared that the Soviet leaders were confident in their strength and might renew 
verbal attacks or open armed aggression against Yugoslavia.  Neither happened, but the 
events in Prague and the potential precedent set gave Tito’s regime a boost towards 
bringing reforms closer to the people.  The General People’s Defense Law served as one 
facet of this turn to popular support as a means to deter the Soviet Union and wave the 
flag for Tito and the continued success of his Yugoslav revolution.  But, when the events 
in Croatia took a turn that called into the question the sovereignty of his state, Tito 
expressed frustration and dismay.  He called out the regime opponents and reevaluated 
his stance on sovereignty.  As the fundamental issue over Croatian demands, the right of 
sovereignty took on a new level for Tito as he declared, “every republic has its 
sovereignty and right to safeguard it”; but, “Yugoslavia, in relation to other countries,” 
has a single “sovereignty as a state, that is, Yugoslav.”  This Yugoslav sovereignty 
consisted of the collective sovereignty of “all the republics.”96  A break from this system 
meant a challenge to Tito and a challenge to the political status quo.  As Brezhnev had 
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called out the leaders in Prague on the same accord, Tito had in fact, in 1971, declared his 
own doctrine—the Tito Doctrine. 
  
CONCLUSION 
In former Yugoslavia, the army was one of the most important organizations.  The army 
allowed the state to exist and maintain itself, and, eventually, served as the means of 
Yugoslavia’s dismemberment.  While the LCY had acted as a bonding agent within the 
post-World War II state’s framework, it also sought to tailor the JNA to the internal as 
well as external threats confronting the Yugoslav state.  That is why the party launched 
the experiment with Territorial Defense and then backpedaled on its reforms.  In the end, 
these machinations over political prowess hampered the construction of a popular 
legitimacy.  While reform harkened an earnest desire for the army to conform to self-
management through the TDF, the reality of power inside Yugoslavia made leaders think 
twice.  Territorial Defense created the necessary deterrent against Soviet action after 
Czechoslovakia and served to expose more Yugoslavs to the differences latent in the 
country; but, though, too many people still harbored discontent with the regime and 
desired change antithetical to Tito’s system.  In the end, once the Communist Party 
abandoned power in 1991, the army and the federal government together sought a new 
“national” basis for legitimacy, which failed and led to wars of secession.  As the Serbian 
historian, Mile Bjelajac, has summarized: “After the collapse of the LCY, the JNA 
became the last standard-bearer of Tito’s brand of communism.”97  Nevertheless, without 
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the LCY, the JNA was an empty institution. 
The history of Yugoslavia is more complex than any simple evolutionary model 
of civil-military relations would suggest, but that relationship did play a determining role 
in the stability and cohesion of the state.  The military initially acquiesced in handing 
over power to Tito’s civil authority during and immediately following the World War II 
and stood idly by as the socio-economic sphere underwent reform vis-à-vis self-
management.  Army leaders cooperated in this unending transformation of Yugoslav 
society partly because they devoutly followed the party’s prescription for success but also 
because they knew that their institution, the army, was largely immune to internal reform.  
Leaders changed their mind, though, when Brezhnev sent forces into Czechoslovakia; the 
result saw how leaders not only embraced ideological reform, but also argued its unifying 
characteristics for the entire country.  Professionalism suffered, as the military grew more 
and more dependent and involved in the party and state apparatuses.  When the army saw 
the dangers of nationalism in 1971, it promptly sought a return to the status quo ante, 
when people were less involved in armed defense.  Political leaders such as Bakarić 
noted such hesitation when he asked the Croatian leadership whom they trusted and if 
they themselves were trustworthy.   
Much later, military leaders, acting in place of a powerful Tito, failed to arbitrate 
successfully between conflicting parties when the country fell apart in 1991 thanks to 
bungled efforts at armed intervention.98  Additionally, the army’s role in the LCY gave it 
a dual role in securing the state.  Laura Silber’s and Alan Little’s more recent 
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interpretation posited that “After 1980, the JNA knew that, along with the League of 
Communists, it was the glue” that held together Tito’s state.  Up to the outbreak of 
conflict in 1991, the authors argued that “most officers genuinely believed in the 
multinational union of six Socialist republics, and in ‘bratsvo i jedinstvo’”—brotherhood 
and unity.99  Silber and Little did correctly note this strong bond between the two 
institutions; overtly used as a mechanism to extinguish separatism in 1971, army officers 
took their newly defined constitutional role seriously after 1974 and fought hard to 
maintain their Yugoslavia at all costs.   
As a member of the Central Committee, Dobrica Ćosić, had argued that during 
the 1960s, decentralization led to bureaucratic nationalism and the exaltation of the 
federal state above the individual Yugoslav citizen.  Ćosić claimed that the 
developmental tendencies of nationalism remained unresolved throughout the Balkans 
and, if trends continued, the national question “will remain the torment and the 
preoccupation of generations to come.”  He felt that the solution rested with the 
“democratic forces of socialism,” because if they did not win the final victory, then the 
Serbian people might seek an “old historic goal and national ideal – the unification of the 
Serbian people in a single state.”  The repercussions of that for Ćosić were clear: “No 
political imagination is needed to foresee the consequences of such a process.”100  Ćosić 
railed against decentralization as a method towards maintaining Yugoslav legitimacy 
because he saw a strong state as the antidote to dismemberment and, quite possibly, as a 
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means to exaggerate a Serbian presence in his idea of a strong, federal state.  Between his 
vocal stance and an underlying danger in his logic, the LCY muted his voice because it 
went against Tito’s idea of how to govern a transitional and multiethnic state.  In 
November 1968, the Central Committee dropped him for what its members noted as his 
anti-decentralization statements and his linkage of decentralization with the bogeyman of 
Yugoslav politics—nationalism.101  By the 1970s, though, after the repercussions of the 
Croatian Spring set in, LCY elites still spoke of decentralization, and, in fact, solidified 
greater individual rights in the 1974 Constitution; but, at the same time, LCY leaders 
worked hard to restrain the ill effects of a decentralized state.  The realignment of the 
TDF under the JNA command structure served as an important pillar in that delicate 
quest to resolve the division between rhetoric and reality, federalism and decentralized 
confederation.  Party members went to great lengths to prove that the state was ready for 
decentralization and that such moves would make it stronger in the end.102 
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respect is of special importance when economically less developed countries are involved.  Thirdly, 
especially at the beginning, it has an important role in fostering the socialist elements of society and giving 
them guidenc.  But, its functions gradually diminish, as society as a whole takes them over.”  For a 
comparison with other Eastern bloc regimes, see Sheldon Anderson, A Cold War in the Soviet Bloc: Polish-
East German Relations, 1945–1962, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001), p. 222.  Anderson has cited East 
German leader Ulbricht, in his typical Stalinist style, as having defended the SED’s (East Germany’s 
Communist Party) tight control over all aspects of East German society to the Polish Embassy in East 
Berlin in 1958: “When one has a strong police then it is possible to talk about building socialism.”  
102.  See Federalizam i Nacionalno Pitanje: zbirka radova, (Beograd: Savez Udruženja za 
Političke Nauke Jugoslavije, 1971), p. 260.  “Osobenost naše samoupravne socijalističke demokratije 
određuje i specifičnu prirodu jugoslovenskog federalizma, pa u tom smislu i sam ustavni karakter i 
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 Within his mantra of reform, ideology served as the single most important 
foundation for Tito’s system—designed simply to supplant all other notions of individual 
and collective identity, including nationalism.  Manipulating ideology proved dangerous, 
as these attempts have shown, and while often positive and proactive, elites too often 
delivered punishment, emphasized jealousy and mistrust, and simply reinforced thinking 
along ethnic lines.  Actions taken during the Croatian Spring unveiled the flaws within 
the system, as did the failure of the ethnic key to bring about a truly equitable system.  
Too often, people had excuse to feel disadvantaged as ethnicity brokered promotion and 
reward rather than merit.  While public and frequently popular, the idea of an ethnic key 
nonetheless brought ethnicity to the forefront of daily politics for many Yugoslavs in the 
civil service or armed forces at the expense of a common identity and equality.  As a way 
to prescribe solutions to such failures, the regime sponsored symposiums and meetings, 
including a so-called brotherhood and unity symposium in 1985, in Ivangrad, 
Montenegro, chaired by former diplomat Mišo Pavićević to deal directly with the crisis of 
Yugoslav disintegration.  Symposium organizers faced difficult questions in trying to 
forge a positive future for the country.  Pavićević said in a summary statement of the 
meetings, “Switzerland is a multinational confederation, but its system functions 
                                                                                                                                                 
društveno-politički sadržaj autonomne pokrajine kao elementa federalizma .... Lenjin je autonomiju tražio u 
celokupnom socijalnom i političkom kontekstu, kulturno-ideološkoj strukturi, u samom shvatanju političkih 
oblika socijalističke demokratije.  Svojevremino je on, ulazeći u suštinu političkih odnosa, govorio da 
“marksisti ne brane” “pravo na autonomiju”, nego samo autonomiju kao opšti, univerzalni princip 
demokratske države sa šarenim nacionalnim sastavom, s oštrom razlikom geografskih i drugih uslova.  
Prema tome, priznavati pravo nacija na autonomiju bilo bi isto tako besmisleno kao i priznavati pravo 
nacija na federaciju.”  This passage talks about some of the major issues involved with greater autonomy 
given to the constituent republics and declares that federalism is the best solution. 
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effectively.”  But, Yugoslavia was also “multinational and is officially a federation, but 
this system does not function effectively.”103  Clearly, something needed fixing but one 
of the toughest roadblocks to clear was the national spirit that thrived in each of the 
republics and provinces.  Despite trying, the regime failed miserably at solving the 
problem political elites they recognized as most critical—nationalism.  Tito and the LCY 
thought the country was ready in 1968 to embrace a Yugoslav nationalism; the patriotic 
outbursts following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia seemed to make that dream a 
reality in the face of overwhelming aggression from outside the country.  The creation of 
the TDF brought this hope alive as a mechanism to forge a common and inclusive 
identity but when anti-regime behavior burst forth in 1971 in Croatia, Tito feared a loss 
of political control, especially in the delicate international environment at the dawn of his 
last decade in power.  As a result, the TDF experiment underwent reform and the most 
loyal group in Yugoslavia—the JNA officer corps—reemerged as a primary political 
arbiter. 
Part of the problem for Tito rested on his ability to maintain a stable and 
prosperous system at home; after all, “the question of material resources will be a very 
important thing,” because with a stronger economy, the country “will get strong in every 
way,” including in the army.104  The LCY relied on bringing people into the system and 
making it function effectively and efficiently as a guarantee for Yugoslavia’s 
                                                 
103.  Dragan Barjaktarević and Ivan Ivanov, “Vreme nam ističe,” Duga, 5–18 October 1985. HU 
OSA 300–10–2 YSFI NP 85, cn. 283. 
104.  Marko Nikezić in “Stenografske beleške sa sednice Komišije CK SKJ za Informisanje, 13 
September 1968,” ASCG CK SKJ XXVI K.1 6, p. 61.     
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independence in the face of broader threats.  Leaders saw the solution to the regime’s 
problems in delivering to the people the promises of prosperity and freedom that the LCY 
had made—after all, how else could the regime expect people to sacrifice their lives in 
defense of the state? 105  Tito recognized in 1971 that, “we have promised the working 
class a lot, and have carried out little.”  Furthermore, “we cannot separate the working 
class according to republics,” because “there is only one working class,” and “it is 
Yugoslav.”106  Tito desperately needed to convince his people just such an idea—that 
ethnic markers clashed with his Marxist ideology and that he must prevail in order to 
unite Yugoslavia.  All of this talk about economics served as euphemisms for what 
leaders poured over as the real dilemma—that is, nationality.  But dissenting voices in the 
LCY—in journals such as Praxis—noted that the Yugoslav Communism had made a 
“fetish of materialism,” with the partial market base of the economy and thus “resurrected 
                                                 
105.  See Jovan Đorđević, “The Creation of the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia,” in Robert A. Goldwin and Art Kaufman, eds., Constitution Makers on 
Constitution Making: The Experience of Eight Nations, (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research, 1983), p. 191.  Đorđević stated that, “The Constitution of Yugoslavia devotes 
several provisions, more than any other constitution, to national defense and the armed forces in accordance 
with the principle that the defense of the country is the right and duty of all citizens and that surrender to an 
enemy is prohibited”; see Article 238, Ustav Socijaličke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, p. 113.  This 
article addresses the issue of surrender as tantamount to high treason: “Nitko nema pravo priznati ili 
potpisati kapitulaciju ni prihvatiti ili priznati okupaciju Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije ili 
njezina pojedinog dijela.  Nitko nema pravo spriječiti građane Socijalitičke Federativne Republike 
Jugoslavije da se bore protiv neprijatelja koji je napao zemlju. Takvi su akti protuustavni i kažnjavaju se 
kao izdaja zemlje.  Izdaja zemlje najteži je zločin prema narodu i kažnjava se kao teško krivično djelo.”  
(No one shall have the right to acknowledge or sign an act of capitulation, nor to accept or recognize the 
occupation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or any of its individual parts.  No one shall have 
the right to prevent citizens of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from fighting against an enemy 
who has attacked the country.  Such acts shall be unconstitutional and punishable as high treason.) 
106.  Tito in “Tito’s Winding-up Speech at the LCY Presidium,” Tanjug, 3 December 1971, HU 
OSA 300–10–2 YSFI CO, cn. 95. 
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many of the evils of capitalism.”  Because the system has failed to deliver material 
plenty, the party’s emphasis should shift “from production to human relations.”107  Such a 
damning critique put extra stress on Tito to have his system perform. 
The unity and strength of Yugoslavia mattered greatly for the LCY, especially in 
the early 1970s, when crises seemed ready to explode into chaos and disintegration.  Any 
real problems that might shake Yugoslavia, party members thought, would open up 
Yugoslavia to outside influences and destroy the entire status quo in Europe.108  
“Therefore,” partly leader Nijaz Dizdarević declared, “we are always ready to defend our 
future,” and that stance has kept aggression at arm’s length.109  Unfortunately, for the 
army, the politicians tinkered with the system and tried to use international law but to no 
avail—the party ultimately invited aggression.   
                                                 
107.  Praxis cited in Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, “Yugoslav 
Intellectuals Challenge the Regime,” 25 June 1965, LBJ Library.  
108.  Stane Dolanc in “Magnetofonske beleške i materijal sastanka Izvršnog bira,” ASCG CK SKJ 
IV K.7 7, 1971, p 22.  He said, “Ja lično mislim da je Moskovska deklaracija slabija od ovog saopštenja 
kojeg smo sad prihvatili jer tu je eksplicitno govora tamo gde se nabraja međusobne odnose sve pod 
firmom socijalističkog internacionalizma.” 
109.  Nijaz Dizdarević in “Stenografske beleške sa sednice Komišije CK SKJ za Informisanje, 13 
September 1968,” ASCG CK SKJ XXVI K.1 6, p. 9. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: TITO’S TWILIGHT AND THE FEAR OF UNRAVELING1 
 
Fear makes easy the task of diplomats.2 
 —John Foster Dulles 
 
My analysis of the evolution of Titoist Yugoslavia focuses on the question of politics and 
politics in Yugoslavia can be broken down into two primary components—power and 
fear.  Unpacking this definition leads directly to the problem that Yugoslav leaders had 
always faced; namely, how to reconcile those two forces into a working system that 
fostered legitimacy.  Party leader Krste Crvenkovski knew these two concepts well; he 
had recognized that the LCY came to rule thanks to individuals who “raised themselves 
to the heights just by means of this irrational authority.  In other words, power on one 
side and fear on the other.”3  Power, as Crvenkovski knew, was important because 
political figures seek to rule—no matter how restricted or unimpeded—over the populace 
under the government’s jurisdiction.  Characteristics of fear remain salient because both a 
beginning and an end bind every regime, and leaders fear their terminal point of 
departure.  Broken into two parts, this chapter will examine the importance of what 
happened when power and fear collided and argue that advanced reform of Yugoslavia’s 
political system—primarily by legal means and dictated by international events—
                                                 
1.  Parts of this chapter have appeared in “The Dynamics of Constitutionalism and 
Legality in Titoist Yugoslavia,” Hindsight, 1:1 (Spring, 2007), pp. 69–93. 
2.  John Foster Dulles in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of 
American National Security Policy During the Cold War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 
142. 
 3.  Krste Crvenkovski in Branko Horvat, An Essay on Yugoslav Society, trans. Henry F. Mins, 
(Belgrade: Jugoslavenski Institut za Ekonomska Istraživanja, 1967), p.197. 
Tito’s Twilight  181 
mandated how elites in Belgrade sought to resolve the never-ending quest for legitimacy 
during Tito’s last decade in power. 
One of the primary problems that has plagued Marxist states from the moment 
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin took power away from Aleksandr Kerenskij’s Provisional 
Government in October 1917, has been the question of legitimacy and succession; 
furthermore, only a few leaders—Tito most especially—have appreciated “legitimation,” 
or the grounding of their rule in legal and historical norms accompanied by related myths 
and the promise of progress, as the “central challenge” to their rule.4  In all fairness, the 
question of legitimate rule arises in nearly all polities, but the socialist states faced a 
peculiar combination of self-directed criticism and international disdain, especially 
during the Cold War.  As part of a great revolutionary experiment, Marxists sought to 
prove the universal applicability of their message by promising the people—more 
precisely the working class—a good quality of life alongside stability and social justice.5  
The promises of material plenty and equality often fell short—even in Yugoslavia—but 
the hope for a better time always seemed as a motivator for the working class.  At the 
same time, though, Marxists have had to contend always with competition from 
capitalists in a pluralistic world.  In the beginning, lukewarm condemnation followed by 
armed action against Lenin’s Bolshevik takeover gave way to ambivalence, and even 
excited anticipation as a relatively large degree of popular appeal for the Soviet 
                                                 
4.  See Ramet, Three Yugoslavias, p. 184.  
 5.  See Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Intervention and the Making of Our 
Times, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 4.  Westad’s overall argument has taken into 
consideration how the world was affected by the two superpowers in their quest to “prove the universal 
applicability” of their ideologies. 
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experiment enthralled observers around the world, who saw something truly novel 
underway and hoped that humanity would be better off as a result.  World War I had only 
recently challenged the European Enlightenment and left millions questioning the 
positive aspects of that legacy, including doubting the value of free-market capitalism.  
Political, cultural, and economic elites around the world thought that Lenin’s Soviet 
regime might prove Marx right and effectively solve economic injustice and disparity 
between peoples.   
Or, maybe not.  Lenin and his successor, Josif Stalin, attempted to refashion 
society completely according to their interpretation of Marxist dogma, and this quest 
produced great success and a genuine hope for progress; but, it also exacerbated 
tremendous pain.  We cannot forget the authentic enthusiasm with which Stakhanovite 
shock workers sought to over-fulfill Stalin’s first Five Year Plan.  The Soviet elites were 
in fact “dizzy with success” by the early 1930s: Stalin’s secret police purged society of 
enough potential enemies to satisfy any paranoid ruler, successfully intimidating the 
remainder of the population into submission.6  Stalin really did have enormous control 
over his people, and, as a result, he wielded great power and lorded over his subjects.7 
Stalin accepted the notion of socialism in one country during the interwar period 
because he recognized, more so than his principal rival, Lev Trotskii, that a world 
revolution ending in a Soviet victory remained far off in the distance.  Even after the 
                                                 
6.  For reference, see J. Stalin “Dizzy with Success,” Pravda, 2 March 1930. 
7.  The dated, yet powerful work by Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (New 
York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973) has illuminated a glaring critique against the power of ideology 
and how any system that claims to “solve” the problems of society winds up mobilizing people to unleash 
death and destruction on unprecedented scales. 
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great advances following the Soviet victory in World War II, the essential problem that 
faced the Soviet leadership until its bitter demise was how to prove to the people—or 
make them accept—that the Soviet system was in fact the best.  Stalin preferred simply to 
act with realistic caution and he succeeded until his death in 1953; whenever his 
successor, Nikita Khrushchev, tried to mimic Stalin, he typically failed, most blatantly 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1961.  Khrushchev’s heir—Leonid Brezhnev—
brought coolness back into Soviet diplomacy, but still struggled to find a working, 
universal solution to the nagging issue of legitimacy.  By the 1970s, the mood among 
political actors in both Moscow and Washington was one of cooperation between the two 
enemies as a solid solution for global stability and reaffirmation of the post-World War II 
territorial divide.  While working together meant that Brezhnev still had no solution to his 
other problems, he continued calmly into the future believing that maintaining the status 
quo was better than any revolution or dramatic alteration of policy.   
Soviet diplomatic pressure to draft and sign the agreement that eventually saw 
fruition in the Helsinki Accords in 1975, which led to the Organization of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), personified this inherent legitimacy crisis.  Yugoslav 
dissident and scholar Aleksa Đilas has argued that Helsinki did little to change the reality 
in Europe at the time and seemed redundant with respect to the mood of détente.  
Helsinki once again legitimized the postwar boundaries in favor of the Kremlin and 
solidified, for the entire world, Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe.  By so doing, it 
necessarily reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Tito’s Yugoslavia while also advancing a 
line of thought familiar to Yugoslav theorists.  Tito himself “solemnly declared” that he 
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considered sovereignty as “binding” for his country, and for all of Yugoslavia’s 
“neighbours in relations to the existing frontiers.”8  Đilas has contended that Helsinki 
grew out of the Soviet fear of internal instability throughout its empire and the results of 
the 1975 accords, delivered a lasting reassurance of geopolitical legitimacy in place of a 
real legitimacy among the Soviet and East European populations.9  I would add to Đilas’ 
contention that this is precisely the same phenomenon that guided Titoist elites as they 
realized that the construction of a popular legitimacy would take many more years to 
build.  As a result, they used international treaties and conferences as a crutch to 
supplement the slow process of fostering a healthy economy and positively transforming 
society. 
The 1970s seemed an ideal time to situate the wider implications of Marxist 
promises against the realities under actually existing societies.  This was a time, despite 
global economic shocks, when consumer culture and real wealth rose dramatically in the 
West.  Capitalism really was beating socialism by delivering more goods and a higher 
standard to more people despite high-energy costs.  In addition, the technology gap 
expanded greatly from this time and the challenge facing the leaders in cities such as 
Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, and even Belgrade, was how to compete against such 
overwhelming odds and solve the “credibility gap” that plagued all of the Marxist 
regimes.10 
                                                 
8.  Tito in Ranko Petković, Non-Aligned Yugoslavia, p. 27.  
9.  Aleksa Đilas, “Of Novelty and Oblivion: What We Can Learn from Dissidents under 
Communism,” lecture delivered at Harvard University, Russian Research Center, 3 April 2007. 
10.  See Flora Lewis, “Many Poles Say that Unrest is Far Deeper Than Economics,” New York 
Times, 26 January 1977, p. 8. 
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PART I: THE DOMESTIC ARENA 
As the revolutionary generation grew old and out of touch, the changes that began to take 
place in the standards of legitimacy throughout Eastern Europe brought about increased 
demands for new, quality leadership; instead of opening completely to the next 
generation, though, many among the ruling elite desperately hoped—perhaps even 
prayed—for the maintenance of the status quo.  Such a scenario applied to the 
Yugoslavia of the 1970s.  As Tito’s death became a more realistic possibility, Yugoslav 
elites feared that his unifying charisma and power over Yugoslav politics would 
disappear along with him.  While politicos argued at the time that Tito’s spirit would live 
on and Yugoslavia would not veer from his path, they also took action just in case.11  
Because Tito’s death grew nearer with each day, the quest intensified for methods to keep 
his spirit and state alive; much of that quest outlined by Tito himself.  Reform in 
Yugoslavia increased to a feverish pace but the question remained—what to reform?  
Tremendous issues faced the country, including high unemployment, rising inflation, and 
increasingly vocal ethnic particularism; these all intersected with issues such as 
constitutional legality and increased ideological validation. 
As time passed, Tito sought to further cement the state to a legalistic framework 
that would bind together the peoples of Yugoslavia and bridge any gaps between his 
                                                 
11.  In 1976, a Serbian-produced movie came out, featuring what would become a semi-official 
song, both entitled, Our Oath To You Comrade Tito.  At Tito’s memorial center in Belgrade—and at select 
monuments throughout former Yugoslavia—a small statue reaffirming this oath never to veer from his path 
stands to this day. 
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ideology and everyday reality by altering the constitution to once again revisit the 
question of how self-management functioned in Yugoslavia and how the party and the 
state served as guardians and helpmeets to success.  The challenges to Tito’s system had 
come and gone; each time, Tito had maneuvered appropriately and avoided a meltdown.  
The 1960s ended with Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, while the 1970s began with 
domestic unrest in Croatia.  While the external challenge posed by the Soviet threat 
brought reform to the top of the political agenda, the reforms undertaken dealt largely 
with the state of civil-military relations.  Soviet action prompted a reevaluation of the 
Yugoslav defense sector, whose leadership feared the worst if relations soured to the 
point of war.  Political figures saw in the army a further vanguard against domestic 
unrest; in that spirit, the burden remained on the army leadership to reshape a positive 
Yugoslav image.  The task of the military increased from simply defense against a Soviet 
invasion to quickly educating Yugoslavs towards creating a united front against all 
enemies, foreign and domestic.  But, at the same time, the divisive student-led rebellions 
during the Croatian Spring and their dynamic and atomized nature called into question 
how involved the people should be within the defense regime.  While the army 
commanders and the party saw popular participation in the state as vital for a successful 
future, they also worried that the people might not be trustworthy.   
Were Yugoslavs, in fact sufficiently signed onto the Titoist experiment?  An 
affirmative answer to this question by leaders makes it clear why their reformed Marxist 
rhetoric sought a more perfect realization of ideological ends using proven (and 
legitimating) legal means.  Yugoslav elites attempted to broker reform in the 1970s based 
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on legal fundamentals—principally vis-à-vis constitutional design—as both a guide and 
as a rational foundation towards constructing a workable, lasting socialist reality.  This 
struggle for popularity was important for Tito at least since the 1948 Cominform critique; 
but the creation of a Rechtstaat as a primary reinforcement for the regime increased 
dramatically with his inevitable passing from the political scene and the tenuous 
international situation prior to the Helsinki Accords in 1975.  Thus, an examination of the 
period of Tito’s twilight unveils a scramble for alternatives to his personal charisma, 
bullying purges, continued successful reform of the self-management system, and the 
pan-Yugoslav appeal of his brotherhood and unity message.  Where army reform left off, 
constitutionalism and international law became the new vehicles for achieving legitimacy 
for Tito’s creation.   
 
THE WORKINGS OF THE EARLY CONSTITUTIONS 
Constitutional rhetoric serves as a useful gauge of how ruling elites sought to reform and 
preserve their system in Yugoslavia.  The development of the three major constitutions 
intersects with the evolution of political thought among Yugoslav elites.  In crafting the 
1946 Constitution, Yugoslav elites drew heavily from the Soviet Union, owing to the 
closeness of the two countries’ ideologies and an assumed amiable post-war 
relationship.12  Chief Yugoslav ideologue Edvard Kardelj, architect of that document and 
                                                 
12.  See, for example, Nebojša Popov, Srpska strana rata: trauma i katarza u istorijskom 
pamćenju, (Beograd: Građanska Čitaonica, 1996), p. 447.  “Posle Ustava iz 1946, koji je zajedo s (kasnije 
nepromenjenim) grbom, bio samo neiventivna kopija ‘velikog’ Staljinovog sovjetskog Ustava iz 1936, na 
nov “samoupravljački” način prihvaćeni su novi ustavi 1953, 1963 i 1974. Oni su znatno izmenjeni 1967, 
1968, 1971, 1981. i 1988 godine.”  (After the 1946 Constitution, which together with the (later 
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all the other constitutions and amendments, declared in 1946 that, “for us the model was 
the Soviet Constitution,” because the Soviet “federation is the most positive example of 
the solution of relations between peoples in the history of Mankind.”13  Such reverence to 
the Soviets by Yugoslav elites was common prior to and shortly after the Tito–Stalin 
split, because as the only successful communist state prior to the end of World War II, the 
Soviet Union had a god-like status among communists in Yugoslavia and elsewhere.  
Like its Soviet counterpart, the 1946 Constitution had two main sections: Having 
dealt with the ideological principles, framers understandably entitled the first section 
Fundamental Principles, while in the second, they addressed state institutions.  Article 1 
defined Yugoslavia as a federal people’s union, “republican in form,” comprised of a 
“community of peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of the right to self-
determination, including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live 
together.”14  The federal units included the People’s Republics of Serbia, Croatia, 
                                                                                                                                                 
unchangeable) coat of arms, was an uninventive copy of the ‘big’ Soviet Constitution from 1936 by Stalin, 
while in the new constitutions of 1953, 1963, and 1974 the concept of self-management was added.  These 
constitutions were all amended in 1967, 1968, 1971, 1981, and 1988.) 
13.  Kardelj in Honduis, The Yugoslav Community of Nations, p. 137.  Kardelj also explained 
some of the factors that played a role in the drafting of the 1946 Constitution in Borba za Priznanje i 
Nezavisnost Nove Jugoslavije: 1944–1957, in Sećanje, (Beograd: Državna založba Slovenije, 1980), p. 77.  
He noted the importance of the time and that the new Yugoslav leaders took into consideration the 
formation of their new state and its constitution in light of the powerful Soviet example: “Taj uticaj 
sovjetskog sistema bio je, naravno, veoma snažan.  Tradicija oktobarske revolucije i celokupnog njenog 
daljeg razvoja, borba za opstanak prve socijalističke države u svetu, a i trenuta međunarodna situacija u 
kojoj smo se nalazili – sve su to bili faktori koji su uticali na to da naš Ustav u velikoj meri bude, bar po 
obliku, kopija Sovjetskog ustava.”   Kardelj then wrote that the influence of the Partisan struggle played a 
role in their formulations: “Uprkos takom pravnom obliku, ipak je u naš Ustav na više mesta i u više 
formulacija utkano iskustvo narodnooslobodilačke borbe.” 
14.  Article 1, Constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, (Washington, DC: 
Embassy of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, 1946), p. 5. 
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Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Hercegovina; and, within the Republic of 
Serbia, the Autonomous Province of Vojvojdina, and the Autonomous Region of 
Kosovo-Metohija.  The idea that certain peoples had come together and jointly desired to 
form a federation was nowhere clear since the broader concept of people itself was 
vague.  It remained ambiguous as to whether this idea of the people merely represented 
the still tiny working class, or, rather, the inhabitants of the particular republics.  
Furthermore, Yugoslav elites scrutinized the issue of separation but they declared 
secession impossible because the constitution’s architects incorporated the idea merely in 
recognition of the eventual withering away of the state⎯they envisioned that secession 
would serve as the symbolic precursor to the communist paradise of stateless order.15 
After 1948, when the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia parted ways and the Yugoslav 
party desperately sought its own ideological identity, Tito struggled with his existence 
outside of the Soviet sphere.  It took some time before the Yugoslavs could operate as 
independent Marxists, and leaders hesitated to complete the removal of the cult of Stalin 
from Tito’s message.  In October 1948, at the Fourth Congress of the Communist Party 
of Yugoslavia, Tito still declared that Yugoslavs were worthy to carry on the great ideas 
of “Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.”16  Soon after, though, the witch-hunt for so-called 
Cominformists—supporters of Stalin—ensued inside Yugoslavia and ended with a secure 
                                                 
15.  For the sake of comparison with the 1936 Soviet Constitution, see Aryeh L. Unger, 
Constitutional Development in the USSR, (New York: Pica Press, 1982), pp. 140–158.  The relevant 
Articles include 13 and 22–29. 
16.  Ћетврти Конгрес СКОЈ-а, 12–14 Октобра, 1948, (Београд, 1948), p. 9.  “Орденом 
Народног хероја својим дјелима у редовима народне омладине потврди још једанпут да је достојна 
великог повјерења наших народа, да је достојна и даље носити идеје Марска, Енгелса, Лењина и 
Стаљина.” 
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and pliant base for Tito.  He succeeded in distancing himself from the Soviet leader, and, 
by the early 1950s, changes to the Soviet-inspired constitution had taken place.  The 
Constitutional Laws of 1953 sought to redefine Yugoslavia as a Marxist state more in line 
with what Yugoslav elites by then regarded as true Marxism based on a self-managing 
reality.  Ruminations of Yugoslav ideologues about self-management and workers 
owning the means the production had already taken shape and soon extended into the 
international arena with nonalignment.  Initial reform helped build a new legitimacy for 
Tito to replace the discredited Soviet one, based upon his clever use of patriotism and 
successful foreign policy—that is, credits and aid from the West coupled with a potential 
for expansion as leaders in the emerging Third World.  Later, at the dawn of the 1960s, it 
was clear that the 1946 Constitution, in service but much amended by the laws of 1953, 
needed complete refashioning in order to keep pace with the widespread reforms.   
The development of a new constitution both reflected the many critiques against 
the Soviet system and Soviet critiques of Yugoslavia.  In 1948, the Soviet Union lashed 
out against Tito’s state as riddled with rampant nationalism alongside a lack of 
democracy within the Communist Party (LCY)—two things antithetic to communism.  
Soviet criticisms included describing the Yugoslav police and bureaucracy as arbitrary, 
and lacking true credibility.17  Shocked, the Yugoslavs responded by remarking in 
numerous essays, speeches, and party conferences that the Soviet system based itself on 
bureaucratic centralism, an argument that would remain in force for the following 
decades.  Yugoslavs argued that the Soviet bureaucracy made the eventual withering 
                                                 
17.  See Pierre Maurer, The Tito–Stalin Split in Historical Perspective, (Bradford: Postgraduate 
School of Yugoslav Studies, University of Bradford, 1987), p. 15. 
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away of the state impossible and thus maintained the dictatorship of the vanguard in 
perpetuity.  Stalin had perversely corrupted the Soviet Union and strengthened rather than 
weakened the interests of the state.  Tito declared much the same when he noted that the 
nature of the Soviet bureaucracy, the secret police (NKVD, later KGB), and the militia 
had no resemblance to “state machinery which is withering away.”18  Kardelj went on to 
emphasize that a great cleavage existed between Soviet rhetoric and reality—a gap that 
he saw rectified within Yugoslav Marxism.  Because his emphasis pointed out the lack of 
democracy and the huge bureaucratic regime run from the Kremlin, the result for Kardelj 
and Tito meant that Yugoslavia needed a system structured on many levels with an 
adequate voice for individuals to reform the system.19  The most local form of popular 
representation came at the commune—village or town council—level, where all citizens 
could share their opinions about government.  As leaders highlighted their move towards 
local politics as profoundly democratic, LCY elites saw this question of political control 
as “one of the key questions” regarding the socio-political system in Yugoslavia.20  While 
few in the party doubted that they would not command authority at the local level, most 
believed that reaching out to Yugoslavs on a grassroots level would yield a boon to the 
never-ending reform movement.    
Because the initial Yugoslav constitution and state apparatuses mirrored the 
Soviet example, the criticisms raised by Yugoslav elites such as Kardelj forced LCY 
                                                 
18.  Tito in Ivo Lapenna, State and Law: Soviet and Yugoslav Theory, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1964), p. 43. 
19.  Tito in Lapenna, State and Law, p. 42. 
20.  Veljko Vlahović in “Stenografske beleške sa sastanka predsednice Komisije CK SKJ za 
pitanje društveno-političkih odnosa,” ASCG CK SKJ XXIII K.2 7, 28 December 1967, p. 26. 
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leaders to refashion completely their own system.  Self-management triggered the federal 
state into undertaking significant decentralization and realizing a broad-based mechanism 
for making the Yugoslav system work long into the future.  The party hierarchy retained 
great power, but virtually the entire society could theoretically respond to local issues 
according to local norms.  Prior to these early reforms, the state was highly centralized 
and ruled in strict accordance under the principles of the Communist Party.  All this 
began to change when the government ratified the Constitution Laws in 1953, making 
self-management a fundamental principle of Yugoslav socialism as a means towards 
distinctive Yugoslav goals that operated under the guidance of the LCY.  Self-
management did not discard the party—it still reined supreme—but decision-making 
dispersed and control from the center necessarily weakened.  Before such change could 
take place, further developments regarding self-management needed reinforcement.   
In the introduction to the 1963 Constitution, Kardelj noted the “right of every 
people to self-determination, including the right to secession,” based upon the 
tremendous “common struggle” during World War II—a significant marker since the war 
was the foundation of Tito’s legitimacy; he owed his power to his own movement’s 
success, not to anyone else.  Moreover, the constitution clarified that the unification of 
Yugoslavia was in accord with the people’s “historical aspirations, aware that the further 
consolidation of their brotherhood and unity” in the “common interest,” and would lead 
to a realization of the desires “of each people and of all of them together.”21  These 
“peoples” were seemingly “voluntarily united and equal” within this “socialist 
                                                 
21.  Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, (Beograd, 1963), pp. 3–4. 
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democratic community based on the powers of the working people and on self-
government.”22  This description tied together Tito’s wartime exploits with the idea that 
everybody in Yugoslavia was better off united and working together than separated into 
competing nation-states.  While self-management took center stage in the unrelenting 
constitutional reform initiatives, the intention to downplay nationalism was clear.  A 
working class with communist aspirations became the de facto center point of Yugoslav 
politics that represented the ideal Yugoslav identity because Tito’s worldview should 
take precedence over all other notions among the people.  The leveling of peoples, in the 
ethnic sense, to a “community of working people” in a broader sense, was also a 
deliberate tool used by the regime because according to the constitution, the working 
people commanded greater authority and transcended ethnic boundaries to help build the 
Yugoslav nation.  Yugoslav theorists also felt that in making the party more in touch with 
the people, internal issues drifted to the margins.23  Despite this, even a progressive idea 
such as self-management, which gave people the right to direct their working 
environment and positively affect change, was subject to the whims of the party after 
                                                 
22.  Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, p. 12. 
23.  The text of exactly what constituted self-management is important in understanding this 
concept and is in Article 9 of the 1963 Constitution.  See Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, pp. 13–14.  “Self-management in the working organization shall include in particular the right 
and duty of the working people ….  In attaining self-government, the working people in the social-political 
communities shall decide on the course of economic and social development, on the distribution of the 
social product, and on the matters of common concern .… Any act violating the right to self-management 
of the working people is unconstitutional.” 
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they decided to “recognize when to discuss” change and when to issue “polemics” to 
reform the system.24 
In 1963, Kardelj had once again clarified for the Yugoslav community that the 
main point of reform and progress rested with socialist self-management.  The basics of 
self-management laid out in 1953 meant that people would work to satisfy both the 
personal and common needs.  The role of the party was to invigorate people into this 
work and this meant continued development of socio-political relations.  As the prime 
mover and ideological guide inside Yugoslavia, the party retained great importance and 
operated not as dogmatic police but as a yardstick of progress, though, oftentimes, 
important people who strayed too far faced removal or prison sentences.25  Veljko 
Vlahović, a member of the committee for socio-political relations, knew that “reform and 
reorganization of the League of Communists” was crucial to the proper development of 
self-management.26  Vlahović confidently went further to note just how the party could 
achieve such results; they rested upon the “material situation” of people, which had a 
“significant meaning” because without development in that direction—for the “entire 
society”—the LCY would be at a grave disadvantage and probably lean towards 
bureaucratization and centralization as instruments of necessary repression.27  Tito had 
                                                 
24.  See Veljko Vlahović in “Stenografske beleške sa sednice Komišije CK SKJ za Informisanje, 
13 September 1968,” ASCG CK SKJ XXVI K.1 6, p. 38. 
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26.  Veljko Vlahović in “Stenografske beleške sa sastanka predsednice Komisije CK SKJ za 
pitanje društveno-političkih odnosa,” ASCG CK SKJ XXIII K.2 7, 28 December 1967, p. 24. 
27.  Veljko Vlahović in “Stenografske beleške sa sastanka predsednice Komisije CK SKJ za 
pitanje društveno-političkih odnosa,” ASCG CK SKJ XXIII K.2 7, 28 December 1967, p. 26. 
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emphasized this path to prosperity as a goal and the Yugoslav economy had grown 
relatively fast since the 1950s.  But the rhetoric needed to keep in line with reality and 
that, leaders feared, was not happening rapidly enough.  
 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE 1970S 
Leaders continued to discuss how the party could best reach people’s needs and make 
Yugoslavia a more stable and prosperous place.  While self-management commanded 
primary value in 1963, the complementary policy of decentralization of the state 
apparatuses continued.  The host of amendments that sprang forth in the later 1960s, and 
early 1970s, expressed the desire of the regime to refashion the functioning and role of 
the state.  In 1971, deliberations began about writing a new constitution that would better 
clarify issues of governance specific to the Yugoslav self-managing system and give even 
more power to local and regional elites.  Most importantly, this last Yugoslav constitution 
served to establish how a post-Tito system would function.  Based on Tito’s conceptions 
of community, the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 evolved into a system where socialism 
and social progress were ostensibly inseparable from equality, freedom, and a real 
promise of material satisfaction.  Yugoslav politicians recognized the kind of state 
needed to govern that community required “multinational, equal, self-managing, and 
cooperative federalism”—no other framework would suffice.28  Some scholars have 
acknowledged this constitution of 1974 as pivotal because it foreshadowed the 
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dissolution of the federation.29  While logic for dissolution seems to have strong roots in 
decentralized and 1974, the tragedy of war in 1991 was avoidable.  What is important, 
though, is to recognize that each constitution adapted to a different way of thinking as 
time progressed, and served to continue the reformist mindset that set the Titoist regime 
apart from other Marxist states.  The quest for popularity within Marxist-led regimes 
posed special problems in part because none satisfied the materials demands of the 
people—including Tito’s regime.  Yugoslav party leaders vied for this popularity in other 
ways, as we have seen with the granting to people a voice in their local affairs, with a 
broad-based and successful foreign policy, and with a more inclusive role for the armed 
forces.  When each failed to produce lasting results, they turned again to reforming their 
internal self-managing system and as a way to move past empty rhetoric, they looked to 
constitutional law as a better way to delineate the relationship between society and the 
withering away of the state.  Political elites in Yugoslavia felt an especially urgent need 
to appeal to society thanks to the convergence of their isolated position within the Cold 
War world—particularly as nonalignment’s appeal decreased by the early 1970s—and 
Tito’s reliance on his popular anti-fascist resistance movement rather than through a 
Soviet-inspired or directed regime change.   
                                                 
29.  See Robert Hayden, The Beginning of the End of Federal Yugoslavia, pp. 3–4.  Here Hayden 
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Having begun the process of catering to the people with programs such as self-
management, Yugoslav elites thought that they needed to refashion constantly in 
response to the changes in society. 30  Even after challenges to the regime from inside, as 
in 1971 with the Croatian Spring, Tito eventually sided with further reforms.  Marko 
Nikezić believed that the evils of 1971 represented the “consequences of a long-lasting 
monopoly of the top party and state leadership,” that, when placed with the overall 
“conservatism,” combined as a prescription for the country unable to fulfill its needs.  
Instead, he noted that the new policy must be in line with and “approved by the masses of 
the people” in order to really affect change.31  Just when some in the party thought 
decentralization and reform had gone too far, leaders like Nikezić reemphasized it as a 
working policy because the Yugoslav experiment never seemed complete.  Tito 
dismissed Nikezić, though, and sided in the immediate term with party leader Stane 
Dolanc, who attempted to refocus the debate onto bringing more people into line because 
it was, for Dolanc, the unruly liberalism that had opened the regime to hostility.  The task 
for the Yugoslav elites, according to Dolanc, was to bring the people into line first and 
only then proceed down the line of what Nikezić wanted.32  While this flexibility might 
                                                 
30.  See Valerie Bunce, in State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1945–1992, eds. Melissa K. 
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31.  Marko Nikezić in Zimmerman, Open Borders, p. 46.  
32.  See Zimmerman, Open Borders, p. 47.  
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have hampered Yugoslavia’s overall survivability, the continued quest, explained by 
Franc Hočevar of the committee for the question of socio-political relations, as a question 
of “what must be changed” to improve Yugoslav society—most especially, of course, the 
regime’s status and ability to govern with the people, not against them.33 
When deliberations for the new 1974 Constitution occurred, Yugoslavs 
emphasized the continued development of their government.34  As deliberations occurred 
in the years prior about how best to realign the system according to what the people 
wanted, the issue of openness arose.  If the parliament was open, Velimir Stojnić argued 
along with Hočevar, transparency will spread “across the socio-political organizations” of 
Yugoslavia and bring about positive change.35  Committee chair Lazar Koliševski 
reaffirmed this lucidity as real in Yugoslavia when he proudly boasted, “no longer do we 
have secrets in this country, everyone knows that.”36  While contested views about just 
what to reform drove the LCY since the late 1960s, it was in the 1970s when these 
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processes were becoming reality.  Elites significantly reorganized the electoral system in 
response to their desire to draw closer to the people of Yugoslavia and ally them to the 
regime.  Vladimir Mitkov argued that the electoral system needed reform because it 
represented the “compromises” that the party had made regarding the structure of society 
at the social, national, and public levels.37  Instead, Mitkov lobbied for solutions but not 
all people welcomed a change despite the system’s limitations.  Vladimir Bakarić argued 
that electoral reform was not only unnecessary but also dangerous to the functioning of 
the state until the people were ready.  In anticipation of that time, any further moves that 
emphasized decentralization might reawaken nationalist feelings according to Bakarić 
and his supporters.38  The committee charged with undertaking reform disagreed on 
principle with Bakarić.  While some members agreed that incorrect reform—or “radical 
reform”—would cause harm to the system, all agreed on the urgency of reform 
nonetheless.39  After all, proponents of reform still pointed to continued evolution as the 
paramount feature of the system and, therefore, could really “compliment and be a 
component” of the mechanism of socialist self-management and help resolve any 
conflicts between Yugoslavia’s peoples.40 
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 One of the primary pieces of reform that the party functionaries examined and 
discussed was how a multiparty system might operate in Yugoslavia while retaining the 
guiding character of the LCY.  Some members, such as Lazar Koliševski, thought such a 
system workable because they could not foresee how any non-LCY policies would be 
feasible.  For Koliševski, “if an enemy, if an opponent with a demagogic position 
appeared, the LCY would stand opposed and in struggle against demagoguery,” proving 
that not only could the LCY implement positive reform programs and bring democracy—
including the principle of “rotation”—to the people, but, that at every stage of 
development, the LCY was a self-fixing institution.41  Recognizing that leaders saw an 
infallibility in the party is critical to understanding the direction that reform took, yet also 
shows a unshakable confidence in the legitimacy of their rule in Yugoslavia.  All that 
mattered after that was convincing ordinary Yugoslavs to understand the same truth. 
When the 1974 Constitution finally came into being after more than two years of 
deliberation among party members, it affected society in several key areas, including: 
Socio-economic relations and the system of self-management; the communal and 
assembly systems; the functions of the federation; the participation and direct 
responsibility of the republics and autonomous provinces in the exercise of federal 
functions; and, finally, with respect to the judiciary and constitutional courts.42  
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Constitution-makers sought to clearly outline the realities of self-management, including 
the importance of abolishing “any kind of monopoly—either private-capitalist or state—
of the means of production.”43  Much as the prior constitution had solidified the role of 
the worker, the 1974 Constitution claimed outright that, “the socialist social system” of 
Yugoslavia relied on the “power of the working class and all working people and on 
relations among people as free and equal producers and creators whose labour serves 
exclusively for the satisfaction of their personal and common needs.”44  The League of 
Communists retained its status as the prime mover through its guiding ideological and 
political action in order to safeguard and further develop the socialist revolution and its 
results, but the emphasis on self-management again secured a voice for the ordinary.45  
Naturally, while democracy became a watchword for elites, the LCY was the only 
recognized ideological leader and political party.  Regarding the important question of 
nationalism, the 1974 Constitution was clear in Article 170, which stated that any form of 
national injustice or incitement of hatred was unconstitutional and punishable by law—a 
pronouncement that only further exacerbated tensions during the 1980s.46 
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 Having clarified issues regarding the entities comprising Yugoslavia, the 1974 
Constitution renovated the political landscape by raising the status of Kosovo to that of 
an autonomous province, giving the increasingly Albanian leadership in Priština a louder 
voice in the federal system; with that, the unification of peoples seemed complete and 
catered to both the dominant nations and the biggest nationality groups.  Each republic 
guaranteed its minorities—Serbs in Croatia for instance—the same rights that they would 
enjoy if they were in the majority.47  Including Kosovo fit within scheme—on the one 
hand helping to protect the province’s Serbian minority, while on the other, giving a 
voice to the Albanian majority at the federal level—and was a major step that worked 
towards strengthening Tito’s legitimacy among all peoples, no matter how they 
constructed their national identity.  Language in the constitution also coincided with the 
general movement of state power away from the center to elites on the local and 
republican levels as part of the broader effort to bring government to the lowest levels 
and secure a faith and support in the regime as a result. 
A rotating presidency was the last significant issue raised by the 1974 
Constitution.  While Tito already ruled as president for life, the 1970s brought about the 
urgency of a post-Tito scenario.  Language in the 1974 Constitution outlined Tito’s idea 
of a rotating presidency to include eight members who alternated and shared power 
among themselves.  Within this framework, issues affecting the federation required 
consensus among all members and thus supposedly guaranteed conflict resolution and 
reinforced cooperation between peoples, because each republic or province possessed 
                                                 
47.  For example, see Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, trans. Petar Mjušković, 
(Beograd, 1964). 
Tito’s Twilight  203 
representation at the presidency.  So long as Tito lived, he would preside over the group 
and manage it according to his vision; but with his death, the rotating system would ease 
the transition and perpetuate a system whereby nobody could wield total control at the 
expense of others and repress any group according to individual prerogative. 
 
AN IMPETUS FOR CHANGE: THE VILLAGE OF KARIN DONJI IN 1971 
It is easy to see the Croatian Spring in broad terms and make equally broad conclusions 
about its causes and effects, including the movement towards broader reform as outlined 
in the 1974 Constitution.  With that in mind, a closer look at the tensions present in 
Croatia in 1971 reveals a great deal about the nature of the Yugoslav system that leaders 
set out to repair.  The picturesque and tourist-friendly region of Dalmatia in Croatia has 
been home to ethnic Serbs for hundreds of years; as a result, Serbian symbols such as 
monasteries and Orthodox churches dotted the landscape alongside Catholic and typically 
Croatian monuments.  While the Croatian Spring was so powerful that it required Tito’s 
threat of military force to suppress large-scale anti-regime feelings, local solutions were 
required to fight specific threats.  Events in Zagreb preoccupied intellectuals and elites, 
and, therefore, took center stage; meanwhile events in villages stole the attention of 
common folk and represented a far more systematic threat to Tito’s state. 
The small village of Karin Donji fell under the jurisdiction of the Zadar-
Benkovac-Obravac opština, or administative region, and a mixed constituency of Serbs 
and Croats called the area home; but, on 2 August 1971, tension there reached a level of 
violence.  Reports of the incident described a small group of ethnic Croatian villagers 
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from nearby Pridraga, but led by a student from Zagreb named Branko Perica, walking 
down the village road singing “chauvinist songs,” thus potentially inflaming tensions 
between the peoples in the mixed community.  The songs no doubt referred to Croatia’s 
greatness or harkened back to the Ustaša state of World War II, or likewise defiled the 
Serbian national heritage.  Such actions—the use of sensitive national markers—drew 
criticism from Tito’s regime since the beginning; as a result, the government had in place 
a series of bans against such action.  Tito understood well that to focus attention on his 
state-building project, he needed the undivided attention of everyone in Yugoslavia and 
thus created legal barriers to inter-ethnic baiting and hostility.  The singing from Pridraga 
to Karin seems not to have aroused local Serbs to respond and seek vengeance, though—
no inter-village fighting or even name-calling took place.  Violence only occurred when 
four members of the local police stationed in nearby Benkovac and Obravac happened by 
and overheard what was certainly alcohol-induced rancor.  The police officers—
comprised of several Serbs—ordered that the drunken revel cease but the villagers 
answered with ill words and a flying beer bottle.48  
In response to the provocation of the singing Croats and the use of force to resist 
the police order, the officers employed their clubs and succeeded in tracking down and 
detaining the drunken men, taking them afterwards to the nearest police facility in 
Benkovac.  When the dust settled, the authorities charged the villagers with “arousing 
national intolerance, hatred and dissent, obstructing official persons in carrying out their 
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official duties, and causing bodily injury” to three officers.49  In all, some nineteen people 
were targets of what would become almost an eight-month-long investigation.  News of 
the incident spread fast despite a desire by the police not to have the situation reach 
popular consumption only to be misunderstood and therefore foster more unrest.  As a 
result, in addition to the arrest and trial of the Croatian villagers, several of the Serbian 
policemen—they themselves objects of the initial harassment—became subjects of 
inquiry for misconduct and undue use of physical force.  In the end, following a thorough 
criminal investigation with dozens of interrogations and interviews, four men faced 
criminal sentences to varying degrees.  That process ended a year later and with it came 
an ease among politicians who had shelved these problems knowing that they had 
stepped up efforts of party activism to thwart any particularism—from Croats and Serbs 
alike—by realigning people with the regime and acting as an honest broker between both 
sides. 
The confrontation between the ethnic Croats and the police reveals four critical 
aspects regarding the national question in Yugoslavia in 1971.  First, it is noteworthy that 
the state authorities had banned the use of national symbols that caused tensions with 
other groups.  This banning encompassed the artistic sphere affecting music, paintings, 
poems, as well as slogans and demonstrations.  Time and again, the publication or public 
announcement of a potentially infuriating song raised the level of awareness for people in 
Yugoslavia.  Such was the case when the Serbian folk song, “Tamo daleko,”—meaning 
“Over there,” as an ode to the survivors of the Serbian army and government who 
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escaped to the island of Crete during World War I—was published in the highly 
respected Yugoslav weekly, NIN, in 1966.  An editorial later appeared in the Communist 
daily, Borba, and called the publication of the song infuriating, especially at a sensitive 
time when Serbian folk music could offend Albanians in Kosovo, not to mention other 
non-Serbs, who distrusted Serbian territorial aggrandizement.50  Likewise, telling 
ethnically biased jokes making fun of other Yugoslavs could land a person in trouble or 
even in jail just as telling a joke about Tito or the Communist Party.51  The Titoist regime 
not only looked poorly upon issues that would raise the ethnic awareness of Yugoslavia’s 
people, but also used its own set of guidelines and principles as a way to frame the case.  
After all, party functionaries described the “basic duty of the federation” as to diffuse 
conflict in a “democratic spirit ‘“while keeping the line of progress and in the interest of 
the whole community.’”52  Politicians reduced their fears of resurgent nationalism by 
conflating it with anti-socialist propaganda by people potentially hostile to the regime.  
Adherence to exclusive nationalism not only likely drove a wedge between Yugoslavia’s 
peoples but also directly challenged the state and its ideals.  The Titoist worldview 
tolerated no real competition and if Croats somehow embraced an exclusive Croatian 
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identity—to use Benedict Anderson’s terminology, if they imagined themselves as a 
larger community of simply Croats and not Croats in Yugoslavia—the state and Tito’s 
worldview suffered.53  As a result, news reports and quotes from officials at the time 
often classified the incident in Karin Donji in terms of anti-socialist behavior, concluding 
resolutely “a conflict between members of the Croatian and Serbian nationalities is not 
involved.”54 
The second critical aspect of this event is that local Croats physically prevented 
the police with carrying out their official duties.  When the officers asked the men to stop 
their singing, they refused and proceeded to resist arrest.  Several of the citizens then fled 
the scene and the police tracked down the perpetrators; as part of that search, other Croats 
became involved and “physically obstructed” the officers in their attempts to “obtain 
information” about the whereabouts of the organizers of the incident.55  From the 
perspective of political elites, the fact that no clashes between Croats and Serbs occurred 
outside of these incidents with the police must have been pivotal in assessing a formal 
response to the day’s events.  Importantly, the Croatian villagers unleashed their hostility 
against the regime—vis-à-vis the police—and not local Serbs living in the area. 
Third, it should be pointed out that while the incident began with drunken rabble-
rousing on the part of Croats, Serbs also faced investigation and punishment.  As with the 
aftershocks of the Croatian Spring, when thousands of Croatian communists found 
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themselves outside of the party, Tito used the events to crack down on what he saw as 
threats from a faction in the Serbian branch of the party eager to recentralize the state and 
reinforce Serbian goals at the expense of other national groups.  Consequently, both sides 
suffered criticism and faced penalties.  The charges against the police officers of Serbian 
ethnicity centered on abuse of authority that regional officials no doubt used as a means 
to alleviate any claim by Croats of unfair penalization.  The court investigated three of 
the four police officers involved, based upon “justified suspicion” that their resort to 
physical force in detaining the troublemakers had drifted into unprofessional and criminal 
offenses of “maltreatment and misuse of official function and powers.”56  This complex 
tit-for-tat system attempted to quell anger but also affected people’s attitudes towards the 
regime, as when a teacher scolds all the children in the yard, but, in fact, only a few 
deserved reprimanding.  We know from the documents of the Karin case that the local 
authorities investigated and charged Serbs too and that this might have been a result of a 
larger Croatian demonstration in nearby Zadar, which called on city officials to recognize 
the need for “protection in their own homeland” of Croats in the face of brutality by 
Serbs.57  Such calls for aid by Croats in Zadar emphasized the regime’s sensitivity to 
ethnic injustice and further justified leaders who meted out punishment to all sides.  
Tito’s system in fact legitimized a zero-sum mentality when nationalism was involved, 
and reinforced it—and highlighted and perpetuated it—among Yugoslavia’s ethnic 
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groups.  Tito solidified this sort of thinking but also tried to couch his terms in political 
rhetoric that equated interethnic mistrust and tension with a “great deal of ideological 
confusion,” that exists everywhere, and a “lot of it at that.”58  Tito’s elaborate system of 
equality only furthered the level of uncertainly when faced with challenges.   
The fourth important aspect of this incident shows how young people were at the 
heart of anti-regime activity; the trial concluded with the mastermind, Zagreb University 
student Branko Perica, sentenced to six months of imprisonment based on his actions of 
organizing the singing and then having caused bodily injury to officer Frane Pajić.  This 
sentence was the most severe; the only other Croat from the group sentenced was Dušan 
Viduka, who faced one year of probation on a suspended sentence of four months 
imprisonment for “preventing militiamen from doing their duty.”59  Regarding the police 
officers, just Dušan Drača faced a suspended sentence equal to that of Viduka for abuse 
of power; the judges found the other three not guilty.  Likewise, the prosecutor dropped 
the charges against the other men involved in the singing; rather than focus on the 
nationalist rhetoric, he had chosen to ground his case on abuses of authority or the 
physical prevention of official duty—easily proven criminal charges—rather than on 
exclusivist behavior witnessed by no one but those involved.60  At the same time, though, 
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as the events in Karin Donji unfolded, other student groups were under severe criticism 
by state authorities.  In nearby Biograd na moru, the regional committee of the League of 
Communists censured the presidium of students of Croatia, especially the University of 
Zadar, because of the large number of students from Biograd “studying in that city.”61  
The committee declared publicly, “communists from Biograd” had “taken a course 
contrary to that of the League of Communists and the strivings of the Croatian people.”62  
As a result, the Biograd committee decided to convene a meeting with all students from 
the area to “thrash out possibly vague questions concerning topical political trends,” as 
part of a larger effort to destroy localized opposition to the regime.63 
While confined acts such as in Karin Donji or Biograd na Moru pressured the 
regime to respond with care but also with severity, proceedings at the national level saw 
to it that the regime regained the momentum.  After having made a series of 
constitutional amendments ever since 1968, Tito set forth with vigor after the Croatian 
Spring to construct the final constitution that would terminate forever any of the 
problems that might further trouble his rule and the rule of his successor.  Ironically, 
many of the more reasonable demands made during the Croatian Spring saw realization 
in this last Yugoslav constitution.   
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The repression of nationalist tendencies in favor of a more statist society was an 
integral, successful feature of Tito’s Yugoslavia.  In contrast, many Croatian elites in the 
LCY advocated decentralization and a continued move towards “market socialism,” or an 
increased alignment with Western economies.  Institutions such as the army 
overwhelmed and repressed ethnically based challenges but the real goal of Titoist elites 
rested on the natural development of Yugoslav society that would overcome nationalism.  
Vladimir Bakarić, chairman of the Croatian League of Communists from 1948–69, 
pronounced in early 1966 that tension between nationalities was the second most 
important question in Yugoslavia, surpassed only by economic reforms, but, ominously, 
“if the battle for the reform and against bureaucratic centralism was not won, it could 
become question number one.  Great tension could lead some republics to think of 
secession.”64  Such a scenario rested on nationalism, in fact, as the primary opponent to 
the regime and Tito needed to address the problem with positive action. 
In 1971, the Yugoslav Defense Ministry polled officers about what problems they 
considered as the greatest threat to the army and, by logical extension, Yugoslavia.  
Rather than expected notions of foreign aggression, respondents cited divisive 
nationalism and chauvinism as the supreme dangers facing the army.  Enemies from 
within apparently worried the officer corps and forced them to insist on measures that 
would bring together the various ethnic groups throughout the country—hence the 
enthusiasm for the use of the army as a vehicle to build unity between peoples, but only 
under their strict control.  Despite the timing of this particular poll at the height of the 
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Croatian Spring, its results spoke to a general attitude prevalent among Yugoslav elites 
during the entire life of Yugoslavia.  Broken down by the rank of the respondent, the 
poll’s results showed how perceptions of nationalism changed across the grades: fifty-
four percent of high-ranking officers (major and above), forty percent of low-ranking 
officers, and forty-seven percent of non-commissioned officers saw nationalism as the 
greatest danger; only 13.5 percent, ten percent, and 11.7 percent respectively, saw foreign 
aggression as the greatest danger facing Yugoslavia.65  Fear of domestic upheaval as 
represented by the Croatian Spring had superseded the potent Soviet threat following the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia a mere three years prior.  The question remained, though, 
what the regime would, or could, do about that. 
 
WHAT LEGAL REFORM MEANT FOR YUGOSLAVIA 
The Yugoslav case is unique among the communist regimes of the time, because a clear 
movement toward legality and rights built upon a constitutional rhetoric already in place 
rather than a system of ignoring the law and perpetuating arbitrary and unpopular rule.  
The early break with the Soviet Union triggered the Yugoslav development of a 
Rechtstaat, though this process itself was a slow evolution; early constitutions fortified 
public law as the basis for a popular socialist commonwealth and with successive reform 
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of self-management, the foundation of law in Yugoslavia came closer to reality.  This 
process further severed ties with the Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated states whose 
leaders sought roughly a long continuance of a dictatorship of the proletariat, 
administrative rule by the party and its apparatuses, and the maintenance of a strong-state 
system in place of a popular legitimacy.66  Titoist elites repeatedly compared themselves 
to the Soviets and they recognized that the Soviet parties “no longer represented the 
political organization of workers.”67  In contrast, Yugoslavia underwent many changes 
that freed the judiciary, made the party’s role more in tune with changing ideological 
realities (adapted as the reform process moved forward), and succeeded in making issues 
of law more than just rhetoric.  Because Yugoslav leaders favored an incremental 
approach to change, the path towards decentralization, rule of law, and self-management 
occurred alongside intricate debate and experimentation.    
What sets each constitution apart in this respect was the manner in which 
successive laws sought to decentralize and increase the power of local institutions.  
Looking at these constitutions shows how legal theory evolved from something that at 
first sought to separate Tito’s state from Stalin’s in the wake of 1948, to a system whose 
leaders developed it in earnest as a way to secure their own legitimacy and recognition.  
Decentralization continually tried to bring the power of the state onto the most local and 
direct levels to affect change there in line with self-management and a desire for more 
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popular representation at each place in government.  The federal apparatus, especially 
after 1974, was to be the glue that kept the union together while allowing the regional 
units⎯republics, provinces, and communes respectively⎯to operate where they best 
serviced the people.68  But, this move was not without controversy.  Some members of 
the central committee argued that the state was not yet strong enough to allow for any 
thoroughgoing restructuring. 
Deliberate rhetoric to downplay troubles and acclaim communist 
accomplishments existed throughout the Communist world—including in Yugoslavia.  
Tito’s reliance on the famous brotherhood and unity slogan personified this rhetorical 
method to avoid answers with abstract concepts.  While overused by the regime, the idea 
of brotherhood and unity was part of a more serious attempt to rein in any dominance by 
one group over another; almost exclusively, Yugoslavs feared a Serbian predominance in 
Yugoslavia and tried to avoid such a situation, resulting in what became a divisive 
nationalism policy.69  The experience in Karin Donji in 1971 showed how the regime 
dealt with nationalism—it avoided recognition of inter-ethnic tensions and instead pushed 
the idea of anti-regime forces coupled with punishments meted out to all ethnic groups 
involved as a way to quiet any potential opposition.  Nonetheless, while the results may 
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have actually provoked inter-ethnic distrust among Yugoslavs, governing elites 
understood the benefits of showing impartiality among all groups.   
True ethnic equality also stands out as one of the major differences between the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia—Russians dominated the USSR and, at times, followed 
deliberate polices of Russification whereas the Yugoslavs sought to realize a more 
realistic balance between ethnic groups.70  Only towards the end of Yugoslavia, and, 
especially after its demise, did a virulent Serbian cause manifest itself, but in a 
profoundly exclusivist manner and in a shrunken political entity.  Any attempt by a group 
to control or alter the identity of another group could not happen in Tito’s Yugoslavia, 
according to the guarantees of the constitution and the precedent of reform that centered 
on securing a viable and constructive legitimacy for the system.  No one mentioned Serbs 
as a special group; moreover, Tito splintered the Serbian republic into a rump state with 
two autonomous provinces.  As a result, all peoples supposedly shared the same rights 
and freedoms in Yugoslavia⎯even non-Slavs such as the Albanian, Hungarian, Italian, 
and Romanian minorities. 
Finally, the role of the party in this movement towards the legal notion of 
legitimacy demands mention.  State leaders had tried ever since the break with Stalin to 
show how rooted their system was in the peculiar Yugoslav experience.  The focus on 
stalwart independence in the face of a dominant foreign oppressor did not begin with 
Tito’s resistance after 1948.  Serbian folklore emphasizing the Battle of Kosovo where 
Tsar Lazar chose the heavenly kingdom—death and honor—instead of an earthly 
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kingdom marked by servitude and prostration to the Ottoman sultan.  More modern 
notions of Slavic resistance to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum in summer 1914 inspired 
Yugoslavs of all stripes, despite the potential victimization that might result.  Showing an 
earnest desire for unity in purpose—in Tito’s case, the construction of Marxism—
furthered along ideas of the real and imagined bonds between the Yugoslav peoples and 
added to his claim of power.   
Tito’s emphasis on self-management also compelled him to make the rule of law 
in Yugoslav another pillar holding up his system.  Even with decentralization, the LCY’s 
role increased with an eye towards emphasizing commonality and inclusiveness rather 
than competition and hatred.71  While the communists lost power at the federal level, 
thanks to decentralization, they retained the monopoly over ideological issues and 
maintained prominence in creating and shaping foreign policy.  As the party devolved 
power to the republic-based parties where political elites had widespread support, it 
became clear by the 1970s that a regional party position was more important than a 
federal one and a regional career yielded greater influence.  The introduction of the 1963 
Constitution provides a good summary of the party’s important socio-political role 
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throughout the entire Titoist period.  “Under the conditions of the socialist democracy 
and social self-government,” it was the job of the LCY, because of “its guiding 
ideological and political work,” to work to “protect and to promote the achievements of 
the Socialist Revolution and socialist social relations, and especially, to strengthen the 
socialist social and democratic consciousness of the people.”72  Framers who designed 
the system to guide thought that with greater decentralization, the more people would see 
the benefits of the system and appreciate the intimacy of Yugoslav governance. 
As the so-called prime movers in Yugoslav politics, members of the League of 
Communists desired that all citizens understand and work for the system, but they had a 
fundamental problem in trying to control people and make them understand the nature of 
the correct path towards communism.  The LCY recognized this intense pressure and 
tried to emphasize its message among new generations of Yugoslavs.  As early as 1958, 
Yugoslav leaders recognized a lack of enthusiasm among the youth compared with those 
communists and non-communists alike who survived the brutality of World War II.  
During 1971, Yugoslavs noted how the “young people” had begun to feel “cheated” and 
experienced a “complete loss of confidence” in the ruling elite.73  Milovan Đilas confided 
to a source for the CIA in 1961 that he felt that Yugoslavia was beset by “real political 
stagnation,” and that “the young generation doesn’t care about slogans, the party or 
doctrine.”  Young people wanted more “economic development” because “the Americans 
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are the real hope of the world.”74  With the worsening of economic issues, a significant 
strain on the leaders’ self-confidence also hampered progress and emphasized the kind of 
political stagnation that Đilas had mentioned at the dawn of the 1960s.75  Nonetheless, 
top Yugoslav political thinkers such as Edvard Kardelj continued to refashion 
communism as a working ideology in Yugoslavia to meet new realities, but the most 
pressing reality was this disappointment in the party at combating economic hardship.  
Yugoslav leaders noted in a meeting from 1968 that it was imperative for the young 
people to mobilize alongside members of the LCY because, “every house, every family 
in Yugoslavia must return to political thought and political sense.”76 
Towards reforming the state through the party, leaders established several 
commissions to work out solutions to their most critical problems.  One such committee 
chairman, Albreht Roman of the Committee for Socio-Political System and International 
Relations, verified the power of the constitution as one of the fundamental cells of the 
entire political system and government.77  To buttress the constitutional works, the 
various LCY committees worked to form “new institutions” that would aid in the 
functioning of the federation and “profoundly influence” the socio-political system.78  
The committee deliberated over what influence it might exert and if there was a challenge 
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to the regime.  National identity took precedence in relation to “our political interest”; 
Fuad Muhić declared that it was a “problem of togetherness which in some 
interpretations” pointed to “one multinational structure,” the creation of which could 
yield a more united populace willing to follow the LCY.79  Creating that single 
multiethnic unit was fraught with danger, though. 
Foreign observers noticed how young people clung to the latest trends and styles 
popular in the West, and how—particularly at universities—“the slogans and speeches” 
praising communism fell on deaf ears.80  As the late 1960s and early 1970s again brought 
challenges for Tito’s project in both the domestic and international arenas, the LCY 
looked with renewed vigor at fixing itself because its leaders feared collapse.  The logical 
result was that the party looked to where it was most successful and influential—the 
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). 
As the Yugoslav state decentralized with each successive constitution in line with 
its ideology of communism, the most important state organ was recentralizing.  Because 
of fears following the Brezhnev Doctrine and an aggressive Soviet position, the army 
succumbed to the reality of squaring off against the Red Army and accepted the de facto 
predominance of the regionally based Territorial Defense Forces (TDF).  But, after 1971, 
the army leadership managed to gain ground and recentralize because it argued that the 
people were not yet ready to accept the full responsibilities of national defense.  This 
drive by army elites also neglected the mantra of Yugoslav politics—that is, self-
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management.  Recentralization continued as a trend until the final months of 
Yugoslavia’s existence, when the army even took it upon itself to prepare cautiously for 
inter-republic fighting.81  In the 1980s, the army high command had begun a series of 
reorganization plans named Jedinstvo or unity.  These operations re-allocated military 
forces to the re-drawn districts to the disadvantage of Slovenia and Croatia⎯republics 
that many Yugoslav political elites feared would attempt to find leverage for more 
autonomy within—or, outside of—the state’s framework.  The army’s own ethnic 
imbalance might have played a role in this phenomenon having fit within the greater 
trend of a Serbian dominance of the armed forces and the mistrust of potential 
separatists.82  Army leaders sought to reign in the TDF and ensure the hegemony of the 
JNA within the federal state, according to the strict rules of and in the name of the 
LCY—the same LCY that operated towards decentralization and self-management in 
civil society.  As the final opportunity under Tito’s guiding hand to clarify the state and 
its communist goals for society, though, his system—as laid out in 1974—ultimately 
rested on the situation outside of Yugoslavia and the relations between the superpower 
blocs.   
 
PART II: SECURITY IN THE POST-1968 WORLD  
Long before Chancellor Willy Brandy of Germany unveiled his Ostpolitik—engagement 
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with the Soviets and East Germans as part of an Eastern Policy—in the 1960s, and before 
a mood of détente in the early 1970s brought about the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Soviets, like the Yugoslavs, strove for international 
recognition.  Soviet actions against Czechoslovakia in 1968 questioned the legitimacy 
emanating from the Kremlin and placed the Soviet Union in a delicate international 
position.  The repression of the Prague Spring brought criticism from the nearby 
Yugoslavs and made the Chinese increasingly wary of their northern neighbor even more 
than before, fueling even greater hostility against Moscow.83  Taking advantage of this 
rift, the shrewd politics of Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon forced the hand of the 
Soviets in foreign policy and reignited fears of isolation and war.  With a new China 
policy, Nixon took advantage of this rift within the communist world and brought the 
Soviets back onto the defensive despite their impressive gains in nuclear weapons and 
growing presence throughout the world.  A renewal of Realpolitik between the two 
superpowers—or three, keeping in mind the power of the Chinese—served to alter 
dramatically the mood in international relations. 
The Soviets asked as early as 1954 for an international conference that would 
solidify the borders of Europe and finalize the division of Europe into the two zones of 
authority.84  Kremlin leaders saw such an affirmation of their rule as necessary in light of 
the internal unrest in many of the Eastern bloc countries.  But, neither the United States 
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nor its Western partners, took the Soviet overtures at face value and distrusted the 
intentions of securing the Soviets a guarantee of authority from East Germany to 
Bulgaria.  That these Soviet intensions came to fruition much later appropriately falls 
under the scheme of linkage among American leaders.85  With a slow American 
withdrawal from Vietnam, Kissinger sought to normalize relations with China and then 
approach the Soviets about disarmament, détente, and press them for concessions as part 
of the later CSCE agreement.  Kissinger’s policies took time, but by the 1972–3, the 
pressure was significant enough to press for a European agreement.  Emphasizing the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, nonintervention in internal affairs, respect for human 
rights, and fundamental freedoms—laid out by the Americans as freedom of thought, 
conscience, religion or belief—coupled with self-determination, the CSCE had a 
fundamental impact for both states and individuals.86  While Kissinger brought the 
Soviets into dialogue thanks to events in Asia, what moved forward as détente gave the 
leaders in Moscow comfort in knowing that the Americans were recognizing their rights 
in Europe.  The key to Europe, though, waited in Berlin.              
As soon as Brandt expressed his notion of Ostpolitik, he effectively opened up 
dialogue between the Germanies and dangled the idea of rapprochement in a larger sense 
because his policies worked to solve the German problem, recognized by most Europeans 
and understood by scholar John Freeman as the “focus of incipient East-West military 
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conflict.”87  A solution to the German problem came true with Helsinki on the larger state 
level but it opened up new avenues for discord on a lower level.  
When it came time to reassess progress of the Helsinki Accords in 1977, then 
U.S. national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, saw the broader process of détente 
as “inevitably challenging Soviet control of Eastern Europe”; as such, any move that 
drove apart East Europeans from the Soviet Union worked to benefit the United States.88  
What seems to have worked at influencing this—as well as tying directly into the German 
problem—was the force of nationalism in this process.  Why else would East German 
ruler Erich Honecker have sought to curb interaction between East and West Germans 
“envisioned in the Basic Treaty,” of the Helsinki Accords?89  It was clear that the 
artificial divide of Germany—a divide that separated peoples within other East European 
countries as well—drew the scorn of average folks; in 1963, lines of West Germans, 
730,00 of them, formed for a Christmas pass to visit relatives and friends in East 
Germany and showed that interaction was paramount in solving the two-state dilemma.90  
Ostpolitik, as engendered by Brandt, had served to normalize the relations and paved the 
way for Helsinki, but Brandt’s policies always pointed importantly to the “emigration 
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rights” for the nearly 2 million “Germans living in the Soviet Union.”91  Emigration 
rights had the clear potential to disrupt the entire Eastern bloc and prove the illegitimacy 
of all the regimes there as people voted with their feet.    
 While Yugoslav leaders influenced little in this larger peace process, they did 
have a lot at stake regarding the outcomes.  One of the most important aspects of 
Yugoslavia’s foreign policy for leaders in Belgrade was that they considered the unity of 
their country to be a key element in European security.  The Cold War system had made a 
European conflict—any conflict—potentially earth shattering and Yugoslavs knew that 
no matter what side they chose, if any, they would suffer invasion.  Tito told Khrushchev 
in 1955 that he believed “the question of resolving the German question is closely bound 
with the question of European security at the same time.”92  While Tito, Khrushchev, and 
Brezhnev all recognized the centrality of solving the status of Germany in order to 
achieve a lasting peace, they also knew that more was at stake.  Party leaders understood 
their limitations but still acted with caution regarding the enforcement of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine; LCY executive bureau member Stane Dolanc stressed that “the whole world 
would see it in a positive light if Brezhnev won’t enforce his doctrine on Yugoslavia.”  
Soviet intentions on the German problem were quite serious and Dolanc saw Brezhnev’s 
1971 visit to Yugoslavia as part of the larger European security problem.93  The Yugoslav 
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relationship with the two German states made any compromise difficult.  While 
recognition of East Germany came late after intense prodding by Khrushchev, Tito owed 
a considerable debt to the West German economic miracle.  Not only were the West 
Germans able to pay reparations, but hordes of Yugoslav workers took part in rebuilding 
West Germany and, as a result, sent home prodigious amounts of hard currency and 
alleviated unemployment problems inside Yugoslavia.  In the larger sense, Tito’s 
particular dilemma recognizing both German states while the superpowers haggled over 
some sort of finality of the German problem paralleled his larger foreign policy dilemma 
as it dealt with nonalignment.94 
 By the early 1970s, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia had stirred Europe 
and given a renewed sense of urgency to Tito for a strong security regime against 
external threats.  This was part of the realization not just of the vulnerabilities of 
mounting an adequate defense against the Soviets, but moreover, part of an understanding 
of the critical strategic position of Yugoslavia.  The 1970s opened the way for increased 
intervention in the Third World by the Soviet Union, the United States, and China.  
Chinese influence made its presence known throughout Asia, in far-away Africa, and 
among Tito’s estranged Albanian neighbors.  Because of the delicate situation in the 
nearby Middle East thanks to hostility against the existence and practices of the Israeli 
state, combined with the global realization of oil as a strategic commodity, the Cold War 
superpowers assigned the region great importance.  Nijaz Dizdarević expressed his 
understanding of the heightened Soviet interest in the Balkans as a product of the “geo-
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strategic position of the region” and any dramatic change in Yugoslavia, in particular, 
was an invitation for Soviet aggression.  Dizdarević understood that during the events of 
the Croatian Spring in 1971, the Soviets looked at how best they could benefit by a 
weakened Yugoslavia; after all, “they have their own interests in our internal situation.”95   
For the members of the party hierarchy, Yugoslavia represented a pillar of 
resistance against Soviet designs on the Middle East.  While Stane Dolanc and the rest of 
the executive bureau of the LCY’s Presidium debated the official language to use to 
describe Brezhnev’s impending visit to Belgrade in 1971, in the end, they pointed out, 
“Brezhnev’s visit was part of an intensive foreign-policy activity on the part of the 
USSR, which Brezhnev characterized as an executive ‘program for peace.’”96  This 
program of peace, though, came at a sensitive time for the Yugoslavs.  With external 
pressure still visible after Czechoslovakia among certain army and party elites combined 
with the student protests at major Yugoslav universities, and nationalist-driven riots in 
Croatia, the LCY decided that it must reinforce the idea that “the existence of Socialist 
Yugoslavia is in the interests” of all of Europe, because, “as the key to the Balkans” and 
as part of the European peace process, Yugoslavia must remain strong and intact.97  
Dizdarević stressed that the talks during the visit gave a critical opportunity to emphasize 
how stability in the Balkans represented an “integral part of the course” shaping the 
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eventual settlement of security and peace in Europe.98  Stevan Doronjski added, “in this 
process, Yugoslavia serves to stabilize relations in the Balkans”; Dizdarević returned 
promptly by reaffirming his fear of upsetting the “status quo of Europe.”99 
 Part of Brezhnev’s 1971 visit meant that a new round of talks occurred regarding 
the questions of Yugoslavia’s place in Europe and the future development of Soviet–
Yugoslav relations.  While relations between the two countries naturally suffered after 
Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslavs clearly wanted another vindication of sovereignty and the 
notion of separate paths.  For these reasons, the executive bureau had worked hard to 
figure out what the proper course for the meetings should take.  Buda Šoškić argued, “we 
would have success if they affirm the position of socialist Yugoslavia as an independent, 
nonaligned country on a unique path towards building socialism.”100  Brezhnev 
essentially made little news to stir up relations and in fact had prompted too much 
worrisome behavior on the part of Yugoslav leaders, they themselves craving support as 
events in Croatia had reached crisis level.  The recognition of nonalignment as a primary 
mover in this process also gave the party elites a chance to reflect on the differences 
between the two systems.  Dizdarević returned to the issue of Yugoslavia’s internal 
stability and delineated how the two systems are different: “we have our system and they 
have their own system.”  What set Yugoslavia apart was that the LCY proceeded from 
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the “people’s nonalignment” and, therefore, acted in a more democratic way—
supposedly always resting on transparency and openness.101  Speaking more broadly, 
Dizdarević confirmed the non-bloc component of the LCY’s view towards security in 
Europe and saw that role as critical to acting as a sort of honest broker between all 
sides.102  Brezhnev, though, cared little for Yugoslavia’s role as an honest broker and had 
a greater international goal in mind with his visit.  Even the New York Times reporter 
Alfred Friendly, Jr., present in Belgrade during the meetings, noted, “behind the Soviet 
smiles,” the Yugoslavs see “only Moscow’s tactics in pursuing its policy of détente with 
the West.”103  Détente with the West, of course, became a priority for the Kremlin as 
continued problems with Chinese leaders set the stage for a potential American–Chinese 
rapprochement.  Brezhnev in 1971 was grateful for external recognition and positive 
publicity—especially from Tito, the heretic—in the wake of his crackdown against 
Czechoslovakia.   
 
IN THE MIDDLE 
What kept Tito and his comrades edgy and fearful, even worrying about Brezhnev’s 
intentions in 1971, was their perception of internal disruptions.  Despite all of the rhetoric 
and the real progress from reforms, people still voiced displeasure and opposition to the 
regime; this was clear during the Croatian Spring on both the broader level and in 
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villages like Karin Donji.  Tito made it his first priority to continue forward with reform 
of the constitution to better the roles and rights of citizens and the government; 
importantly, he also took the opportunity to use the police to quiet adversaries.   
The Yugoslav security service (UDB-a) ensured that political enemies of all sorts 
were kept under control, but repression by Tito’s forces generally was intermittent 
because it generally reacted to threats both in and outside the LCY.  A crisis would arise 
because of a problematic publication, a dangerous protest, or series of riots prompting 
Tito to respond by ordering the removal of these people from the spotlight.  Such 
vicissitudes symbolized Tito’s tenure as Yugoslavia’s leader—whether it was relations 
with the United States or the Soviet Union, treatment (negative or positive) of ethnic 
groups, or with real or imagined opponents—Tito’s state alternated between carrot and 
stick methods.  During the first half of the 1970s, Tito and Brezhnev enjoyed amicable 
relations, but the second turned problematic.  Tito lashed out rather irrationally with 
infuriated rage when the Soviets celebrated thirty years of peace after World War II and 
ignored the Yugoslav theater of operations.  While no more than symbolic, the outrage 
shown by Tito represents how even minor issues potentially worried Yugoslav leaders, as 
they feared a discredited legitimacy.  Tito mocked the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe 
as a series of “too heavy interferences in the communist countries” that, “can no longer 
be considered as ‘liberating.’”104  As a result, the Soviets officially apologized and the 
issue subsided.   
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Merely a year later after the Soviet apology, Brezhnev again visited Yugoslavia 
and the results of this encounter epitomized Tito’s characteristic shifting.  Brezhnev had 
requested a Soviet naval base on the Adriatic but Tito vehemently denied the Soviets 
access to Yugoslav ports.  Meanwhile, Tito ordered UDB-a officers to track down and 
arrest or harass people associated with fringe groups who might possibly ally with 
Moscow in any fight against Tito; namely, Cominformists, Croatian nationalists, Serbian 
army officers, and Macedonian irredentists.105   
 Despite such whimsical and irrational use of police power, Tito’s state did try to 
emphasize positive ideal.  The number of incarcerated dissidents or political enemies 
fluctuated during the entirety of Titoist Yugoslavia, but when the focus on human rights 
came to Belgrade in 1977—in a scheduled analysis of the Helsinki Accords—Tito 
surrendered to pressure and released over 200 prisoners in a general amnesty.106  But this 
fact did not discolor his standing either at home or abroad; Tito in fact, remained “very 
popular” in Europe because of his independent position between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact and his stance on nonalignment.107  Popularity among statesmen abroad naturally 
buoyed his position internally and countered any small to moderate level of police 
persecution.  While the 1960s were the heyday of Tito’s role in making nonalignment a 
global phenomenon, the unique international position marked by the Non-aligned 
Movement’s drift into distinctly local, African, and Asian territory failed to curb the 
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LCY’s enthusiasm for nonalignment; nor did it lessen any interest shown by the United 
States.  American diplomats hoped to set “higher standards” for human rights and take 
the lead at the Belgrade Conference in 1977 through cooperation with the nonaligned 
countries.108  Yugoslavs continued to cherish the foreign-policy spectacle: Borba, the 
Yugoslav daily, unjustifiably argued in 1971, partly because of the recent Croatian 
Spring, that because of Yugoslavia’s “great international prestige,” through 
nonalignment, diplomats safeguarded independence.  Nonalignment, even after it had 
largely moved beyond Tito’s goals, still represented for the Yugoslav press a tangible 
international legitimacy that remained an attractive means to support the regime.109 
 One thing, though, that emerged from nonalignment’s rhetoric and carried over to 
larger international venues such as the Helsinki Conference was the issue of sovereignty.  
When Brezhnev spearheaded the Warsaw Pact’s intervention in Czechoslovakia, he 
meddled in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation, a nation recognized by both East and 
West.  Yugoslavs everywhere cried that the invasion “raised onto the level of a doctrine 
governing the relations among socialist countries” and threatened world peace.  Proof no 
sooner came when NATO met in November 1968, and issued explicit warnings, 
determined to undertake certain military measures to enhance readiness among its 
members.  Večernje Novosti, a Yugoslav daily, mocked the surprise of Warsaw Pact 
countries at the post-Czechoslovak invasion by insisting that it would have been 
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“unbelievable” for the “authors of the military occupation of Czechoslovakia” to have 
had any illusions that their actions of 1968 would not heighten tensions in Europe.110  
While the Yugoslavs feared the destabilizing aspects of Soviet intervention, both blocs 
also recognized that it was in everyone’s interest to reaffirm the forces of stability.  
Hinting at where this logic would follow, Secretary of State Dean Rusk had commented 
in 1968, that “it is impossible for us not to be concerned about what happens to the 
national independence and sovereignty and integrity” of all European countries.111  
Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States soon emerged as the path to 
restore confidence in peace and cooperation.  While the Yugoslavs emphasized respect 
for the Charter of the United Nations (UN), including independence and sovereignty of 
all countries and the banishment of force in international relations, the superpowers also 
had such ideals on their front burners.112   
 When the United States and Soviet Union agreed on the terms for a European 
summit to ease tensions and reaffirm the territorial status quo, the Western negotiators—
chief among them Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—successfully lobbied for a so-
called third basket consisting of human rights and a freedom of movement for all people.  
The subsequent meeting in Helsinki outlined a broad plan that gave the Soviets the 
commitment by the West to uphold in international law the contentious borders created 
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following Nazi Germany’s defeat in 1945.  Furthermore, the summit attempted to ease 
tense relations and succeeded in reinforcing the prevailing mood of détente.  Such an 
international situation drew support from European political leaders because no revisions 
could be made to existing borders and, with that, ideas of sovereignty and the call for 
non-intervention were solidified as universal—no longer the exclusive domain of 
nonalignment.  Issues of human rights remained less important for all parties concerned 
at Helsinki, but with a relative success in the first two arenas, human rights violations 
became the focus of the Belgrade Conference in 1977.   
 The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 had dramatically upset the 
mood in Belgrade and reawakened a fear of conflict.  With a history of both positive and 
sour relations between Moscow and Belgrade, people during the 1960s increasingly saw 
Tito as a constructive force.  The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, though, had 
reaffirmed that a grave threat existed in the East, and while Tito never asked for the 
support of the West in case the Soviets made designs on Yugoslavia, his middle stance 
came under scrutiny as the possibility of war loomed.  NATO planners feared that the 
Soviets would follow up their intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 with an open threat 
to pressure Romanian leaders to admit Soviet troops into that country to participate in 
“joint maneuvers” and generally move closer to their Moscow ally.113  Military planners 
recognized that pressing Romania and bringing in Soviet troops was a negative blow for 
the situation in Europe during 1968, but what NATO—and most certainly Tito—feared 
most was the Soviet use of Romania as a launching-pad for an operation against 
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Yugoslavia.  Austria’s defense ministry issued statements in August 1968 that questioned 
the extent of Warsaw Pact movements.  Without direct intelligence, the Austrians still 
drew conclusions about an invasion of Romania likely to encounter “no opposition,” 
from neither the Romanian armed forces nor the West, the latter because they considered 
Bucharest “within Soviet’s sphere of influence.”  The ministry concluded that with 
Romania under occupation, there was a “strong probability that Yugoslavia would then 
be taken over.”114  Tito made his concerns clear with the statements that emerged from 
official sources that drew largely on the ideological outlook held by Yugoslav party elites 
since 1948, including the foreign policy shaped by the principles of nonalignment.  Radio 
Zagreb announced that the Soviet actions as well as NATO’s reaction were “directly 
touching on the security of Yugoslavia,” partly because the Soviets slapped Tito’s legacy 
squarely in the face by arguing that he owed his existence to Moscow’s own “existence 
and strength.”  Soviet elites put down Tito when they argued that Yugoslavs would have 
to “abandon” their independence if not for the Warsaw Pact.115   
 Any doctrine by one of the superpowers that threatened the peace was inherently 
destabilizing and outright dangerous.  Borba reiterated that with the shift in Soviet policy 
from “member-equality to a thesis of limited sovereignty for all socialist countries,” 
world leaders needed to find a new balance.116  The new balance could only come, as 
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Yugoslavs saw it, with a determination to respect sovereignty and the integrity of 
individual states.  Tito’s nonalignment mantra—non-intervention in another country’s 
domestic affairs—took center stage in the wake of the Soviet involvement in 
Czechoslovakia for international relations in general and for Yugoslav leaders more 
specifically, who recognized that NATO assurances against further action in Europe 
“were certainly useful and have the de facto meaning of guarantees” of sovereignty.117 
 
HELSINKI AND BEYOND 
With the policy of détente, relations normalized between East and West, especially after 
the global ramifications of America’s new China policy; as a result, both sides benefited 
from a renewed call for peace.  Tito could also breathe easier as the heightened Soviet 
threat since 1968 seemed over with the agreement at Helsinki.  While European leaders 
could relax and enjoy moments of calm, an issue of contention born at Helsinki 
increasingly grew important.  Admittedly, not a critical priority at the Helsinki meetings, 
issues of human rights and the free movement of people became talking points for the 
American and West European negotiating team.  Nationalism dominated the logic behind 
this entire issue; whether people in Eastern Europe desired a unique approach—such as 
“socialism with a human face” in Czechoslovakia—or how the West envisioned the free 
movement of peoples.118  Part of this rhetoric that inspired Western diplomats to seek 
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freedom for people to travel rested with the German problem.119  In an artificially divided 
nation after World War II, many German families remained stranded from kin networks 
without the opportunity for reunion.  The onus mainly rested on Germans in the 
Democratic Republic of Germany (DDR) because not only did the Federal Republic 
(BRD) consider all Germans as BRD citizens, but also because the DDR could not trust 
that its people would return home.  This also applied to ethnic Germans living in the 
Soviet Union who wished to emigrate to the BRD.  Moreover, Western views held that 
Jews from the Soviet Union should have permission to emigrate to Israel or the United 
States, but other problematic issues over ethnic identity could have potentially upset the 
peace.  Hungarians living mainly in the Slovakia and in Romania, and Germans in 
Romania, all complicated the issue of where people belonged and thereby directly 
threatened the working logic of communism—as the ideology that stated a resolution for 
all ethnic problems.  Tito outlined the importance of nationalism with regard to the 
Helsinki Accords: “national minorities must not be misused for disturbing good-
neighbourly relations”; moreover, Tito saw the dangers inherent with the Third Basket, 
because, “any idea of forcibly moving state frontiers for the purpose of settling minority 
questions” was alien to his country’s ideology.120  A logic that involved the movement of 
peoples could only further aggravate nationalism in Yugoslavia if minorities such as 
Hungarians voiced demands for union with Hungary and compromised cooperation with 
their neighboring Croats and Serbs.     
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At Helsinki, the Soviet Union accepted this idea of human rights as encompassing 
the freedom to choose a place of residence, but, by 1977, the leaders in Eastern Europe 
argued that human rights, as emphasized in the Helsinki Accords, contradicted the ban—
as laid out in the same document—on interference in the internal affairs of any other 
nation.  A communiqué following a meeting in Sofia, in 1977 leveled criticism against 
the “imperialist circles” in the West who were merely using human rights as a vehicle to 
undermine the regimes and systems in Eastern Europe.121  The Soviet Union followed up 
soon after, by defining what “human rights” really meant and determined that the right to 
work, free medical care, free education, and old-age pensions were critical.  None of 
these existed in the capitalist West, where a “tiny clique” supposedly reaped “huge 
profits” and wielded “enormous power” as part of the larger “inferno for the working 
class.”122 
 Western leaders naturally disagreed.  Belgrade, though, once again became a 
center for international activity, as the Helsinki Accords underwent review in 1977, by a 
multinational delegation in the Yugoslav capital.  This would be Yugoslavia’s last major 
international event until 1980, when Tito died and funeral services drew hundreds of 
world leaders for mourning.  When Secretary of State Cyrus Vance placed enormous 
emphasis on the issue of human rights and argued that “the freer flow of people and 
ideas” was critical “to long-term security and cooperation,” he put pressure on the 
Soviets.  Vance argued that Warsaw Pact countries needed to understand that travel or 
emigration to the West was not a “privilege to be granted or refused by the state rather 
                                                 
121.  “Communists Ask a Battle on Rights,” New York Times, 5 March 1977, p. 2. 
122.  Paul Hoffman, “Soviet Bloc Steps up Ideology Drive,” New York Times, 14 April 1977, p. 4. 
Tito’s Twilight  238 
than as a matter of personal choice.”123  The Yugoslav government had accepted travel as 
a necessary tool in obtaining foreign currency—vis-à-vis foreign tourists or remittances 
from Yugoslav workers abroad—but it also felt strained by the repercussions of 
migration; might Yugoslavia lose more talented people to the West or would opponents 
of the regime join forces with diasporas and thwart Yugoslav policy overseas?  
Furthermore, part of a freer flow of people meant a freedom of the press that naturally 
stood in opposition to the closed regimes of the Soviet bloc.  American senator Claiborne 
Pell assumed that the Soviets would take the chance to avoid questions of “basket three” 
and instead, “move into other things, such as general conference, of a broad and 
unspecific nature.”124  Brezhnev did indeed take that tack, having focused his attention on 
the “continuing process of détente,” that he saw as more important than human rights, 
especially considering the West’s viewpoint and the recognized danger that this clause 
had in terms of the internal stability throughout Eastern Europe.125  This led to a mixed 
attitude regarding the Belgrade Conference, one where the West was confident for 
progress, but leery that “a great many things have not” yet been done.126 
 When the Belgrade Conference got underway, the Western delegation made a 
point of assuring that human rights would be the main issue because people in the West 
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were “thoroughly tired of having their hopes raised and then shattered by empty words 
and unfulfilled pledges.”127  One aspect of this hopeful Western attitude manifested itself 
with a delegation of fifteen visitors who lobbied on behalf of Soviet Jews; the result for 
those fifteen was ironic—arrest, ostensibly because they abused their visas for 
Yugoslavia.128  Such treatment to contain opposition groups or other troublemakers kept 
the focus on the abuses of the Tito government and undermined his other positive 
attempts of reform, which included increasing freedom for the press and for freer speech.  
As the host nation of an event that sought to improve human rights, the negative publicity 
that began for the Yugoslav government remained as a number of political prisoners 
remained in captivity even after the conference began amid rumors of a general amnesty.  
One such case included a Yugoslav judge, Franc Miklavčić, arrested in his own 
courtroom in late 1976, after UDB-a officers read his diary and concluded that he had 
“expressed a belief in political pluralism rather than Communism.”129  Sentenced to six 
years in prison for his apparent opposition to Tito’s reform regime, Miklavčić joined over 
500 comrades awaiting the end of their terms in prison.  Yugoslav leaders eventually 
pardoned 200 political prisoners in 1977, but the issue of how a supposedly legitimate 
regime functioned alongside hundreds, if not thousands, of political victims remained a 
poignant reminder of how true popular support eluded Tito’s Marxist system. 
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 In the end, Helsinki’s third basket, which dealt with human rights, was both a 
conservative and a radical document.130  Conservative in its reaffirmation of basic 
principles from the UN Charter including sovereign equality, no threat or use of force 
between nations, inviolability of frontiers, peaceful settlement of disputes, and 
nonintervention in the internal affairs of another state.131  The settlement put to rest any 
claims for revenge or hopes for territorial aggrandizement in Europe; but it also raised the 
specter of doubt over what intervention in another state meant.132  President Gerald Ford 
acknowledged that when he signed the final act at Helsinki, he declared, “our peoples 
will be watching and measuring our progress,” because it was critical that these “noble 
sentiments” became reality.  To that end, Ford saw the OSCE as the vehicle to measure 
the gains of freedom, but also stated that it was not his purpose to “interfere in the 
domestic affairs of others.”133  The behavior of a government against its own citizens—
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whether freedom of speech, religion, or movement—though, suddenly became a 
legitimate international concern and stood poised to upset the delicate and unfinished 
national question active east of Winston Churchill’s Iron Curtain.  This opened up a line 
of thought that both reassured and scared Tito.  After all, the problems facing Yugoslavia 
not only included the fear of a foreign invasion, but most importantly, a domestic 
challenge that would overturn the regime.  It was with this notion that Tito hoped the 
international situation after the Belgrade Conference would help his state transition 
peacefully after he died.  This same anxiety made the standing policy apt: “After Tito—
Tito.”134 
 
CONCLUSION: AFTER TITO—TITO 
The final decade of Tito’s rule called into question how the post-Tito system would 
function.  As Tito aged, he recognized the need to ensure his successors would inherit a 
legitimate and well-functioning political system.  Two things guided Yugoslavia during 
the 1970s: Internal constitutional reform and the external focus on upholding ideas Tito 
had championed since the early 1950s.  Yugoslav political reform took the events of the 
1960s and early 1970s, and tried to home in on the legal means to make the regime 
unbreakable following Tito’s death.  Drafters emphasized self-management and 
decentralization of the federal system and set up a rotating presidency as part of a larger 
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power-sharing method to maintain equality between all ethnic groups and regional 
political entities.  Kosovo’s status grew from autonomous region to autonomous province 
and thus the Kosovar leaders gained a voice in the federal decision-making process.  
Likewise, the federal system brought the army closer—this in response to both the 
external threat by the Soviets after 1968, and a renewed spurt of nationalist tensions in 
Croatia in 1971. 
 The general mood in the international environment also brought great hope for 
Yugoslavia’s future.  No major international conflicts arose to trouble Tito during his last 
years in power; in contrast, the Soviet Union and the United States met in 1975, in 
Helsinki, and reaffirmed the territorial borders, the sovereignty of states, solidified the 
mood of détente, and finally repeated the importance of human rights as outlined in the 
UN Charter.  While the human rights aspect drew Yugoslavia back into the spotlight with 
the hosting of the review of Helsinki’s progress until 1977, the other consequences of 
Helsinki encouraged Yugoslav leaders.  With territorial integrity and sovereignty restated 
and the status quo upheld by both blocs, Yugoslav leaders relaxed knowing that neither 
side would recognize external designs and that any moves for secession from Yugoslav 
republics would be disregarded.135  Reemphasizing this commitment to Yugoslavia’s 
territorial integrity in early January 1980, as Tito’s failing health brought about a 
profound concern for the future of Yugoslavia, Stephen Larrabee noted in a National 
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Security Council memorandum that the United States government should treat 
Yugoslavia as a special case and be prepared to “aid Yugoslavia in case of a crisis.”136  A 
telegram from the American Embassy in Belgrade to the secretary of state called on the 
president for a “further public restatement” of his position to “make certain that the 
Soviets are aware that” the United States “will react to any Soviet move.”137  As a result, 
in a private letter to Brezhnev, President Jimmy Carter confirmed the view first 
established by Harry S. Truman that “we and our allies attach the highest importance to 
the independence, unity and territorial integrity of non-aligned Yugoslavia.”  
Furthermore, sensing Tito’s death, Carter wished to confirm to the Yugoslavs “under 
whatever leadership” that they must be free to choose their own course.138  This chapter 
has shown that while the Yugoslavs used the 1970s to fix what they saw as any final 
flaws in their internal workings before Tito died, they also tried to manipulate the 
external situation to their benefit and largely succeeded.  Reacting to the dynamic of the 
time, the Yugoslavs sealed any differences between their system and the other socialist 
system in Eastern Europe.  Proud of their reinforcement of legality in the 1974 
constitution, leaders felt confident that the system would function smoothly without Tito, 
especially after they considered the progress of détente to have upheld the territorial 
integrity of European states at Helsinki.  With both superpowers therefore committed to 
upholding the current state of affairs, and consistent with rhetoric made popular by 
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Yugoslav politicians and theorists since the early 1950s, Tito’s legacy seemingly could 
live on indefinitely.  But, fear still gripped the Yugoslav leadership in anticipation of 
Tito’s death; Secretary of Defense General Ljubičić, exclaimed that Yugoslavia sat in a 
“complicated position” between both domestic and international troubles.139  All they 
could hope for was that the brotherhood and unity of all nations and nationalities in 
Yugoslavia seemed guaranteed so long as a Titoist ideology supplied it. 
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CONCLUSIONS: YUGOSLAVIA AND THE LEGACY OF THE COLD WAR 
 
Not a single one of our republics would mean anything if we were not all together.  
Socialist history of Yugoslavia united also in the future.1     
  —Josip Broz Tito  
 
To understand the historical significance of how leaders attempted to build legitimacy in 
Titoist Yugoslavia, the process needs to be situated in the broader history of the 
twentieth-century.  As the century of ideology, the competition over legitimate 
worldviews defined how leaders both shaped their state’s identities and outlined the 
nature of alliances.  The century began with a profound hope that Enlightenment values 
would persist indefinitely into the future and that human progress was destined to achieve 
all things imaginable.  World War I brutally called into question this positive outlook on 
progress and challenged the core values held by people not only in the West, but also 
throughout the world.  The tremendous devastation from the war laid the groundwork for 
an ideological battle that took on awesome proportions for the remainder of the century.  
When war raised its ugly head again at the end of the 1930s, thanks primarily to Hitler’s 
aggression, the provocative power of ideology took on a radical new dimension.  The 
warring parties drew boundaries that were more concrete over what separated “us” versus 
“them” and made the struggle for survival larger than life.  For each side, the world’s 
freedom was at stake and everything fell into its own intellectual compartment.  
Fascism’s defeat in 1945 meant that the world was down to two: Democratic market-
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capitalism and Marxism.  For the wealth of leaders who harnessed political control across 
the globe for the first time and attempted to fill the political vacuum that followed 
fascism’s defeat, they all found state building in the post-1945 world unfeasible absent 
one of the compelling worldviews. 
 State building in an era of tension shaped the nature of how the governors could 
govern.  Fear over nuclear devastation—especially once the Soviet Union got the 
bomb—helped form not only government policy in both East and West, but also 
reinforced popular movements such as the student rebellions of 1968 and the Green 
Revolution.  But the two superpowers eventually worked out a system whereby conflict 
would be controlled and localized; nuclear holocaust remained in the background while 
proxy wars in the Third World prevailed over direct confrontation.  Nonetheless, the Cold 
War brought fear to a new height.  For Tito, his fragile creation stood on the frontier 
between East and West; its own divided legacy—torn between the Hapsburgs, the 
Ottoman Sultans, and, to an extent, the Romanovs—made the Cold War dilemma even 
greater for him and the people of Yugoslavia.  Where would their allegiances fall if 
World War III set into motion the fateful clash between the superpowers?  What hope did 
Yugoslavs have for a peaceful future and prosperity in a stable environment?  Finally, 
what goals could the regime have pointed to as paramount in their attempt to control the 
direction of change? 
 My look at Tito and his creation of Yugoslavia focuses on how power, legitimacy, 
and ideology intersected to instruct the course of events.  Change over time unveils a 
state wrapped up with modes of dynamism yet forever stuck as a static replica of the 
Yugoslavia and the Legacy of the Cold War  247 
ideologically driven past with the resiliency of a one-party system.  The Partisan legacy 
from the early years of fighting for control of the country during World War II, and then 
the fateful blow by Stalin when he called into question Tito’s Marxist credentials, 
instilled profound fear into the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (LCY).  Territories that 
Tito and his comrades fought so hard for became the subject of political dispute after 
1948 and the Soviets branded the LCY as falsifiers of Marx and imperialist lackeys, 
thereby dramatically calling into question the sincerity of Marxism in Yugoslavia and 
pushing the regime into an ideological abyss.  Yugoslav communists had none of that. 
 Banished from the Soviet camp yet unable and unwilling to abandon their Marxist 
principles, the Yugoslav elite set about creating something new; but, from the beginning, 
they recognized that this new system required a legitimate foundation to replace Soviet 
power from both external and internal sources.  That the Yugoslavs found support from 
the West should come as no surprise given geostrategic realities in Europe; that they 
desperately clung to Marxism in light of the Cold War’s progression might not be so easy 
to dismiss.  The struggles within the party over the correct direction that it should take 
brought almost every dilemma into the spotlight for its potentially destabilizing effects, 
but most crises had little probability of actually affecting change.  The fight against 
divisive nationalism, the continued success and popularity of the party, the educating and 
inclusive role of the army, and a quest for outside approval together decided the fate of 
the party and its state.  Fear of internal dissension, world war, or a localized European 
war drove the party down a path of reform that tried to fix every problem and guarantee 
prosperity and stability for everyone according to tenets of Karl Marx. 
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Documents show that Tito’s initial problem between the two blocs grew into a 
profound and serious agent of change in its own right.  Yugoslav elites gave birth to a 
unique ideology and sought to make their interpretation of Marxism genuine and lasting.  
Constant reform of the party’s role in society and the important nature of civil-military 
relations helped to guide Tito’s state down the path towards reaching its goals.  
Manipulating the external situation and using foreign-policy victories to offset domestic 
troubles, the LCY leadership showed itself as shrewd and pliable.  While internal matters 
troubled the party, members remained confident that their stance would eventually solve 
all the problems.  Domestically, the path to this solution rested, so they thought, on 
legality and guarantees from the state and seemed to compliment well the legitimacy 
earned by the regime abroad.  Various speeches and conversations by LCY members 
showed a consensus on these issues as it effected them and their system.  Burdened with 
the hapless job of succeeding in an environment of immense pressure and multi-faceted 
conflicts, the LCY members who spoke out at committee meetings, in the newspapers, 
and to other agents, did so with an earnest desire to succeed in the struggle for political 
mastery, which, for them, also meant socio-economic transformation driven by the 
messianic desire to convert all Yugoslavs—in brotherhood and unity—to their cause.  
Scholarship has mistakenly viewed this history as one fraught with unsolvable and age-
old ethnic hatreds or as led by men who were inept when it came to political 
machinations.  But the ethnic differences were neither unsolvable nor ancient and the 
politicians displayed a firm handle on matters and displayed a cognizance and 
shrewdness that equaled their fellow Cold Warriors.  The sources show that the 
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Yugoslavs failed because of their over-reliance on Marxism and in their 
misunderstanding over reform in a one-party state; without serious competition, reform 
cannot hope to prevail no matter how sober the intentions.   
Conflicts have historically bound together allegiances and created a unity so that 
coalitions slowly transformed into permanent groups.  Reformers in the top echelons of 
power in Yugoslavia manipulated conflict and fear to prolong the rule of the LCY.  They 
thought that the unification against a common enemy would permanently glue together 
Yugoslav society but, such unity, according to sociologist Lewis Coser, “tends to remain 
on the level of temporary association when it is limited to instrumental ends and 
temporary, limited purposes.”2  This temporal aspect of Yugoslav politics meant that the 
direction or emphasis constantly changed; reform for the LCY was a spastic effort to 
reach out in all directions without concretely solving anything.  Fear of the common foe 
was the glue that bound the regime together but it was an adhesive that failed to hold 
because the definition of what was Yugoslav and what was not constantly eluded the 
people of Yugoslavia.  The LCY remained in the hands of World War II-era elites, men 
who changed reluctantly after 1948, but who nonetheless recognized that change—at 
least the rhetoric of change—was the only thing possible to prolong their political 
survival.  While the leadership remained conservative, desperate attempts to find 
progressive solutions to the country’s dilemmas riddled the political landscape.  The two 
forces never reconciled to build a lasting legitimacy. 
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 An aspect of similarity among all twentieth century ideologies was the insistence 
that nationalism was dead.  In the case of fascism, exclusionary rhetoric emphasized the 
nationalism of one group—Italians or Germans, for example—so much so that no other 
group mattered.  Elaborate racial hierarchies explained the future march of history and 
with Hitler’s victory, all semblance of difference would disappear as the Untermenschen 
themselves would wither into oblivion.  For Marxists, they understood a history of 
conflict that would cease because Marx’s system would end all antagonisms between 
people.  The last antagonism to disappear would be class, but Marx was confident from 
his look at history that while each national group needed to organize to realize their own 
revolutions, animosity between nationalities would cease as more and more workers 
united.  Finally, it is worth mentioning that American or Western ideology, based on 
capitalism and opportunity also has contended to solve divisive nationalism.  The 
American dream unites all people, so it goes, gradually tearing off the accoutrements of 
ethnic identity.  While it seems that in the American case, violent nationalism indeed 
seems far from the political spectrum, the twenty-first century might present 
unforeseeable challenges that could shake the foundation of America’s ideology much as 
what befell Marxism in the 1980s and 1990s.3  What seems ironic is that despite Marx’s 
insistence on having abolished nationalism in a socialist society, the loss of political 
control in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia by the communists meant that politics 
degraded into the ethnic.  In the end, many of Yugoslavia’s problems were not ethnic in 
origin, but the political system never really moved past ethnicity as an identifying 
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marker—indeed, it often emphasized ethnicity and, by the 1980s, politicians seeking an 
easy path to power ethnicized problems.  The image that arose to explain this movement 
towards ethnicity as one of primordial hatreds rests on shaky foundations; rather, we must 
recognize that “particular identities (such as ethnic or religious ones) are significant one 
day and insignificant the next,” depending on the larger economic, historical, political, 
and other circumstances.4 
 Conflict largely has disappeared from the embattled Yugoslav arena despite the 
continued debacle over Kosovo’s final status as the last successor state to Tito’s failed 
creation.  Local issues may persist but in the place of wide-scale violence, the European 
Union (EU), with its inclusive foundations and great wealth, has stumbled into its new 
role as the primary arbiter in European diplomacy.  A united Europe inherited this role as 
soon as the Soviet Union crumbled, but, at the time, Yugoslavia’s leaders, whether too 
shortsighted, selfish, or simply indignant of the rapidly changing realities at the end of the 
Cold War, retreated into a more destructive manipulation of fear instead embracing 
European institutions.  Within each republic, leaders looked inward and played on 
nationalism to win votes and attain political power with little regard for worldviews or 
global trends.  Politicians argued that multiethnic societies preyed on the weaker or 
smaller group; therefore, Croats were inherently unsafe in a Serbian-dominated 
Yugoslavia, Serbs were unsafe in an independent Croatia, neither Croats nor Serbs were 
safe in a Muslim Bosnia-Hercegovina, and so the trend continued.  Neighbors turned on 
each other despite years of peaceful and friendly coexistence because leaders exaggerated 
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diversity to delineate the exceedingly small differences that really existed between all 
groups.  The massive evidence of what unfolded during the resulting wars of 
dismemberment elucidates not the dangerously provocative attraction of selfish, 
exclusive nationalism, but, rather, how fear and emptiness can drive people to extremes.5 
 After Tito’s death, official Yugoslav channels declared that Tito still ruled—his 
spirit would provide the new governing elite with the necessary inspiration.  The major 
problem that the post-Tito elites could not foresee included the rapid pace of change as 
the Cold War ended.  But once Mikhail Gorbachev began real reform in the Soviet Union 
and backed away from the Brezhnev Doctrine, especially with respect to the East 
European satellites, all the accomplishments of détente and the strengthening of the state 
vanished as foreign-policy tools for the ruling elite of Yugoslavia.  The external 
legitimacy they so needed disappeared and the entire Cold War world—including the 
nonaligned—came under fire.  While Yugoslav elites desperately sought to make their 
reform program work and perpetuate their rule, they found out that reforming Marxism 
could not solve the inherent dilemmas latent within the ideology.  Reform—no matter 
how earnest or conscientious the desire—failed, just as socialism more broadly did.  In 
the end, despite their status outside of the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslav leaders had tied their 
fate to a form of Marxism and once Boris Yeltsin outmaneuvered Gorbachev and the 
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largest Marxist state—the Soviet Union—disintegrated, empty rhetoric governed 
Yugoslavia until violence filled the void and destroyed the country.6
                                                 
6.  See Marlise Simons, “Yugoslavia on the Brink,” New York Times, 24 January 1990, p. A11.  
Simons has quoted Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Marković, who said, that the “process of disassociating 
of the two [party and state] has begun.  If parties have a real chance to take part in free elections, then 
everything else is rhetoric.”  He was correct. 
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EPILOGUE: THE TRIUMPH OF FEAR AND LOSS OF LEGITIMACY 
 
However much each of us loves the land of socialism, the USSR, he can in no case love 
his own country less.1         
 —Josip Broz Tito  
 
The national question in Yugoslavia has provoked a great deal of scholarly interest, 
especially since the devastatingly violent dismemberment of that country during the 
1990s.  Yugoslav elites had attempted to encourage ethnic inclusiveness, and, in 
response, instituted legal and social norms for the treatment and rights of the constituent 
national groups within their federalist, socialist state model.  “Brotherhood and unity”—
the popular and inclusive slogan defined as “tolerance, solidarity, and a consciousness of 
unity”—epitomized Tito’s system; that is, a system that actively fostered interethnic 
cooperation and harmony as part of its broader ideological outlook.2  But, after the brutal 
ethnic wars of the 1990s, scholars have forgotten about Tito’s successes and portrayed 
Yugoslavia as a problem of nationalism or as part of the larger, “unfinished business of 
1918–1921.”3  Not surprisingly, discussions of nationalism in Yugoslavia have centered 
largely on a negative understanding: That is, scholars either have primarily based their 
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second edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 165. 
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assumptions on primordialist “ancient hatreds” or have utilized a constructivist model, 
using a modern mapping of nationalism.4  Too often, the violent death of Yugoslavia has 
hindered scholars from taking Tito’s failed state seriously and examining just how 
political elites sought to foster connections between peoples to achieve unity behind the 
party.  In the end, the problems in Yugoslavia between nationalities were not latent 
within the peoples of Yugoslavia but rather within the ideology that governed them. 
 
NATIONALISM AND THE WARS OF DISSOLUTION  
Returning to the issue of nationalism in Yugoslavia, we can see how the often profound 
difference between a nation and a state becomes painfully apparent when states—or 
institutions that govern based upon founding myths, ideological underpinnings, or 
bureaucratic systems—break down and leave their citizens scrambling for new guiding 
principles.  Political theorist Miroslav Hroch has argued that this process leaves the 
nation as the “ultimate guarantee” for citizens who align themselves accordingly in a 
political vacuum.5  In former socialist Eastern Europe, states suffered from, among other 
things, the “economy of shortage” in which, “ethnicity, like kinship, and other networks 
of potential reciprocity or patronage” already existed by the 1990s, because the respective 
                                                 
4.  Primordialism, according to Dovile Budryte, has interpreted nationalism as “‘an ideological 
movement for the attaining and maintaining identity, unity and autonomy on behalf of a population deemed 
by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation.’  In other words, nationalism is a social 
movement, but it is also an instrument of transmission of the myths, traditions, language, and historical 
memory that constitute and help maintain the ‘feelings of oneness,’ or national identity.”  Taming 
Nationalism?  Political Community Building in the Post-Soviet Baltic States, (London: Ashgate, 1995), p. 
16. 
5.  Miroslav Hroch in Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, p. 173 
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states failed to circumvent nationality as a salient force—or, in Tito’s case, tried at every 
turn to emphasize the non-emphasis on nationalism.6  In addition, Tito’s political system 
attempted at one point to move past particular ethnic identities and create a single 
Yugoslav identity for all.  The malfunctioning of this nationality policy helped to 
exacerbate a situation that already undermined the power of the united Yugoslav state so 
long as it existed, and became outright dangerous once Titoist elites surrendered power. 
 One of the central questions then facing politicians following the dramatic 
realignment of peoples and ideologies following World War II, was could nationalism be 
controlled or used potentially to bolster the legitimacy of new states.  American political 
scientist Jack Snyder has written that two types of nationalisms—civic and ethnic—arise 
under different circumstances and naturally, have different consequences.  Civic 
nationalism—oftentimes seen as benign—“normally appears in well-institutionalized 
democracies, whereas ethnic nationalism depends on culture for support and therefore 
fosters group identification.”  Furthermore, in line with Hroch, Synder has determined 
that ethnic nationalism “predominates when institutions collapse,” because those 
institutions fail at “fulfilling people’s basic needs” without other satisfactory alternatives 
readily available.7 
 Having admitted that his argument might be too pessimistic, Snyder has qualified 
his point to emphasize the “turbulent transition to democracy” in a state lacking 
foundational institutions; this supports my contention that within strong states—or those 
                                                 
6.  See Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, p. 173.  
7.  Jack Synder, “Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State,” Survival 35:1 (Summer 
1993), p. 12. 
Triumph of Fear  257 
with confident leaders such as Tito—a lack of institutional guarantees can be substituted 
with merely the promise of hope and the backing of arms, but such illegitimate systems 
cannot last forever.8  Synder’s theory works best when analyzing a state that is in political 
upheaval and thus apt to accentuate tensions while insufficiently equipped to contain 
them.  Scholar Adrian Jones’ theory of nationalism agrees fundamentally and he has 
recognized the root of the problem in what he has called “political culture.”  Having 
compared the transitioning states of the former Soviet bloc with the United States, Japan, 
and parts of Western Europe—states whose modern existence encourages stability and 
relatively prosperity—Jones has pointed to the trait common to all transitioning states as 
“turmoil at the centre,” which allows peripheral groups to advance their agenda.9  But 
does state failure or far-reaching political refashioning necessarily lead to ethnic conflict? 
 It seems that only under the right circumstances—in dispersed ethnic 
communities or perceived unequal multiethnic societies—can nationalism turn into 
conflict in states experiencing fundamental (i.e., ideological) transition.10  In a similar 
vein, the historian Benedict Anderson has called for us to recognize that the “gauge and 
emblem” of national freedom is the “sovereign state” and it seems, Yugoslavia was no 
exception.11  Furthermore, that nation “is always conceived as a deep, horizontal 
                                                 
8.  Snyder, “Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State,” p. 17. 
9.  Adrian Jones “Competing Ideas of the ‘Self’ in Russian Self-Determination, Past and Present,” 
in Aleksandar Pavković, Halyna Koscharsky, and Adam Czarnota, eds., Nationalism and Postcommunism, 
(Sydney: Dartmouth, 1995),  pp. 40, 54. 
10.  In a similar way, ethnic war is no different from any other war, whereby the latter has been 
hypothesized as arising from a power disparity; indeed, “a lopsided balance of power will promote war is 
probably the most popular theory of international relations,” in Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), p. 109. 
11.  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (New York: Verso, 1991), p. 7.   
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comradeship,” which makes this cultural bond so important for people “not so much to 
kill,” according to Anderson, but “as willingly to die” for what he has termed “such 
limited imaginings”—or the modern nation-state.12 
The answers to questions about the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia, as 
Anderson has elucidated, center on nationalism itself.  People die so that their ethnic kin 
might live together in a sovereign state, as Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina died 
trying to maintain political unity with a Serbian regime in Belgrade.13  In reality, that may 
be one of the right answers, but it speaks to a limited question.  The broader question 
should focus the debate on the circumstances whereby these nationalisms rose to the 
forefront of politics.  Should we automatically identify nationalism as the root causes of 
ethnic conflict when such conflicts might “revolve around issues of resource control, 
political power, the manipulations of the political elite, and the inability of the central 
state to address the needs of the periphery”?14  Anderson may be right in having 
recognized that the relationship between ethnic kin trump all others as people attach the 
greatest importance to one of the most imaginary aspects of identity, but other scholars 
have written that we need to attribute the profound triumph of nationalism and its 
manifestation in inter-ethnic violence in Yugoslavia to the security dilemma. 
                                                 
12.  Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 7 
13.  See, for example, Lee Walker, “Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet 
Transition,” in Leokadia Drobizheva, Rose Gottemoeller, et al., eds., Ethnic Conflict in the Post Soviet 
World: Case Studies and Analysis, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 3. “Nationalism and ethnic 
conflict are widely credited with having initiated the collapse of the Soviet empire and the Soviet state and 
are blamed for threatening the stability of the “democratizing” states of Central Europe and the newly 
independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union.” 
14.  Catherine McArdle Kelleher, “Indicators, Implications, and Policy Choices,” in Drobizheva, 
et al., eds., Ethnic Conflict in the Post Soviet World, p. 339. 
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 The security dilemma arises, according to political scientist Barry Posen, when 
“proximate groups of people suddenly find themselves newly responsible for their own 
security,” prompting these groups to ask questions of their neighbors, such as “‘do you 
threaten me, and if so how?’”15  When answers to these questions are ambiguous, chances 
of war increase.  Especially in a period of transition, the power of states or emerging 
states to trace clearly their limits and intents remain difficult.  Taking former Yugoslavia 
as an example, we can see that during the 1980s, when the federal government suffered 
setbacks in solving economic problems, the constituent republics looked to their own 
accounting and well-being.  Leaders of poor republics, such as Macedonia, wanted to 
receive more federal aid for their local economies, while the wealthy Slovenes and Croats 
watched their earnings drawn away to support the seemingly hopeless, poverty-stricken 
south.  Yugoslavia’s overall economy struggled with inflation and unemployment and 
leaders fought hard to improve or even maintain stability; meanwhile, selfish politics 
proliferated at the local level.  Due to the weak central government structures set up in 
the final years of Tito’s administration, federal policymakers possessed few options to 
compel cooperation among the divergent views.  In fact, as A. Ross Johnson persuasively 
suggested, non-Serbs would interpret any effort on the part of the federal government to 
recentralize in order to combat internal economic and political problems as a move 
towards Serbian hegemonialism.16  As the decade proceeded, selfishness won out, and 
                                                 
15.  Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 35:1 (Spring 1993), p. 
27. 
16.  See A. Ross Johnson Impressions of Post-Tito Yugoslavia: A Trip Report, (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation, 1982), p. 15. “Said one Croat official, ‘If there were recentralization, Yugoslavia 
would fall apart.’ … At the turn of the 1970s, Yugoslavia underwent an irreversible decentralization; under 
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nobody knew where to stop nor did elites have the wherewithal to act with strong resolve. 
Within the security dilemma’s framework, the ratcheting up of ethnic conflict 
emerges when actions taken by one group threaten another, despite potentially benign or 
defensive intentions.  Moreover, if ethnic groups are dispersed and form “ethnic islands,” 
political geography “frequently create[s] an ‘offense-dominant world.’”17  In other words, 
if an ethnic group feels threatened because of its geographic dispersal, then the incentives 
for that group to take the initiative to expand its territorial base is great.18  In the case in 
former Yugoslavia, Serbs stranded in hostile territory such as an independent Croatia and 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, struck out on the offensive (or defensive) to unite their territory, 
and used ethnic cleansing to achieve a complete polity of loyal folk.  But, what was it 
about Tito’s state that had kept all of this under control? 
 
A YUGOSLAV SUPRANATIONALITY  
Maybe the combination of ideology and nationalism was supposed to keep things under 
control.  In any case, policymakers attempted to create a Yugoslav supranationality as a 
way to replace the traditional labels in the hope that such a marker would combat any 
                                                                                                                                                 
no foreseeable circumstances short of civil war and Soviet invasion could it be recentralized—and perhaps 
not under those circumstances.”  Furthermore, Johnson has explained how recentralization also contained 
an ethnic twist: it would “in fact stand on a platform of Serb-Montenegrin hegemony.”  See Yugoslavia: In 
the Twilight of Tito, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1984), p. 54. 
17.  Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” p. 32.  
18.  See Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” p. 32.  “Isolated ethnic groups – 
ethnic islands – can produce incentives for preventative war.  Theorists argue that perceived offensive 
advantages make preventative war more attractive: if one side has an advantage that will not be present 
later and if security can best be achieved by offensive military action in any case, then leaders will be 
inclined to attack during this ‘window of opportunity.’” 
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antagonisms between ethnic groups.  While the regime struggled to realize significant 
increases in the number of these self-identified Yugoslavs, the most successful period of 
growth occurred between 1971 and 1981, when the respective censuses from those years 
measured a four-fold increase to almost 1.25 million. 19  Yet this was still a tiny fraction 
of the overall population, which had reached above 20 million.  Leaders clung to this idea 
of strengthening this “Yugoslav socialist patriotism” as a bridge between ethnic divides 
and enhance the sense of a Yugoslav community—especially for young people who grew 
up surrounded by and “continuously educated in the atmosphere” of Yugoslav socialism, 
which included the development of a self-managed socialist society and the “realization 
of common and equal condition for life and work.”20  Being “a good Slovene or Croat, a 
good Serb or Macedonian” and so forth, meant, “by that very virtue one becomes equally 
also a good Yugoslav.”21  Communist rhetoric desired that people “get over nations as 
barriers and be—to put it so—the vanguard of society.”22  But communist ideology also 
                                                 
19.  See Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991, (Bloomington, 
IA: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 57.  237,077 people identified themselves as Yugoslavs in the 1971 
census, a fourteen percent increase over 1961.  Ten years later the figure increased to 1,216,463.  Also see 
Robert Hayden, The Beginning of the End of Federal Yugoslavia: The Slovenian Amendment Crisis of 
1989, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1992), p. 2.  Hayden explained the diversity in Yugoslavia and 
discussed the Yugoslav phenomenon.  For example, he attributed mixed marriages to the identification of 
Yugoslav as opposed to Serb or Slovene, while also having cited that the fourfold increase in those self-
identified as Yugoslav between 1971 and 1981 included young people, “as the result of increased 
interethnic contact and education.” 
20.  See “Common Achievements and Tasks,” Mladost, 24 May 1967, p. 8.  HU OSA 300–10–2 
YSFI N 66–69, cn. 283. 
21.  Predrag Matvejević in Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, p. 51. 
22.  “Common Achievements and Tasks,” Mladost, 24 May 1967, p. 8.  HU OSA 300–10–2 YSFI 
N 66–69, cn. 283. 
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spoke to a time when ethnic differences would wither away along with the state.23  Srđa 
Pavlović has argued that in this sense, the communist elite in Yugoslavia possessed just 
as much nationalistic spirit as their predecessors, but “the manifestations of their 
nationalism had acquired new ideological frameworks,” which had created this Yugoslav 
supranationality.24 
An overarching Yugoslav nationality naturally created great controversy.  Vlado 
Beznik, secretary of the Republican Conference of the Socialist Alliance of Working 
People (SAWP) of Slovenia, the popular organ of the League of Communists, argued 
that, “Yugoslavism as a nationality is not only inappropriate” but implied also the 
“existence of some sort of supernation.”  As Beznik pointed out, policymakers imposed 
the “overcoming of nationality” and relied upon the creation of “yet another artificial 
nation” as the vehicle to achieve this equality.25  Despite the criticism, the notion of a 
pan-Yugoslav ethnic identity served the regime with a broader-based legitimizing notion 
that could advance the goals of communism.  LCY leaders focused on brotherhood and 
unity and saw a common identity as a method to achieve harmony among all people and 
solicit legitimacy for their party-run state.26  The Marxist expression, “national in form, 
socialist in content,” allowed the state to express socialist patriotism in terms of a 
                                                 
23.  See Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, p. 50.  “No doubt in the ripeness of time national 
differences would wither away—a prerequisite for the withering away of either federalism or the state.” 
24.  Srđa Pavlović, “Understanding Balkan Nationalism: The Wrong People, in the Wrong Place, 
at the Wrong Time,” Southeast European Politics 1:2 (December 2000), p. 118 (Emphasis in original). 
25.  Cited in Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, p. 57. 
26.  See Desanka Pešić, “‘Jugoslovenstvo’ u kongresnim dokumentima KPJ–SKJ” in 
Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis, vol. 3 (1987), p. 99. “Dakle, jugoslovenstvo kao (etnička kategorija) bilo 
je, pre svega, u funkciji (klasnog jedinstva) jugoslovenskog proletarijata; ono je doprinosilo ujedinjanju 
radničke klase Jugoslavije, a temelj to vjedinenje bio je zajednički klasni, politički, ekonomski interes.” 
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Yugoslav ethnic identity; yet, this idea only helped to exacerbate problems because the 
party continued to answer the wrong question, as when the Serbian politician, Mihailo 
Marković, termed the greatest problem facing Yugoslavia as “not a crisis of ideology,” 
but, rather, it was a “national identity crisis.”27 
 
THE END OF BROTHERHOOD AND UNITY 
During the 1980s, when the Soviet Union underwent restructuring under Premier Mikhail 
Gorbachev, tensions mounted in the outlying areas of Soviet control—both within the 
USSR itself and among its satellites and ideological neighbors.28  In certain respects, 
what happened in the Soviet Union mirrored a similar process of change taking place in 
Yugoslavia.  In the end, dramatic political failure brought forth remarkable changes that 
made nationalism a “beneficiary of these developments but not, in any serious sense, an 
important factor in bringing them about.”29  In the Yugoslav case in particular, Robert 
Hayden has written that, “it is tempting to see the breakdown of federal Yugoslavia as the 
inevitable result of those national tensions, once the overarching structure of the one-
party state” disappeared; but to “stress only those nationalisms is to distort the reality of 
                                                 
27.  Marković in Marlise Simons, “A Sign of Bad Times in Yugoslavia: Trade War Between Two 
Republics,” New York Times, 28 January 1990, p. 14. 
28.  Naturally, an alternative argument exists in the form of Soviet policy as rooted in the 
economic turbulence of the 1970s.  Specifically, the two oil shocks of that decade created an atmosphere 
whereby the Soviet Union found a more lucrative market for its raw materials in the West and in effect 
abandoned Eastern Europe to its own devices.  Once East European satellites looked to the expensive 
Western market for raw and finished goods (oil from the Middle East, for example) they were neither 
economically viable as individual states nor beneficial for Moscow’s economic policies.  Gorbachev 
merely realized this economic imbalance in trying to balance his accounts and espoused a political policy to 
the working economic reality with Glastnost and Perestroika. 
29.  See Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, p. 167.  
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political, social, and economic life in Yugoslavia in the critical years of 1989–91.”30  I 
would add to Hayden’s assertion that to stress only nationalism misrepresents not just the 
“critical years” of the civil wars but discounts the relative success achieved during Tito’s 
tenure. 
During World War II, the Nazis deliberately ripped apart and carved up 
Yugoslavia along competing ethnic lines vis-à-vis annexations and support for one of the 
most fanatical Croatian politicians, Ante Pavelić, who sought to refashion his 
Independent State of Croatia (NDH) as a homogenous nation-state.  In response to the 
Nazi–NDH alliance, Tito and his communist cadres fought Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, 
the NDH, and the Četniks (primarily Serbian royalists representing the Yugoslav 
government-in-exile), while advocating for an inclusive and multiethnic state after the 
war.  Historian Carol Lilly has termed this vicious fighting among Yugoslavs during 
World War II, as having given rise to a “legacy of hatred,” which “was perhaps the 
greatest challenge that Yugoslavia’s postwar Communist Party would face.”31  I agree, 
but emphasize that the LCY’s overall approach to conflict resolution failed.  Yes, the 
country developed and progressed and living standards rose, leaving people better off 
than their immediate neighbors in the East and North, but Tito promised a lot and 
admitted a lackluster performance in delivering.  As a result, the regime tried to win 
international prestige with the Non-aligned Movement, scare people into worrying about 
a crisis between nationalities, and perpetuate other negative features in order to bind 
                                                 
30.  Robert Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav 
Conflicts, (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 27. 
31.  Lilly, Power and Persuasion, p. 29. 
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people to the regime.32  By 1960, Tito had declared success because Yugoslavia was no 
longer frought with “internal national strifes and antagonisms,” or exploited by “domestic 
and foreign capitalists.”33  For Tito, the functioning of his socialist state simply meant, 
“we have solved the national question in the best possible way, according to Marxist 
principles;” nationalism was an outgrowth of capitalism and imperialism and Tito had 
supposedly eliminated both factors within Yugoslavia.34  But despite such positive 
rhetoric and the “construction of hope,” leaders had to keep repeating the same fear of 
nationalist tension because they never really achieved the kind of economic success that 
                                                 
32.  For a similar approach to this idea, see Esad Zgodić, Titova Nacionalna Politika: Temeljni 
pojmovi, načela i vrijednosti, (Sarajevo, Kantonalni odbor SDP BiH, 2000), p. 164.  He has noted that Tito 
believed that brotherhood between peoples had helped him beat the common foe—the fascists—and that a 
continued emphasis on brotherhood in post-war Yugoslavia would logically continue, especially as long as 
a common threat remained. 
33.  See Josip Broz Tito, The Building of Socialism and the Role and Tasks of the Socialist 
Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, Report to the Fifth Congress of the Socialist Alliance of the 
Working People of Yugoslavia, (Beograd: Publishing House Jugoslavija, 1960), p. 37; also see Tito, The 
Building of Socialism, p. 36. “But, both for the young people and for the whole of our socialist community, 
the most important thing is that the youth should during these work drives strengthen the brotherhood and 
unity of our peoples and, discarding obsolete national prejudices and chauvinistic tendencies, should forge 
a new, more monolithic, socialist social community – Yugoslavia.” 
34.  See Zgodić, Titova, pp. 93–100.  “Mi smo u svojoj zemlji riješili nacionalno pitanje na 
najbolji mogući način, u skladu sa marksističkim principima.”  Also see Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a 
Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,” Slavic Review 53:2 
(Summer 1994), p. 420. Slezkine has quoted a Civil-war era theorist who argued, “Many of these peoples 
have nothing in common except the fact that before they were all parts of the Russian Empire and now they 
have all been liberated by the revolution, but there are no internal connections among them.”  Furthermore, 
Lenin believed that the surest way to unity in content was diversity in form: “By fostering national cultures 
and creating national autonomies, national schools, national languages and national cadres, the Bolsheviks 
would overcome national distrust and reach national audiences.  ‘We are going to help you develop your 
Buriat, Votiak, etc. language and culture, because in this way you will join the universal culture, revolution 
and communism sooner.’” 
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they said they wanted.  More importantly, the economic and social development in 
Yugoslavia was unequal. 
 
THE 1980S: THE BEST AND WORST OF TIMES 
In 1986, Dušan Bilandžić, a professor in Croatia, stated clearly, “we abandoned the 
Eastern model because it did not suit us.”  Overall, for him, Marxism had “failed,” 
because it was “born in the nineteenth century,” but “cannot be applied in the modern 
world without some amendment.”  What Yugoslav leaders searched for, especially in 
times of crisis, was the proper reform that could reverse the negative situation facing the 
country.35 
Socialism was not dead yet.  As a worldview based on the “fundamental 
principles” of “social equality” and “freedom and democracy,” it still had enough support 
inside Yugoslavia in comparison to the tiny minority of people who wanted to impose “a 
heavy hand” to restore stability and prosperity to the country.36  In 1967, a poll showed 
that ninety-two percent of Yugoslavs were “satisfied with the political situation in 
Yugoslavia.”  Two decades later, that same question garnered a less-than enthusiastic 
fifty-five percent with twenty-seven percent of the respondents having expressed “fear” 
alongside twenty-three percent believing in “hope” for a better future.37  The fear of 
                                                 
35.  See Slobodan Stankovic, “Soviet System for Yugoslavia Rejected,” 8 August 1986, RAD 
Research Report.  HU OSA, 300–10–2, YSFI, Public Opinion Polls, 1988 [POP88], cn. 354. 
36.  “Yugoslavs Call for More Democracy, Unity to Solve Crisis,” Tanjug, 17 October 1986.  HU 
OSA, 300–10–2, YSFI POP88, cn. 354. 
37.  See “SFRY: Results Published of Zagreb Opinion Poll,” Borba, 23 November 1987, p. 5.  HU 
OSA, 300–10–2, YSFI POP88, cn. 354. 
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foreign invasion subsided, but the fear of being able to secure employment and raise a 
family took over.  Nearly two-thirds of all Yugoslav households expected to live worse in 
1988 than in 1987, while only seven percent had “hope” for a better quality of life.  Such 
statistics illuminated what a dire situation the people faced.  All this grew worse with the 
general agreement in stagnation and worsening in all fields of life such as social 
differences and conflict as well as the political status of the country.38  With ninety-two 
percent inflation in January of 1987, the people indeed had a great deal to fear.  Unlike 
the general state of the economy, though, inflation did not stagnate—it grew worse.  By 
August of the same year, inflation was marked at 110 percent and represented a 
tremendous challenge to the regime because it directly called into question the legitimacy 
of Tito’s worldview from a material standpoint—something a Marxist should have fixed 
long ago.39 
Yugoslav elites fretted over what they saw as a generation gap and a general 
disenchantment with the regime among young people.  After all, the economic problems 
hit young people—a large contingent of the population by the 1980s—the hardest and 
facilitated the replacement of hope in the future with a profound fear of what lay ahead.  
The plethora of polls conducted during the 1980s unveiled a lot about the situation inside 
of Yugoslavia.  One such poll asked young people where they would like to live if no 
Yugoslavia existed; they largely chose Western countries—33.6 percent for the United 
                                                 
38.  See “Poll Measures Reaction to Economic Crisis,” Tanjug, 17 July 1988, and “Будучност 
Земље,” Недељна Борба, 27–28 August 1988.  HU OSA, 300–10–2, YSFI POP88, cn. 354. 
39.  “Yugoslavs Pessimistic About Future,” Associated Press, 3 August 1987.  HU OSA, 300–10–
2, YSFI POP88, cn. 354. 
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States and another 15.8 percent for Australia—compared to a miniscule .9 percent having 
chosen the Soviet Union as their ideal society.  Young people clearly vied for Western 
liberalism—or, at least, Western goods, as their goal; moreover, Yugoslavs felt that the 
benefits of the Western system were possible if led by a progressive LCY vis-à-vis 
socialist self-management and an increased move to greater democracy, complete with 
multiple candidates.40  In stark contrasts to the situation at home, young Yugoslavs 
expressed their wish to achieve the economic prosperity Tito had promised long ago.  
University of Split professor Boris Vušković agreed, in 1984, “the main source of all 
problems is the economic crisis.”41  This corresponded to the absolute dire status that 
faced many Yugoslav families.  NIN—the weekly newsmagazine—determined that the 
“worsening living standards, unemployment, housing shortage,” and the “moral crisis,” 
combined to make 1984 a terrible year.42  What more proof of that than the 
overwhelming vote for Ronald Reagan as the personality of 1984.43 
While Yugoslavs largely expressed frustration and called for a change on the 
micro-level, some party elites still saw the problem in a state-driven system.  One 
member of the presidency of the federal Socialist Alliance of Yugoslavia, Jovan 
                                                 
40.  See Zlatko Gaš, “Radnici vole papu,” Intervju, 27 September 1985.  HU OSA, 300–10–2, 
YSFI, Public Opinion Polls, 1982–85 [POP 82–85], cn. 354. 
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Dejanović, argued in 1986, that it was “illusory to expect that that institutional changes 
and constitutional amendments” would alone solve the problems of Yugoslavia.  He 
admitted such in response to what he termed the control of “socially-controlled income” 
by “strongholds of mighty groupings”—in other words, leaders could not trust the people 
to rise to the occasion and defend a united Yugoslavia.  But, what is more telling in 
Dejanović’s statements was that he had essentially given up on the hallmark of Tito’s 
system—reform no longer matter, it was the state itself that had rotted beyond repair.44  
Most importantly, Dejanović was not alone. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The brutal dismemberment of Yugoslavia during the 1990s directed the world’s attention 
away from peace and joyous celebration in the wake of the collapse of the Berlin Wall 
and the Soviet Union’s retreat from competing in the Cold War and subsequent 
disappearance.  But, it is a mistake to assume that the Yugoslav leaders acted as cynics.  
They were dedicated communists with their own ideology that coalesced over more than 
forty years.  As soon as Stalin waved his little finger as part of his effort to remove Tito 
from power after ejecting Yugoslavia from the Cominform, Yugoslav ideology changed 
and kept on changing.45  Reaching out to the various ethnic groups under a state’s control 
                                                 
44.  Jovan Dejanović in “Vested Interests, Nationalism Said Hampering Yugoslavia’s 
Development,” Tanjug, 23 May 1986.  HU OSA, 300–10–2, YSFI POP 82–85, cn. 354. 
45.  See A. Ross. Johnson, The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case, 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972), p. 242.  “After 1953 Yugoslav Communist ideology developed a more 
integral, codified conception of socialist self-management, with its own philosophical assumptions, 
analytical categories, and terminology—much of which must often have seemed as unfamiliar to Soviet or 
Chinese Communist theorists as to Western non-Marxists.  After 1953, the philosophical component of the 
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was vital and sought to equalize the peoples in question and thus solidify the regime by 
removing political opposition and competing ideologies.46  A sort of democratization 
within the LCY also allowed, as the Yugoslavs eventually put into practice, the 
decentralization of the state and facilitated the path towards its eventual disappearance.  
Theorists argued that by including more people in a system “where there are communists 
who are active and united in activity,” positive results would appear.47  Furthermore, with 
a sound system in place in Yugoslavia, the LCY would emerge—according to Yugoslav 
theorists—as the model for communism around the world, having “opened the way for a 
genuine socialist democracy.”48  Nevertheless, who could imagine any such worldview as 
credible in 1990 as all of Eastern Europe and Eurasia seemingly clamored for change 
from a socio-economic system that had failed to deliver? 
The decentralization of the state, while fitting into Tito’s worldview, served as a 
mechanism for both containing and emphasizing nationalist tensions because on the one 
hand, Tito fought against particularism, but on the other, his reforms brought power away 
                                                                                                                                                 
ideology underwent a major transformation matching the doctrinal transformation examined in this study.  
Stalinist dialectical materialism and historical materialism were revised as Yugoslav philosophers drew 
increasingly on the non-Marxist philosophical tradition.  But, by 1966, when the most recent stage of 
political and economic reform in Yugoslavia was initiated, it was perhaps questionable whether a Yugoslav 
Communist ideology still existed at all … Self-management itself became a term of self-legitimization for a 
number of contending groups within the LCY.” 
46.  See Ivo Banac, National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics, (Ithaca, NY:  
Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 413. “Since [interwar] Yugoslavia’s national question was, more than 
anything, an expression of mutually exclusive national ideologies, the chances for its internal stability were 
not very good.” 
47.  “Aktuelni problemi izbornog sistema i uloga društveno-političkih organizacija u izbornom 
sistemu,” ASCG CK SKJ XXIII K.2 7, 1967, p. 13. 
48.  See Anton Bebler in Report of the First Asian Socialist Conference, (Rangoon: Asian 
Socialist Publication, 1953), p. 21. 
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from a strong center and into the hands of local elites.  Because decentralization enabled 
local folks to engage in decision-making, the ethnic character of the local party 
organizations necessarily stood in opposition to federal or other competing regional units.  
The ethnic key provided the federal government with a diverse foundation, but the reality 
within the regions—such as the Zadar region in Croatia—oftentimes resisted the 
manifestation of the ethnic key and only exacerbated tensions.  Moreover, the Yugoslav 
identity remained insignificant and when economic troubles reached a boiling point 
during the 1980s, people lost hope and confided their fears to local elites.  The full effects 
of this move showed themselves once “six million” Yugoslavs lived “on the edge or 
below the minimum subsistence” standards.49  Finally, elites in the JNA feared that the 
Territorial Defense Force (TDF)—the system arranged to complement the federal army 
with units drawn from the constituent republics—would not respond to the central 
government because of similar selfish interests.  Time proved those viewers correct 
because in the 1990s, not only did the TDF not respond to calls by the federal 
government for loyalty, but they also in fact formed the bases for new armies in the 
secessionist republics.  Nationalism did take the place of communism and filled the 
political vacuum that accompanied the confusion behind the end of the Cold War; 
unfortunately, for several East European and Eurasian states, the power of nationalism—
or at least aspects of it—still reigns supreme in the twenty-first century. 
                                                 
49.  Radmila Klikovac, “Socijalna pomoć svakom sedmom!” Večernji list, 13 March 1985.  HU 
OSA, 300–10–2, YSFI POP 82–85, cn. 354. 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF KEY LCY OFFICIALS, 19581 
 
Name Nationality Age Joined LCY Federal Position 
Kardelj, Edvard Slovene 49 1928 Vice President 
Ranković, Aleksandar Serb 50 1928 Vice President 
Gošnjak, Ivan Croat 50 1933 General 
Vukmanović, 
Svetozar 
Montenegrin 47 1935 Vice President 
Leskosek, Franc Slovene 62 1926  
Stambolić, Petar Serb 47 1933 Pres. Federal National 
Assembly 
Pučar, Đuro Bosnian-Serb 60 1922  
Koliševski, Lazar Macedonian 45 1935  
Bakarić, Vladimir Croat 47 1933  
Marinko, Miha Slovene 60 1924  
Jovanović, Blazo Montenegrin 52 1924  
Vešelinov, Jovan Serb 53 1923  
Begović, Vlajko Bosnian-Serb 54 1930  
Popivoda, Krsto Montenegrin 49 1933 Committee for internal 
affairs 
Popović, Koca Serb 51 1933 State Sec. Foreign Affairs
Žeković, Veljko Montenegrin 53 1934  
Bebler, Aleš Slovene Jew 52 1929 Pres. Committee Foreign 
Affairs 
Humo, Avdo Muslim, 
Bosnian-Serb
45 1935  
Mičunović, Veljko Montenegrin 43 1934 State Under Secretary 
Foreign Affairs 
Todorović, Mijalko Serb 46 1938  
Vlahović, Veljko Montenegrin 45 1935 Pres. Committee for 
Internal Rel. 
Krajger, Boris Slovene 46 1935  
                                                 
1.  Department of State Intelligence Report.  “After Tito: Forces of Cohesion and Division in the 
Union of Communist of Yugoslavia.”  26 November 1956.  Department of State Library Division  
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Karabegović, Osman Muslim, Serb 48 1932  
Arsov, Ljupčo Macedonian 49 1940  
Crvenkovski, Krste Macedonian 37 1940  
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APPENDIX B: ETHNICITY IN THE JNA, 1963 
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